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 Following the inauguration of the newly constructed capital of 
Brasília in April 1960, the former federal district and Brazilian capital of 
Rio de Janeiro was transformed into the city-state of Guanabara. 
Although Rio lost its status as the political capital of Brazil after nearly 
200 years, extensive urban renewal campaigns to modernize the city 
were employed by numerous politicians, planners, architects, artists, 
and ordinary residents to help restore Rio’s position as Brazil’s “true” 
capital city. This dissertation examines these urban renewal efforts in 
Guanabara from 1960 to 1975 - a period when Rio de Janeiro 
experienced its largest period of population and spatial growth.  
Whereas many of the urban renewal campaigns and projects for 
development prior to 1945 were intended to beautify, embellish, and 
  
“civilize” the city, the projects of the 1960s and 1970s were highly 
technical and revolved around integrating the automobile into the urban 
landscape. The measures of investment and resources devoted to 
modernizing and reforming the city during the Guanabara period were 
unprecedented for Rio de Janeiro, consequently resulting in significant 
spatial, social, cultural, and economic reorganization of the city.        
 “Tunnel Vision: Urban Renewal in Rio de Janeiro, 1960-1975” 
examines specific projects of urban renewal such as tunnels (Rebouças 
and Santa Bárbara), expressways, parks (Aterro do Flamengo), subways, 
overpasses, and beaches while also exploring the technocratic approach 
to urban planning which was demonstrated through attitudes and 
principles that often marginalized “non-expert” participation in reforming 
the city. Using diverse primary sources such as government and urban 
planning documents, as well as neighborhood association materials, this 
dissertation also considers broader historical issues such as the politics 
and culture of military regimes, as well as questions related to the built 
environment, comparative planning cultures, space, class, race, 
ethnicity, and popular culture. Furthermore, this study also argues that 
the politics and culture of urban planning in Rio de Janeiro during the 
Guanabara period mirrored many of the same political, cultural, and 
social tensions that existed throughout Brazil and Latin America before 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 After nearly 200 years as Brazil’s capital, the city of Rio de Janeiro 
was transformed into the city-state of Guanabara following the 
inauguration of the newly-constructed capital of Brasília in April 1960.  
Although Rio lost its status as the federal district and capital of Brazil, 
there were numerous politicians, planners, architects, technocrats, and 
residents profoundly determined to modernize, reform, and develop 
Guanabara’s urban infrastructure in order maintain Rio’s position as the 
“true” capital of Brazil.  During its short tenure as the city-state of 
Guanabara (1960-75), Rio de Janeiro experienced its most intense period 
of growth in population and urban development. The various measures of 
investment, resources, and effort devoted to modernizing and reforming 
the city-state were unprecedented and also contributed to 
transformations in the city’s space physically, culturally, and socially.        
 This dissertation will focus on the numerous large-scale forms of 
urban development and renewal in Rio de Janeiro (Guanabara) from 
1960 to 1975.  Whereas many of the urban renewal campaigns and 
projects for development prior to 1945 were intended to beautify, 
embellish, and “civilize” the city’s landscape and its inhabitants, the 
projects of the 1960s and 1970s were highly technical and differed 
aesthetically and philosophically from many of the major urban reforms 
of the Primeira República (1889-1930) and the Vargas years (1930-1945). 
Thus, not only is the scale and quantity of these projects noteworthy, but 
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so is the new technocratic approach to planning which was 
overwhelmingly dedicated to integrating the automobile into the urban 
landscape.  Furthermore, the politics of urban planning in Rio de Janeiro 
during the 1960s and 1970s also mirrored many of the same political, 
cultural, and social tensions that existed on the national level in Brazil 
before and after the military coup of 1964. Throughout this study I will 
focus upon specific projects of urban renewal and development in detail 
such as expressways, tunnels, roads, and parks while also considering 
the various spatial, political, socio-cultural, and economic consequences 
that these projects had for the city’s neighborhoods and residents during 
and after this time period.   
 Aside from examining the design, construction, and 
implementation of the numerous large-scale projects such as tunnels, 
expressways, overpasses, and a new urban park, I also intend to 
examine the factors and rationale behind the specific geographic 
locations for these projects as well as the numerous debates and studies 
that were conducted regarding the design and implementation of these 
projects.  Moreover, I will suggest that these projects were not only 
significant due to their large scale, but also the degree to which they 
drastically altered the spatial configuration of the city.  Thus, my 
dissertation considers how the construction of new forms of urban 
infrastructure (such as the enormous Túnel Rebouças) not only 
exemplified the new technocratic turn that planning took in Rio, but was 
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also a watershed for the socio-cultural as well as socio-economic 
constructions of space in the city.  Recently, certain Cariocas (residents 
of the city of Rio de Janeiro), journalists, and politicians from a variety of 
socio-cultural and political backgrounds have nostalgically viewed the 
Guanabara period as a golden age of urban reforms and public works 
that positively changed the city’s landscape.  Although it is important to 
acknowledge that urban renewal and development programs of the 
Lacerda and Negrão de Lima administrations during the 1960s did solve 
some of the problems that had plagued the city for many years, but 
much of this sentimentality is a product of the city’s current state of 
violence, crime, and urban chaos.   
 Of the three gubernatorial administrations in power during the 
tenure of the city-state of Guanabara, only the first two, Carlos Lacerda 
and Francisco Negrão de Lima, came to power through open democratic 
elections as a result of the limitations on the electoral system put in 
place by the military dictatorship in 1965.  Lacerda and Negrão invested 
a great deal of capital into urban development and reforms not only for 
political gain, but to show that Rio de Janeiro could still be a modern 
and economically viable region. Although Rio had been surpassed 
demographically and industrially by São Paulo, many politicians, 
engineers, and even residents wanted to demonstrate that the city of Rio 
de Janeiro would still serve as Brazil’s de facto capital city.  In numerous 
ways, Lacerda, Negrão de Lima, the planning community, and ordinary 
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citizens utilized urban planning and renewal as a means to reformulate 
Rio’s reputation as the most modern city within Brazil and Latin 
America.    
While my argument suggests that there was indeed real progress in 
modernizing the city’s infrastructure which transformed the spatial 
dynamics of the city, my approach does not infer that this period of Rio’s 
history should be viewed nostalgically or as a “golden age.” While Rio 
continued to be the cultural capital of Brazil, even after the inauguration 
of Brasília, immense and new modern forms of infrastructure could not 
solve the problems the city-state faced. Even with massive modernization 
and urban renewal, Rio still could not keep pace with the population 
explosion that continuously put pressures on the city’s utilities, roads, 
and other forms of infrastructure. Subsequently, increasing problems 
regarding petty and organized crime, violence, racism, lack of affordable 
housing, and the general lack of social peace which intensified during 
Rio’s period as the federal district in the 1950s, were not entirely solved 
by the large public works of the 1960s under Carlos Lacerda and 
Francisco Negrão de Lima.    
Likewise, I also will consider the role of local, national, and 
international politics and capital behind urban planning in Rio de 
Janeiro.  The role of transnational aid (such as the Alliance for Progress) 
in financing many of the urban development projects before and after the 
military coup of 1964 was a central element in the debates concerning 
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urban renewal amongst politicians, citizens, architects, and other 
technocrats.  This will be significantly discussed during Carlos Lacerda’s 
tenure in office from December 1960 to December 1965.  Lacerda, who 
was an extremely polemical, controversial and popular politician, was 
able to achieve the most rapid progress in terms of urban development in 
the history of the city, due to his ability to implement an administration 
that vested the majority of authority in departments and companies 
which his cabinet directly controlled.  In many ways, Lacerda intended to 
use his platform in office as a “tryout” for the 1965 presidential elections 
by establishing an administration built upon meritocracy, democracy, 
honesty, fiscal responsibility, and efficiency.  Through urban renewal, 
Lacerda wanted to show that he was Brazil’s hope for a democratic 
future, and accordingly, the new redeemer of his native Rio de Janeiro. 
Much to the dismay of millions of Brazilians, and Carlos Lacerda himself, 
these direct elections for the presidency would be put on hold for over 
twenty years, as the military régime ultimately seized power in April 
1964.   
Due to their political ideologies and party affiliations, all three 
governors of Guanabara were usually in opposition to those in power at 
the national level during most of their tenure in office.  This signified that 
during the lifetime of the city-state of Guanabara, Lacerda, Negrão, and 
Chagas all had an ambivalent relationship with the federal/military 
government, and were rarely given any significant financial assistance 
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from Brasília.  During Lacerda’s term in office, one major solution for this 
was to solicit international aid to help fund major urban reform projects, 
as well as to creatively invest in the state economy and raise taxes.  
Although urban reforms during Chagas Freitas’ term (1971-1975) did not 
approximate what Lacerda and Negrão were able to achieve on several 
levels, the military dictatorship’s pressure to end the existence of 
Guanabara and force the fusion with the state of Rio de Janeiro was 
paramount at that time.  Likewise, the election of Negrão de Lima as the 
governor of Guanabara in 1965 was a major factor behind the military’s 
Second Institutional Act (AI-2), which cancelled direct elections and 
banned political parties in Brazil - despite Negrão’s longtime friendship 
with military president General Castello Branco (1964-67). Chagas 
Freitas was indirectly elected as the governor of Guanabara in 1971 
under the legal opposition party (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro - 
MDB) and was forced to abandon the strategies that Lacerda and Negrão 
de Lima employed to revitalize the city-state.  As the only state governor 
from the opposition party in Brazil, Chagas’ administration attempted, 
under encouragement from the military’s technocrats, to reorganize 
Guanabara’s state administration similar to every other state in Brazil.  
Consequently, he was forced to largely abandon the strategies Lacerda 
and Negrão employed to govern Guanabara.  
   Additionally, I am interested in revealing the tensions that existed 
among urban planners, residents, and politicians regarding the 
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philosophy, role, and characteristics of urban planning in Rio de Janeiro. 
I will present a case study of this by examining Lacerda’s contraction of 
the Greek Firm, Doxiadis Associates, to create a growth management 
plan for the city-state of Guanabara until the year 2000.  Even before the 
research for the plan was conducted, the signing of the contract between 
the state of Guanabara and Doxiadis Associates created intense 
controversy among the various associations of engineers, architects, and 
politicians.  The plan that was prepared by both Brazilian and Greek 
researchers proposed new techniques and an emphasis on urban 
infrastructure rather than ideas of beautification and embellishment 
which existed at the beginning of the twentieth century.  Although the 
plan was never fully adopted and was quickly discredited by Negrão de 
Lima’s administration, I will argue that it has served as a reference point 
for city planning agendas from the late 1960s to the present as evidenced 
in Chapter 6.   
 The remainder of this chapter will present a general overview of the 
urban reforms of Rio de Janeiro up until Rio de Janeiro was transformed 
into the city-state of Guanabara following inauguration of Brasília in 
April 1960.  Before providing the basic background up until 1960, I will 
first situate my work within the historiographical and scholarly contexts 




1.1 Literature Review 
 Scholars interested in studying questions of urbanism and 
planning in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Latin America have produced a 
copious amount of scholarship on this topic over the last several 
decades. The historical literature on these topics has gained momentum 
since the early 1980s and has mainly been concerned with these 
questions within the time period of Brazil’s Primeira República (First 
Republic: 1889-1930), during which Rio de Janeiro along with other 
Brazilian and Latin American cities experienced their first major wave of 
growth due to urbanization, industrialization, immigration, and rural to 
urban migration. These factors, coupled with the wealth of archival and 
other forms of primary sources, have led to a rich historiography of 
urban life and society in Rio de Janeiro during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  
This scholarship has addressed many issues within the loosely 
defined field of urban history.1 One area in particular that has been 
                                                 
1 The historiography of urban planning and reforms in Rio de Janeiro during the 
Primeira República (1889-1930), particularly during Pereira Passos’ administration 
(1902-1906) is extensive.  For various examples see: José Murilho de Carvalho, Os 
Bestializados: O Rio De Janeiro E A República Que Não Foi  (São Paulo: Companhia das 
Letras, 1987); Jeffrey Needell, A Tropical Belle Époque: Elite Culture And Society In Turn-
Of-The-Century Rio De Janeiro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Oswaldo 
Porto Rocha and Lia de Aquino Carvalho A Era Das Demolições: Cidade Do Rio De 
Janeiro 1870-1920 -Contribuição Ao Estudo Das Habitações Populares:  Rio De Janeiro 
1886-1906 (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro – Secretaria 
Municipal de Cultura, 1995); Giovanna Rosso Del Brenna, ed., O Rio De Janeiro De 
Pereira Passos: Uma Cidade Em Questão II (Rio de Janeiro:  Index, 1985); Jaime Larry 
Benchimol, Pereira Passos: Um Haussmann Tropical (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da 
Cidade do Rio de Janeiro – Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, 1990);  Teresa Meade, 
Civilizing Rio:  Reform And Resistance In A Brazilian City 1889-1930 (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Christopher Boone, “Streetcars and Politics 
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investigated by historians is the construction, demolition, and sanitary 
conditions of popular housing by also integration questions regarding the 
role of ethnicity, race, citizenship, popular and elite culture, gender, 
sexuality, and public health into their analyses.  Moreover, many of these 
studies are also concerned with the broader questions of Brazilian 
national identity which were entwined with various scientific and 
philosophical ideas such as positivism, scientific racism, and eugenics.2    
The study of Rio’s architecture and built environment has received 
a fair amount of attention from scholars, as particular emphasis has 
been given to the influence, politics, and socio-cultural significance of 
during Pereira Passos’ tenure as mayor of Rio de Janeiro from 1902 to 
1906.3   This vast literature written by numerous scholars has drawn 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Rio de Janeiro:  Private Enterprise versus Municipal Government in the Provision of 
Mass Transit, 1903-1920,”  Journal of Latin American Studies 27 (1995): 343-365. For 
an overview of the role of the state and urban development law in Brazil see Edesio 
Fernandes, Law and Urban Change in Brazil (Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Company, 
1995); Mauro Kleiman, “De Getúlio a Lacerda:  Um “Rio de Obras” transforma a Cidade 
do Rio de Janeiro:  As Obras Públicas de Infra-Estrutura Urbana na Construção do 
“novo Rio” no Período 1938-1965” (Ph.D. Thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade 
de Arquitetura e Urbanismo, 1994); Alberto Gawryszewski, “”A Agonia de Morar”:  
Urbanização e Habitação na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro (DF) – 1945/50”  (Ph.D. Thesis, 
Universidade de São Paulo, Departamento de História, 1996).  
      
2 For a general overview of the questions of national identity and science see Nancy 
Stepan, The Hour of Eugenics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
 
3There is also a vast historiography on these issues within other Latin American cities.  
For some examples, see Diego Armus and Juan Suriano, “The Housing Issue In The 
Historiography Of Turn-Of-The Century Buenos Aires,”  Journal of Urban History 24 
(March 1998): 416-428; D. Davis. “The Social Construction of Mexico City: Political 
conflict and urban development, 1950-1966,” Journal of Urban History 24:3 (March 
1998): 364-415; idem, Urban Leviathan: Mexico City in the Twentieth Century 
(Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1994);  Henry Dietz, Urban Poverty, Political 
Participation, and the State:  Lima 1970-1990 (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1998);  John Lear and Diego Armus,  “The Trajectory Of Latin American Urban History.”  
Journal of Urban History 24:3 (March 1998): 291-301; Richard Morse and Jorge Hardoy, 
Rethinking the Latin American City (Baltimore:  JHU Press, 1992); Anton Rosenthal, 
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upon numerous political, diplomatic, architectural, and judicial archival 
sources and been written within various theoretical frameworks that 
raise broader questions regarding the dynamics of public and private 
space, elite and popular culture, the role of science, and inspiration and 
influences for urban renewal campaigns.   
During the 1970s and 1980s, many scholars, particularly urban 
geographers, produced studies on the transformation of urban space in 
Rio de Janeiro.4  One publication in particular was Maurício de Almeida 
Abreu’s work, A Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro.  Abreu’s work is 
noteworthy because it stands as the only comprehensive history of urban 
space in Rio de Janeiro from the colonial period to the mid-twentieth 
century.   Furthermore, Abreu’s study nicely integrates a socio-political 
narrative of the city’s history with an excellent analysis of the 
demographic and spatial transformations that is often absent or vague in 
many of the studies written within the paradigms of social or political 
history.  While Abreu’s work is fairly descriptive and quantitative, he also 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Spectacle, Fear and Protest:  A Guide to the History of Urban Public Space in Latin 
America,” Social Science History 24:1 (Spring 2000): 33-73; Richard Walter, Politics and 
Urban Growth in Buenos Aires, 1910-42 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1993).   
 
4 For a vast overview and lengthy bibliography on the scholarly production of urban 
geography in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro, see Maurício de Almeida Abreu, “O Estudo 
geográfico da cidade no Brasil:  Evolução e Avaliação. Contribuição à história do 
Pensamento Geográfico Brasileiro,” Revista Brasileira de Geografia 56:1-4  (Jan-Dez 
1994): 21-122.  The work of Lysia Bernardes and Maria Therezinha de Segadas Soares, 
the pioneers of urban geography in Rio de Janeiro is worth mentioning.  Their 
influential essays and research in the 1950s and 1960s served as a reference point for 
the early and following generations of scholars interested in studying  urban space in 
Rio de Janeiro. A collection of their most important essays from the 1950s and 1960s 
can be found in Rio de Janeiro: Cidade e Região (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da Cidade do 
Rio de Janeiro – Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, 1995). 
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suggests that Rio’s development and spatial evolution are largely 
attributable to capitalistic initiatives taken by actors such as 
transportation companies, real estate firms, and big business. Abreu’s 
Marxist interpretation of Rio’s spatial development demonstrates the 
predominant theoretical influences in the field of historical geography in 
Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s, which also influenced many of his 
colleagues and students.    
Aside from the work on Rio de Janeiro in the 1980s written by 
urban geographers and other social scientists, a significant output of 
scholarly and even “popular” literature regarding the history and memory 
of streets, neighborhoods, and buildings from the 1960s to the 1990s 
emerged as a result of the growth of Brazilian universities and public and 
private planning firms.5 Furthermore, some of the more noteworthy 
research and scholarship pertaining to communities, neighborhoods, 
space, politics, and urban renewal can be attributed to the established 
                                                 
5 Some of the more popular literature and those regarding city landmarks and spaces 
are Dora Alcântara, “Praça XV e imediações:  Estudo de uma área histórico no Rio de 
Janeiro,” Revista do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional  20 (1984): 114-121; Nilde 
Nersen Aragão, Vila Isabel:  Terra de Poetas e Compositores. (Rio de Janeiro: Conquista 
Editora, 1997); Maurício Lissovsky and Paulo Sérgio Moraes de Sá, “O Novo em 
Construção:  O Edifício-Sede do Ministério da Educação e Saúde e a disputa do espaço 
arquiteturável nos anos 30.”  Revista Rio de Janeiro 1:3 (May-August 1986): 17-29; 
Isabel Lustosa, “Catete:  Singularidades de um Bairro,” Revista Rio de Janeiro 1:1 
(December 1985): 25-33; Wilma Mangabeira, “Memories of “Little Moscow (1943-64):  
Study of a public housing experiment for industrial workers in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,”  
Social History 17:2 (May 1992): 271-287; Roberto Moura, Tia Ciata e a Pequena África 
no Rio de Janeiro, 2nd Edition.  (Rio de Janeiro:  Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, 
1995); Robert Moses Pechman, editor.  Olhares sobre a Cidade. (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora 
UFRJ, 1994); Rachel Sisson, “Marcos históricos e configurações espaciais:  um estudo 
de caso os centros do Rio,” Arquitetura Revista 2 (1986): 57-81; Elizabeth Dezouzart 
Cardoso, Lilian Fessler Vaz, Maria Paula Albernaz, Mario Aizen, and Robert Moses 
Pechman, editors.  Saúde, Gamboa, e Santo Cristo - História dos Bairros (Rio de Janeiro:  
João Fortes Engenharia / Editora Index, 1987).  
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and young urban anthropologists, ethnographers, sociologists, and 
journalists who conducted field research in various parts of Rio de 
Janeiro from the late 1960s to the 1980s.6 Scholars such as Carlos 
Nelson Ferreira dos Santos and his staff at the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Administração Municipal (IBAM) in the 1970s and early 1980s worked in 
an interdisciplinary fashion to tackle some of Rio’s most pressing issues 
such as urban renewal and development, urban social movements, and 
the politics of urban planning.  The work produced by Carlos Nelson and 
his team at IBAM often challenged influential claims by internationally 
known theoreticians and suggested that Rio’s problems, both on macro 
and micro levels, could not be explained by adhering rigidly to a 
proposed theory of urban space. Nonetheless, many scholars have 
framed their studies within the parameters of theoretical frameworks 
developed by internationally known scholars such as Manuel Castells, 
David Harvey, Marshall Berman, Henri Lefebvre, and Milton Santos.7
                                                 
6 Certainly worth mentioning here is the work of the late Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos 
Santos and his research team at the Instituto Brasileiro de Administração Municipal 
(IBAM) in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  For examples of his research see Carlos 
Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, Movimentos Urbanos no Rio de Janeiro. (Rio de Janeiro: 
Jorge Zahar, 1981); “Pesquisa sobre uso do Solo e Lazer no Bairro do Catumbi, Rio de 
Janeiro,” Revista SPAM - Sistema de Planejamento e de Administração Metropolitana. 7:  
(Outubro 1981):  3-12; Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos and Arno Vogel, Quando a 
Rua Vira Casa,   (Rio de Janeiro:  IBAM/FINEP, 1985).  An interesting take on the 
dilemmas of urban renewal can be seen in the work by journalist Guida Nunes, 
Catumbi: Rebellião de um Povo Traído (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1978).  For 
biographical and career related information on Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos see 
Américo Freire and Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, organizadores, Capítulos da Memória do 
Urbanismo Carioca, (Rio de Janeiro:  Folha Seca, 2002), Chapter 3, “O arquiteto que 
virou antropólogo:  Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos,” 106-132. 
 
7 For some background on the various theories and ideas regarding urban space see 
David Harvey, The Urban Experience (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); 
Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
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Some of the most influential and important work on urban Rio de 
Janeiro has come from scholars such as Janice Perlman and Licia do 
Prado Valladares who were interested in the growth and socio-cultural 
relations of favelas and their residents.8  Literature focusing on favelas 
in the 1930s and 1940s originally centered on the origins and initial 
settlement patterns of these communities by also examining how they 
were hotbeds for criminal and unhygienic lifestyles. By the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, revisionist interpretations emerged as scholars and 
activists began to argue that the favelas and their residents were 
integral, rather than marginal, components to urban society.  The 
literature on favelas had also examined eradication and resettlement 
                                                                                                                                                 
1983); Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air (New York: Penguin Books, 
1982); Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers, 1991); 
Milton Santos, A Natureza do Espaço (São Paulo: HUCITEC, 1999); Michael Peter Smith, 
Transnational Urbanism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); and Edward Soja, 
Postmodern Geographies (London: Verso, 1989). 
 
8 Favelas are shantytowns that have developed since the early 20th century on Rio de 
Janeiro’s ubiquitous hillsides.  They are different from tenement-style houses which are 
known as cortiços in Brazil or conventillos in the rest of Latin America.  On favelas and 
their residents, see Licia do Prado Valladares, Passa-Se Uma Casa: Análise do Programa 
de Remoção de Favelas do Rio de Janeiro, 2nd Edition (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 
1980);  Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1976); Lucien Parisse, Favelas do Rio de 
Janeiro: Evolução e Sentido (Rio de Janeiro, Cadernos CENPHA, 1969);  Recent historical 
literature on the growth and social relations of favelas can be seen in Julio César Pino, 
Family and Favela:  The Reproduction of Poverty in Rio de Janeiro (Westport:  Greenwood 
Press, 1997); idem, “Dark Mirror of Modernization:  The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro in the 
Boom Years, 1948-1960,” Journal of Urban History 22:4 (May 1996): 419-453.; Ayse 
Pamuk and Paulo Fernando A. Cavallieri, “Alleviating Urban Poverty in a Global City: 
New Trends in Upgrading Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas,” Habitat International 22:4 (1998): 
449-462; Maurício de Almeida Abreu, “Reconstruindo uma História Esquecida:  Origem 
e Expansão inicial das Favelas do Rio de Janeiro,”  Espaço & Debates 37 (1994): 34-47; 
Lilian Fessler Vaz, “Dos Cortiços às Favelas e aos Edifícios de Apartamentos -  A 
Modernização da Moradia no Rio de Janeiro,” Análise Social 29:3 (1994): 581-597; idem, 
Modernidade e Moradia:  Habitação Coletiva no Rio de Janeiro, Sécculos XIX e XX (Rio de 




campaigns as well as recent strategies to improve and develop the 
favelas infrastructure.  Additionally, various studies have highlighted the 
roles of race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, crime, and hygiene, and how 
they factor into the daily life of the favelas as well as Rio’s overall cultural 
and social identity as a city. 
Scholars in the fields of architectural history, urbanism, and 
historic preservation have also made major contributions to the study of 
planning and urbanism in Rio de Janeiro.  The predominant themes 
emerging from these fields have centered on the birth of city planning, 
aesthetic and technical influences among planners and architects, and 
analyses of certain master plans and designs for the city.9  Additionally, 
there also exists a good deal of literature that is highly technical and 
pertains to the actual engineering, implementation, and design of certain 
forms of planning.  
Although there is a wealth of literature and archival sources that 
exist for Rio’s urban history, the overwhelming majority of this material 
pertains to the city up until 1945.  Accordingly, very few studies have 
considered Rio’s urban history once it lost its status as a federal district 
                                                 
9 David Underwood, “Alfred Agache, French Sociology, and Modern Urbanism in France 
and Brazil,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians (June 1991), 130-166; 
Norma Evenson, Two Brazilian Capitals: Architecture and Urbanism in Rio de Janeiro 
and Brasília (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Vera Rezende, Planejamento e 
Ideologia:  Quatro Planos Para a Cidade do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro:  Civilização 
Brasileira, 1982); Maria Cristina da Silva Leme, editor, Urbanismo no Brasil: 1895-1965 
(São Paulo:  FUPAM/Studio Nobel, 1999); Marcos Tognon, Arquitetura Italiana no Brasil: 
A Obra de Marcello Piacentini (Campinas: Editora UNICAMP, 1999); Margareth da Silva 
Pereira,  “Pensando a metrópole moderna: os planos de Agache e Le Corbusier para o 
Rio de Janeiro,”  In Cidade, Povo e Nação, edited by Luiz César de Queiroz Ribeiro and 
Robert Pechman, (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1996) 363-375. 
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and national capital to Brasília in 1960. Even the aforementioned work of 
Maurício de Almeida Abreu goes into little detail or discussion of the 
period following 1960.  Much of this can be largely attributed to the 
difficulty of finding primary sources in the main archives, institutes, and 
libraries.  With the fusion of the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, 
many official documents, maps, plans, photos, and other source material 
were either lost, destroyed, misplaced, or perhaps even merged with 
active documentation that is not yet available to the public.   
While there is still very little historical literature regarding the role 
of planning and urbanism in the post federal district and capital years 
(1960 to present), excellent studies of the political culture and the 
transition from capital to city-state have been published. 10  The work of 
Marly Silva da Motta has focused on various facets of political culture 
during the Guanabara period by examining the creation of the city-state 
of Guanabara and its importance culturally and politically in the 
aftermath of the inauguration of Brasília.  Additionally, Motta’s work also 
examines the characteristics and significance of Lacerdismo and 
                                                 
10 To gain insight into the political culture and composition of the State of Guanabara 
see Marly Silva da Motta  Saudades da Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora Fundação 
Getúlio Vargas, 2000); idem Rio de Janeiro:  de Cidade-Capital a Estado da Guanabara 
(Rio de Janeiro:  Editora FGV/ALERJ, 2001); Carlos Eduardo Sarmento, organizer, 
Chagas Freitas (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1999); Francisco 
Manoel de Mello Franco, O Governo Chagas Freitas: Uma Perspectiva Nacional Através 
de Uma Experiência Local (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1977);  A 
recently published source regarding fusion and the newly created state of Rio de 
Janeiro since 1975 is  Américo Freire, Carlos Eduardo Sarmento, and Marly Silva da 
Motta, organizadores, Um Estado em Questão:  Os 25 anos do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de 
Janeiro:  Editora FGV/ALERJ, 2001); Marieta de Moraes Ferreira and Mario Grynszpan, 
“A Volta do Filho Pródigo ao lar Paterno?  A Fusão do Rio de Janeiro,” In Marieta de 
Moraes Ferreira, coordenadora, Rio de Janeiro: Uma Cidade na História, (Rio de Janeiro:  
Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2000) 117-137. 
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Chaguismo – the two distinct political styles that were cultivated by the 
first and third governors of Guanabara.   Finally, Motta’s work also offers 
a glimpse of Guanabara’s changing political position within the Brazilian 
Republic before and after the military coup in 1964. There have been 
some published debates regarding the subsequent transition from city-
state to fusion with the state of Rio de Janeiro in 1975. Nonetheless, 
most of these studies are overwhelmingly concerned with constituencies, 
voting, and other forms of political culture in Guanabara, and only 
briefly broach factors such as urban planning, development, and urban 
space.  
The work of Angela Moulin S. Penalva Santos presents an excellent 
overview of the economic and financial background of urban development 
schemes during the fifteen year existence of the state of Guanabara at 
the macro level; although it is rather general in regards to the actual 
projects and the physical, social, and cultural space within the city-state.  
Santos’ work investigates how the new city-state government strategically 
used urban development not only to redevelop the city’s infrastructure 
and image, but to also stimulate and recondition a staggering economy in 
a state and area that many thought were not economically viable.11  
Santos’ work is also nicely complemented by Mauricio Perez’s recent 
                                                 
11 Angela Moulin S. Penalva Santos, Economia, Espaço, e Sociedade no Rio de Janeiro 
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2003), Chapter 6.  Also see Angela 
Moulin S. Penalva Santos, “Planejamento e Desenvolvimento:  O Estado da Guanabara 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, FAU/USP, 1990).  The recent work of Mauro Osorio also 
investigates Rio’s economic development from the 1950s to present in Mauro Osorio, 
Rio Nacional, Rio Local:  Mitos e Visões da crise Carioca e Fluminense (Rio de Janeiro:  
Editora SENAC Rio, 2005). 
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work on the origins and organization of Guanabara’s administrative 
model during Lacerda’s term. Heavily quantitative, Perez’s work 
considers how Lacerda attempted to implement a progressive and 
efficient state administration which would aid in the rebirth of the city 
and promote his future political aspirations.12
My dissertation not only examines the logistics and details behind 
the design, planning, and engineering of the numerous projects 
constructed in Rio de Janeiro during the 1960s and 1970s, but also aims 
to consider their broader socio-cultural, spatial, and economic 
implications.  One way that I feel my study differs from the previous work 
is its incorporation of various archival and primary sources.  Moreover, 
my interdisciplinary approach will equally consider issues such as space 
and the built environment rather than approach the questions solely 
within the paradigms of social, economic, and political history. 
Throughout the main chapters, I will discuss how meanings and 
interpretations of space differed among planners, engineers, politicians, 
and residents.  According to geographer David Harvey, this can be 
explained through ideas such as the appropriation of space: “the way in 
which space is used and occupied by individuals, classes, or other social 
groupings, as well as the domination of space: “the way in which 
individuals or powerful groups dominate the organization and production 
                                                 
12 Mauricio Dominguez Perez, “Estado da Guanabara: Gestão e Estrutura 
Administrativa do Governo Carlos Lacerda” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Universidade Federal do 
Rio de Janeiro, 2005). 
 17
 
of space so as to exercise a greater degree of control over the friction of 
distance or over the manner in which space is appropriated by 
themselves or others.”13   One brief case that highlights this issue is the 
Túnel Rebouças. This tunnel provided the first major link between the 
zona norte and zona sul, but represented different meanings of space for 
different people. Engineers and planners saw this tunnel as an 
engineering marvel that “conquered” Rio’s daunting topography; whereas 
politicians declared it as a symbol of unity that would link the two 
regions of the city.  However, many residents saw it as a new form of 
infrastructure that distinguished the north from the south on social, 
cultural, and economic levels.  Although politicians and planners 
advocated the tunnel as a project that would symbolically and literally 
unite the two regions of the city and alleviate the ubiquitous traffic jams, 
it was not until the mid 1980s that the public buses regularly began to 
travel through the tunnel.  This is one very brief example of how I intend 
to delve into the political, cultural, spatial, and social consequences of 
the urban development projects in Guanabara.  In order to fully 
understand the significance of the myriad of urban renewal projects of 
the 1960s, I will first present a brief sketch of some of the major 
development plans that took place in Rio de Janeiro from 1930 to 1960.  
Subsequently, Chapter Two will extend upon this material by providing 
an in-depth analysis of Rio’s neighborhoods, zones, topography, and 
                                                 
13 Harvey, 263-64. 
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socio-cultural climate around the time of the creation of the new state of 
Guanabara in April 1960.  
1.2 Urban Planning in Rio from 1930 to 1960: A Brief Sketch  
Many of the urban reforms that were initiated in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro from 1930-60 are rooted in the “master” plan for the city 
designed in 1930 by the French urbanist, Donat Alfred Agache.  Often 
referred to as the Plano Agache, this study’s intent was to reorganize the 
economic, social, cultural, and civic space of Rio de Janeiro.14  One 
major objective of the Plano Agache was to prescribe a growth 
management plan for Rio de Janeiro, while also remodeling and 
beautifying the city to reflect its status as capital of a modern Brazil. A 
cross between the ideas of the city-beautiful and city-practical 
movements that emerged at the turn of the century, Agache’s plan for Rio 
de Janeiro had an integral role in Rio’s city planning between 1930 and 
1960 which has attracted attention from various scholars.15
                                                 
14 The official title of the Plano Agache is Cidade do Rio de Janeiro: Extensão, 
Remodelação, Embellezamento (Rio de Janeiro: Foyer Bresilien, 1930).    
 
15 For some good overviews of the actual plan and Agache’s influence on urban planning 
in Brazil see Fernando Diniz Moreira, “Shaping Cities, Building a Nation: Alfred Agache 
and the Dream of Modern Urbanism in Brazil (1920-1950), (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2004); David Underwood, “Alfred Agache, French Sociology, 
and Modern Urbanism in France and Brazil,” Journal of the Society of Architectural 
Historians (June 1991), 130-166; Norma Evenson, Two Brazilian Capitals: Architecture 
and Urbanism in Rio de Janeiro and Brasília, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 
40-52;  Margareth da Silva Pereira, “Pensando a Metrópole Moderna: Os Planos de 
Agache e Le Corbusier para o Rio de Janeiro.”  In Cidade, Povo e Nação: A Gênese do 
Urbanismo Moderno, editors Robert Moses Pechman and Luiz Queiroz de Ribeiro  (Rio de 
Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1996), 363-375.  Vera Rezende, Planejamento e Ideologia:  
Quatro Planos Para a Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, (Rio de Janeiro:  Civilização Brasileira, 
1982). Maurício de Almeida Abreu, Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro, 3rd Edition, (Rio 
de Janeiro: IPLANRIO/Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, 1997), 86-91. 
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 It was the hospitality of Antônio Prado Junior, the mayor of Rio de 
Janeiro from 1926-1930, which first landed Agache in Brazil.  Initially 
invited in 1927 to deliver several lectures on urbanism and planning, 
Agache subsequently ended up producing a comprehensive plan for 
Brazil’s capital city over a three-year period.  Often cited as the first 
comprehensive plan for Rio de Janeiro, the Agache Plan studied Rio’s 
daunting topography using aerial photography, and also analyzed the 
city’s demographic growth in an historical fashion.  Inspired by the 
traditions of the Beaux-Arts and the Hausmann reforms of Paris, Agache 
proposed a grandiose renewal scheme mainly for the downtown (centro) 
area of Rio.16   
Agache suggested that Brazil’s capital city did not possess the 
monumental qualities that a capital city of its stature should display.  
Agache accentuated this point by drawing attention to the various 
government buildings and ministries that were arbitrarily scattered 
throughout the city.  Thus, Agache believed that Rio de Janeiro was a 
capital city that was disorganized spatially and lacking monumental 
qualities.17 According to Norma Evenson, “Agache sought to create 
within Rio a series of monumental civic complexes – symbolic focal 
                                                 
16 This would be the second time that the city of Rio de Janeiro would attempt to reform 
under the influence of French forms of urbanism.  The most celebrated (and studied) 
period was during the administration of Mayor Pereira Passos from 1902-1906.  For 
some examples of this scholarship on urban reforms in Belle Époque Rio, see the works 
in footnote 1. 
 
17 Rachel Esther Figner Sisson, “Rio de Janeiro, 1875-1945: The Shaping of a New 
Urban Order.”  The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts 21 (1995), 147. 
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points in which the authority of the state could be embodied in 
appropriate architectural dignity.”18     
Part of Agache’s plan to transform Rio into a monumental capital 
city was to design certain specialized districts and praças (squares) in the 
downtown area (centro). Agache proposed a new distribution of space 
and zoning where government ministries, embassies, and the banking 
and business sectors were to be located.  Agache believed the flattened 
area of the Morro do Castelo would be an ideal location to house some of 
these entities.19  On the northern fringe area of the centro, he proposed 
that the Praça da Bandeira would serve as one of the foci of the 
redevelopment scheme.  Another ambitious idea was to construct a 
grand Porta do Brasil (Gateway to Brazil) along an aterro (landfill) created 
by the razing of the Morro do Santo Antônio.  The Gateway to Brazil was 
proposed as a hemicyclical plaza, 350x250m in area, opening towards 
the bay and would act as a site for military parades, civic demonstrations 
and as a place to welcome and receive national and international 
guests.20  Agache planned the Gateway to Brazil to operate as the ‘’post” 
ceremonial, governmental, and monumental center that Rio lacked.21  As 
                                                 
18 Evenson, 43. 
 
19 The Morro do Castelo was home to many working-class people that was eventually 
leveled or razed during Mayor Carlos Sampaio’s administration from 1920-22.  Once 
leveled in 1922, this area was used for the Exhibitions of Brazil’s Centennial 
Celebrations.  
 
20 Evenson, 46. 
 
21 A quote from Agache found in Underwood, 151. 
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a complement to the Gateway to Brazil, palaces of fine arts, commerce, 
and industry would surround the main plaza.   
The reorganization of urban and civic space in the Plano Agache 
included a triangular system of boulevards and avenues to complement 
the Gateway, Praça da Bandeira, and the new specialized districts.  Two 
of the avenues that were part of this scheme, the Avenida Central (later 
named Rio Branco) and the Avenida Mem de Sá, were already in place 
due to the reforms under the Pereira Passos regime at the beginning of 
the twentieth century.22  The third axis of this plan was to link the 
Avenida Central and the newly constructed financial and commercial 
centers with the Praça da Bandeira and the rail zone via a mega 
boulevard.  Almost ten years after the completion of the Plano Agache, 
this mega boulevard would finally be constructed and named the Avenida 
Presidente Vargas.   
 The Plano Agache was Rio’s first comprehensive official master 
plan.  It provided meticulous details about the city and proposed highly 
detailed and monumental ideas for reorganizing Rio’s urban and civic 
space. As a comprehensive plan, the Plano Agache was never 
implemented given the change in national and local administrations 
brought about by the October 1930 revolution led by Getúlio Vargas.   
Indeed, the plan was officially outlawed in 1934 under Getúlio Vargas 
and Mayor Pedro Ernesto.  With the nationalist climate of the Vargas 
                                                 




period, the Plano Agache came to signify the imperialist influences and 
foreign initiatives of the Primeira República on several levels.  Aside from 
the French architectural influences, architectural historian David 
Underwood stresses how Agache believed that not only should Rio de 
Janeiro be a monumental capital city, but could evolve into a “paradise” 
for European tourists.23  Constructing many of Agache’s plans would 
result in the displacement of many working class Cariocas who Vargas 
hoped to win-over for his own political support. Nonetheless, the Agache 
Plan would still provide inspiration for planners, politicians, and 
engineers for a number or years, and even during Vargas’ Estado Novo 
(1937-45). 
Beginning with its construction during Pereira Passos’ 
administration (1902-1906), the Avenida Central was considered the 
main civic space of the city and symbol of the new Brazilian Republic’s 
obsession with order and progress.  The Avenida Central (now called 
Avenida Rio Branco), which extended from the Praça Mauá to the 
Avenida Beira-Mar, contained important cultural institutions such as the 
Museu das Belas Artes, the Biblioteca Nacional, and the Teatro 
Municipal.  It also was the main corridor for civic commemorations and 
parades of great importance for a number of years.  One project that was 
proposed during the Passos government that was never carried out was 
the construction of a large avenue between the Cais dos Mineiros and the 
                                                 
23 Underwood, 158. 
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Largo do Matadouro (Praça da Bandeira).24  This avenue, which was also 
proposed in the Plano Agache and even in a modified version under 
Mayor Carlos Sampaio (1920-22), would eventually be constructed under 
Mayor Henrique Dodsworth (1937-45) and be called the Avenida 
Presidente Vargas.25  This grand boulevard not only provided a direct 
link between the northern and central zones of the city, but also had a 
great impact on the civic, social, cultural, and economic activities of the 
city for many years. 
During the administration of Pedro Ernesto (1931-36), many of the 
urban reforms such as the Plano Agache and the Plano de Obras da 
Comissão da Cidade were outlawed.  It was not until Vargas appointed 
Henrique Dodsworth to serve as mayor of the Distrito Federal in 1937 
that these programs were revived. Under Dodsworth, the idea of 
constructing a large boulevard between the Avenida Rio Branco and the 
zona norte was reconsidered by the Serviço Técnico do Plano da Cidade 
in 1938.  Approval to construct and make way for this large mega 
boulevard came into law in 1940.  The construction, from April 19, 1941 
to September 7, 1944, was heavily financed by the Banco do Brasil and 
included the demolition of 600 buildings (including the palace of the 
Federal Government) and three colonial churches; São Pedro, Bom Jesus 
                                                 
24 Evelyn F. Werneck Lima, Avenida Presidente Vargas: Uma Drástica Cirurgia  (Rio de 
Janeiro: Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, Turismo e Esportes, Departamento Geral de 
Documentação e Informação Cultural, Divisão de Editoração, 1990), 23.   
 
25 Lima, 28.  The proposal under Sampaio was to link Avenida Rio Branco with the 
Praça da República which was significantly shorter than the proposal during than 
Passos’ and Agache’s.    
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do Calvário, and São Domingos.26  Inaugurated on September 7, 1944 
(Independence Day), the Avenida Presidente Vargas was a significant 
watershed in the history of the city of Rio de Janeiro.  For the first time, 
a direct link between the north zone and the centro was established 
which permitted better circulation of streetcar and automobile traffic.  
Symbolically, the new avenue represented a new arena for civic and 
official commemorations.  Four lanes in width, Avenida Vargas became 
lined with new buildings such as the new rail station (Dom Pedro II) and 
the Ministério de Guerra (Palácio Duque de Caxias).  Although the 
Avenida Central still retained a certain stature in the urban fabric of the 
city, the Avenida Presidente Vargas symbolized a Rio that extended to the 
northern and suburban areas of the city, which eventually extended to 
the interior of Brazil.  Even though the central region of the city would 
still predominate in the financial, commercial, and cultural activities of 
the city, the Avenida Vargas enabled the city to grow outward and 
facilitate the access between the zona norte and centro regions.  
Another project that connected the central zone of Rio with the 
outer suburbs and interior of Brazil was the Avenida Brasil.  Inaugurated 
in 1946, the Avenida Brasil was partially constructed over a landfill 
(aterro) and allowed a better circulation of traffic to the Rio-São Paulo 
and Rio-Petrópolis highways.  Furthermore, it established a better link to 
the central zone from the Leopoldina suburbs of the city and also 
                                                 
26 José de Oliveira Reis, “50 Anos da Avenida Presidente Vargas,” Revista Municipal de 
Engenharia XIX (Janeiro-Dezembro 1994), 7-9. 
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triggered the growth of industry in the suburban areas of the city.  
Fifteen kilometers long and four lanes wide, the Avenida Brasil stretched 
from the Rua São Cristóvão and Avenida Rio de Janeiro (Port Area) to the 
Avenida das Bandeiras (later Avenida Brasil) and the Rio-Petrópolis 
Highway.27
With a new “theatre of power” such as the Avenida Presidente 
Vargas and a new artery like the Avenida Brasil connecting Rio with its 
suburbs and the interior of Brazil, the reforms during the Dodsworth 
administration (1937-45) considerably altered the spatial characteristics 
of the city of Rio de Janeiro.28  Not only did these two avenues change 
the circulation of transportation throughout the city, they also played an 
integral part in the transformation of Rio’s industrial and residential 
space.  The numerous demolitions that occurred to make way for the 
Avenida Presidente Vargas were largely responsible for this as factories 
and offices occupied by the textile and furniture industries chose to 
relocate to areas on the fringes of the central district (Estácio, São 
Cristóvão, Lapa) or move out to the suburban areas along the Avenida 
Brasil or the Central and Leopoldina Rail Lines. 
Simultaneously, residential patterns were also altered in Rio 
because of the new grand boulevard.  Many people who lost their homes 
and apartments due to the construction moved to nearby areas such as 
                                                 
27 Maria Cristina da Silva Leme, editor, Urbanismo no Brasil: 1895-1965 (São Paulo: 
FUPAM/Studio Nobel, 1999), 368. 
 
28 O Teatro do Poder (Theatre of Power) is a concept that Lima uses in Chapter 5.  
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Catumbi, Estácio, and São Cristóvão, while others “relocated” to the zona 
norte, the suburbs, and various favelas. By the mid 1940s, the south 
zone of Rio, particularly Copacabana, started to experience a “vertical 
invasion” with the construction of high-rise apartment buildings and the 
demolition of the older one and two-story homes.  Furthermore, this 
“vertical invasion” created chaotic conditions and precarious growth due 
mainly to little regulation of land use or building codes. With the 
declining population of the central zone of Rio due to the reforms and 
newly constructed avenues, many neighborhoods began to develop into 
sub-centers with their own commercial, cultural, and civic culture that 
would rival that of the central area.  The districts that developed into 
major sub-centers by the end of the 1940s were Tijuca in the zona norte 
(Praça Saenz Peña), Copacabana in the zona sul, Méier and Madureira in 
the suburbs.29  Tijuca and Copacabana emerged as products of the real-
estate boom and verticalization projects, whereas Méier and Madureira 
owed their status to being located on the rail lines in the more distant 
suburban regions of the city.  More than before, certain areas developed 
their own social, commercial, and cultural identities independent of the 
traditional and historic central area of the city.  These changes came 
about not only as a result of the overall political economy of Brazil, but 
                                                 
29 For more details see Maria Therezinha de Segadas Soares, “Bairros, Bairros 
Suburbanos e Subcentros,” In Lysia Bernardes and Maria Therezinha de Segadas 
Soares, Rio de Janeiro: Cidade e Região, (Rio de Janeiro: Secretaria Municipal de 
Cultura, Turismo e Esportes, Departamento Geral de Documentação e Informação 
Cultural, Divisão de Editoração, 1995), 121-133. 
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also as a result of the urban reforms in Rio during the 1930s and 
1940s.30
 Another major urban development project that transformed Rio 
during the first half of the twentieth century was the Estádio Municipal, 
also known as Maracanã.  Built to be the main venue for the 1950 World 
Cup, construction of the stadium began on January 20, 1948.  The 
Estádio Municipal not only replaced Vasco da Gama’s São Januário 
Stadium in São Cristóvão as the largest in Rio, but was heralded as the 
largest in the world.  President Dutra officially dedicated the Estádio 
Municipal on June 16, 1950, a date that also coincided with the third 
mayoral anniversary of General Ângelo de Morais’ term in office.31  
Although the construction and location of the stadium had its detractors 
such as Carlos Lacerda, many believed that the Estádio Municipal gave 
Rio de Janeiro a new monument that served as a postcard for the “new” 
Rio.32  Journalists, politicians, and citizens praised the stadium because 
it represented a Brazilian made monument that harmonized with the 
natural beauties of Pão de Açucar (Sugarloaf) and the Baía da 
Guanabara.33  It represented progress for Brazil culturally, but also for 
the civic and symbolic morale within the capital city.   Furthermore, the 
                                                 
30 This will be addressed more in-depth in Chapter 2. 
 
31 Gisella de Araujo Moura, O Rio Corre Para O Maracanã (Rio de Janeiro: Editora 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1998), 34-43. 
 
32 One of the most vocal opponents of the location of the stadium was the then Vereador 
and future Governor of Guanabara, Carlos Lacerda. 
 
33 Moura, 43.  
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construction of the Estádio Municipal put Brazil above or on the same 
level with Brazil’s European counterparts in the world of futebol and 
would serve as a stage for its efforts at modernization and urban renewal 
during the post World War II period. 
 Other initiatives that were taken during General Morais’ tenure 
included beginning work on the Túnel Catumbi-Laranjeiras (Santa 
Bárbara) which aimed to link the central area of the city with the interior 
neighborhoods of the south zone of the city.34  This measure aimed to 
alleviate the traffic congestion caused by the increasing number of 
vehicles entering the central area from the rapidly growing zona sul.  
Other initiatives taken to help develop the south zone of the city included 
the extension and widening of the Avenida Beira-Mar that coincided with 
the renovation parts of Botafogo in the zona sul.35  Moreover, the opening 
of the Túnel do Pasmado in Botafogo linked the Avenida das Nações 
Unidas along the Praia de Botafogo with the Avenida Lauro Sodré in 
Botafogo.  The Túnel do Pasmado, inaugurated in 1952, facilitated the 
access from Botafogo and Copacabana via the Túnel do Leme and the 
newly constructed Avenida Princesa Isabela in Leme.36  Not only did 
                                                 
34 Although work on this Tunnel began in 1949, it was not inaugurated and open to 
traffic until 1963 during Carlos Lacerda’s administration. 
 
35“Duplificação da Avenida Beira-Mar,” Diário Carioca (Rio de Janeiro) 20 January 1950.  
 
36The Túnel do Leme was constructed in two different phases.  The first stretch of the 
tunnel was opened in 1904 and the second was built in 1946 and linked the Avenida 
Lauro Sodré with Avenida Princesa Isabela.  The Túnel do Leme is often referred to as 
the Túnel Novo.  See Estado da Guanabara/Governo Carlos Lacerda/SURSAN, “Os 
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these reforms help the circulation of traffic throughout the city, but they 
also gave people easier access to the beach and new tourist destinations 
in the zona sul.   
As the residential population of the south zone intensified in 
Copacabana in the 1940s and 1950s so did the tourist industry.  Hotels, 
restaurants, shopping galleries, and movie theatres flourished along the 
Avenida da Nossa Senhora da Copacabana and the Rua Barata Ribeiro in 
Copacabana due to various reforms and the politics of real estate 
development in Rio during the 1940s and 1950s. 
 By the mid 1950s, many Cariocas had become less dependent on 
the central area of the city, and the majority of the new reforms and 
infrastructure were concentrated in the growing zona sul.  Aside from 
Tijuca, many of the neighborhoods of the zona norte and subúrbios were 
neglected in urban renewal campaigns.  The more industrial and working 
class areas along the rail lines had inadequate water supply, unpaved 
streets, and poor circulation of traffic due to the lack of overpasses and 
viaducts over the rail lines that often geographically divided 
neighborhoods.  Even though the majority of the city’s population resided 
in the neighborhoods of the distant northern areas and suburbs, they 
received limited and ambiguous forms of investment and improvements 
                                                                                                                                                 
Túneis da Guanabara.”  No date given on this publication/Arquivo Geral da Cidade do 
Rio de Janeiro (AGCRJ).    
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in the late 1940s and early 1950s.37  By the mid to late 1950s, the 
political economy of Brazil under Juscelino Kubitscheck coupled with the 
real-estate and automobile boom sparked even more plans to urbanize 
the southern zone areas of Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leblon, and the 
northern, suburban, and western regions to a lesser degree.  During the 
1950s, several new tunnels were planned and constructed that aided in 
the growth of Copacabana.  These tunnels were built in order to facilitate 
automobile traffic throughout the neighborhood and the zona sul 
however they did very little in the end to solve the problem of constant 
congestion throughout the city.38    
Another major form of urban development of the 1950s that 
transformed the city of Rio de Janeiro was the demolition of the Morro do 
Santo Antônio and the planning of several intra-city expressways that 
would “cut” through the central area of the city.  The Morro do Santo 
                                                 
37In terms of percentages, the suburbs actually received a nice slice of the new 
development projects, yet the amount of investment was not equal to the zona sul.  For 
a good quantitative study of this see Mauro Kleiman, “De Getúlio a Lacerda:  Um “Rio 
de Obras” transforma a Cidade do Rio de Janeiro:  As Obras Públicas de Infra-
Estrutura Urbana na Construção do “novo Rio” no Período 1938-1965,”  (Ph.D. Thesis, 
Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo, 1994).  For an 
additional take on the quality of life issues see Alberto Gawryszewski, “”A Agonia de 
Morar”:  Urbanização e Habitação na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro (DF) – 1945/50,” (Ph.D. 
Thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, Departamento de História, 1996).  
 
38 Two tunnels that were built and planned during the administration of Francisco de 
Sá Lessa (December 1955-December 1956) were the Túnel Sá Freire Alvim and Túnel 
Major Rubens Vaz.  Túnel Sá Freira Alvim connected the Rua Barata Ribeiro with the 
Rua Raul Pompeia, and Major Rubens Vaz linked the Rua Tonelero and Rua Pompeu 
Loureiro. Although they were planned during Lessa’s term as mayor of Rio, both 
tunnels were not opened until 1960 and 1963. J. Figueiredo “Túneis Esquecidos Dentro 
da Gaveta,” O Globo (Rio de Janeiro), 3 February 2000, p. 6-7.  Two other tunnels were 
also proposed during this time.  One was to link ruas Fernandes Guimarães in Botafogo 
with Tonelero in Copacabana, and the other was to unite ruas Sá Ferreira in 
Copacabana and Nascimento Silva in Ipanema. 
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Antônio was the subject of a number of reforms and plans for a number 
of years, but was not razed until Dulcídio Cardoso’s period as mayor 
from 1952-54.  A major avenue, Avenida Perimetral, also was planned to 
extend from the Morro do Santo Antônio and Avenida Beira-Mar to the 
Praça Mauá.    After undergoing several revisions, the Avenida Perimetral 
and numerous other urban projects were constructed under the 
supervision of Mayor Negrão de Lima’s SURSAN in the late 1950s.  
SURSAN (A Superintendência de Urbanização and Saneamento – The 
Superintendency of Urbanization and Sanitation) was established to act 
as a planning agency directly linked to the executive for the 
implementation of urban development plans.  Established on September 
20, 1957, SURSAN and its plan for urban development was the major 
executor of urban reforms in Rio until the early 1970s.39  Many of the 
plans that transformed Rio de Janeiro as the city-state of Guanabara in 
the 1960s were SURSAN projects dating back to the initial message of 
1957.  In the coming chapters, I will describe how SURSAN was the most 
important mechanism used by both Carlos Lacerda and Francisco 
Negrão de Lima in reforming the city of Rio de Janeiro.  
 April 1960 signified the end of an era for Rio de Janeiro.  After 
almost 200 years Rio ceased to be the political capital of Brazil.  
Following the transfer of the capital to Brasília in the central-west region 
of Brazil, Rio was in search of a new political and cultural identity.  In 





the previous thirty years, Rio experienced a reorganization of urban 
space, but these reforms would dull in comparison to what would 
happen during the first ten years of its transformation into a city-state. 
The most obvious and important of these earlier reforms from 1930-1960 
was the Avenida Presidente Vargas as it intended to symbolically 
supersede the Avenida Central built during the Primeira República of 
Pereira Passos’ Belle Epoque.    
 Whereas the Avenida Central and Praça Floriano dominated the 
civic and cultural life of Rio from 1906-40, the Avenida Presidente Vargas 
and the southern sub-centers (especially Copacabana) began to supplant 
the status the centro held during the Belle Époque.  As important as the 
Avenida Central was to the development of civic culture in Rio during the 
1910s and 1920s, so were Avenida Presidente Vargas and Copacabana in 
the 1940s and 1950s.  Soon after Rio de Janeiro was converted into the 
city-state of Guanabara in 1960, the first part of the Avenida Perimetral 
was inaugurated by Juscelino Kubitschek on November 14, 1960.40  
Stretching from Avenida General Justo to the Praça Pio X along the 
Avenida Presidente Vargas, the arrival of this elevated expressway had a 
symbolic meaning as portions of it were named Avenida Kubitschek. 
  The idea of the Perimetral was to circumvent the central area of 
the city by going from the south zone to the Port Area and continue along 
the Avenida Brasil.  The avenue cut through the historic Praça XV de 
                                                 
40 “JK Inaugurou ontem o primeiro trecho da Avenida Perimetral,” Correio da Manhã 
(RJ), 15 November 1960, 3. 
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Novembro and its naming after JK was representative of Rio’s days as a 
capital coming to an end.  Furthermore, it also symbolized the new 
automobile culture that JK had cultivated during his presidency and the 
ways that it would inspire and challenge urban planners to integrate the 
car into the urban landscape.    
By taking the Avenida Perimetral, automobiles would no longer 
need to travel through the main corridors of the central area of the city in 
order to reach the interior regions of the state and nation.  What once 
was the unavoidable center of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil could be 
circumvented.  Thus, there was more to life in Rio than the image and 
idea of the centro da cidade as the  fever for roads, known as the febre 
viária, and the methods necessary to accommodate the automobile into 
the urban landscape would be at the top of the agenda for Rio’s 
engineers and planners  the following decades. 
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Figure 1.1 The Agache Plan for Rio de Janeiro, 1930 
 





Figure 1.3  The Tunnels of Copacabana by the late 1950s 
 
 









Figure 1.5  Work on the Túnel Santa Bárbara in the 1950s; Opened only in the 
1960s 
 





















Chapter 2:  The Emergence of a City-State:  Guanabara Circa 1960 
 
“This city of 2,700,000 inhabitants is bursting at the seams.  
Hemmed in tightly between the South Atlantic and mountains, Rio 
de Janeiro is having to resort to miracles of engineering and 
ingenuity to cope with its phenomenal growth…To free itself from the 
stranglehold of nature, the capital of Brazil is climbing on the 
surrounding mountains, burrowing through hills that rise in its 
midst, tearing down other hills and spreading onto the blue waters 
of Guanabara Bay.  The city’s population is expected to reach 
3,000,000 by 1960…When Rio’s new mayor Dr. Negrão de Lima 
took office last March, he summed up the problems of overcrowding 
that he faced by saying “We are a besieged city.”  “There is no 
water” Dr. Negrão de Lima said, “no transportation, no food supply 
system, no thoroughfares, no hospitals, no schools.  We have a 
deficient light, telephone, and gas service, not enough homes for 
everybody, no room for recreation, and no place to bury the dead.” 
…The favela problem is complicated by the fact that shack dwellers 
are reluctant to move to city housing projects.  Some favela shacks 
have television antennas.  Rio de Janeiro has 1,000 street cars, 750 
bus fleets, 2,500 private buses, 11,300 taxis, and 62,000 private 
cars but all this is not enough to meet the rush-hour transportation 
needs.  Meanwhile, the problem of making Rio de Janeiro livable is 
foremost in all minds.” 1
 
Before the newly constructed capital city of Brasília was 
inaugurated in April 1960, many Brazilians and Cariocas deliberated 
over the geopolitical future of the city of Rio de Janeiro.  President 
Juscelino Kubitschek’s (JK-1956-61) dedication to the building of a new 
capital city was based heavily on an economic development agenda that 
planned on generating more regional development in the central and 
center-west regions of the country. Other aspects such as Rio’s 
continuous industrial decline and infrastructure problems along with its 
                                                 




history of being at the center of much of Brazil’s major political and 
social unrest during the twentieth century were also factored into 
Kubitschek’s plan; particularly in the wake of Getúlio Vargas’ suicide in 
1954 and efforts which attempted to block Kubitschek’s presidential 
inauguration.  JK and his closest advisors argued that a more “tranquil,” 
“secure,” and “modern” capital such as Brasília would help bolster 
Brazil’s developmentalist agenda of “fifty years in five” and also spark 
interior economic and industrial growth away from the Rio-São Paulo 
axis.2   Although there was tense opposition to Kubitschek’s plan to build 
Brasília along social, economic, and geographical lines, there was a great 
deal of sentiment among the political, academic, and economic 
communities of Brazil that Rio’s “glory days” were long past.  These 
attitudes regarding Rio’s problems are highlighted in an article written in 
tandem by North-American and Brazilian geographers in 1956: 
“There is feeling that the federal government in Rio is so 
closely concerned  with the problems of this one place that it finds 
difficulty in viewing the problems of the rest of the country in proper 
perspective.  The press of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo is thought to 
have too much influence.  Administrators and lawmakers are in 
danger of losing sight of the country as a whole whey they must do 
their work in the midst of Brazil’s great metropolis.  Their decisions, 
some think, would be more clearly in the national interest if they 
worked in a small capital city removed from direct contact with any 
of the major centers of settlement…Life in Rio de Janeiro, pleasant 
                                                 
2 For debates surrounding the transfer of the capital from Rio to Brasília, as well as the 
debates on Rio’s future see:  Marly Silva da Motta, Rio de Janeiro:  de Cidade-Capital a 
Estado da Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2001) Chapter 
two. For a historiographical overview of the transfer from Rio to Brasília see Marly Silva 
da Motta, “O Rio de Janeiro continua Sendo?” In Rio de Janeiro:  Capital e Capitalidade 
edited by André Nunes de Azevedo (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora UERJ, 2002) 159-169; 
James Holston, The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasília (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1989).  
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though it may be for tourists and foreign visitors, is  trying for 
permanent residents.  With the advent of automobiles, the street 
pattern of Rio de Janeiro became intolerable.  Bottlenecks confine 
the morning and evening flow of commuters to and from the center of 
the city.  The mountainous setting of Rio provides spectacular 
scenery, but it also presents all but insuperable physical obstacles 
to growth and development.  In contrast, the Brazilian engineers and 
architects envision a kind of dream city – a city of wide avenues, tall 
modern buildings, spreading suburbs, and happy people.3
 
 Despite the intense debates over the transfer of the capital from 
Rio to the future city of Brasília, construction in the late 1950s affirmed 
the realities of a new “dream city.” Subsequently, numerous debates 
surfaced regarding the future of the capital city of Rio de Janeiro.   In her 
work on Rio de Janeiro’s political history and the creation of the city-
state of Guanabara, Marly Silva da Motta identifies the three central 
questions that developed regarding Rio’s potential geopolitical 
circumstances in the late 1950s:  
1. Whether Rio de Janeiro should become an autonomous city 
or remain under federal auspices or still a federal territory?   
2.  Would the city of Rio de Janeiro become part of the state of 
Rio de Janeiro?   
3. Or, should it be converted into the new state of Guanabara – 
as was outlined in Brazil’s 1946 constitution which 
established Kubitschek’s precedent for the building of a new 
capital city? 4  
   
                                                 
3 Preston E. James and Speridão Faissol “The Problems of Brazil’s Capital City,” 
Geographical Review XLVI: 3 (July 1956), 306.  Both authors received their doctorates 
in geography from Syracuse University and visited the region where Brasília was 
eventually constructed in the early 1950s.  Since their article was published in 1956, 
the name of the future capital, Brasília, was yet to be coined.  It was their speculation 
at that time that the new name was going to be Vera Cruz.  According to Holston (1989, 
20) there were many possible names throughout Brazilian history for a new capital city:  
Nova Lisboa, Petrópole, Pedrália, Imperatória, Tiradentes, and Vera Cruz.   
 
4 Motta, “O Rio de Janeiro Continua Sendo?” 162-163. 
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 While many politicians and Cariocas (residents of the city of Rio de 
Janeiro) were worried about the economic and political consequences 
that “de-capitalization” would represent for Rio, many of the debates 
regarding Rio’s geo-political future centered on how Rio would still retain 
its autonomy and not be transformed into “just another city or state” 
considering Rio’s dynamic history as the political and cultural center of 
Brazil for over two hundred years. Conversely, various politicians, 
industrialists, and residents argued that for Rio de Janeiro to become its 
own state (Guanabara) seemed impractical on the grounds that it was 
geographically too small and economically unviable; particularly as 
industrial and port activity within the city continuously declined in 
comparison with greater São Paulo.  Nevertheless, the city-state faction 
won and the San Tiago Dantas Law, which was passed on April 12, 1960, 
officially legalized the creation of the state of Guanabara.  While this law 
enabled the creation of a new state, numerous questions still remained 
regarding the administrative structure and organization of the city-state 
of Guanabara.   
As a federal district, Rio’s mayor had been nominated by the 
President of Brazil, whereas only the Câmara dos Vereadores (city 
council) had been elected by the district’s residents.  The San Tiago 
Dantas Law stipulated that from April to December of 1960, the new 
state of Guanabara would have a provisional governor appointed by 
Kubitschek, while elections for a governor and a new constituent 
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assembly would be held along with Presidential Elections in October, 
1960.  Soon after the October 1960 elections, the new constituent 
assembly was transformed into a legislative assembly of Guanabara, 
while the old Câmara dos Vereadores was later dissolved.  Still, the 
administrative structure of the new state of Guanabara was unclear to 
many: Would it be a state organized like every other one in the Brazilian 
Federation (with separate municipalities and mayors)?  Or, would it 
continue in the vein of the old federal district, with the exception that it 
would be an official state with one municipality (Rio de Janeiro) and an 
elected governor?  Ultimately, Guanabara did indeed maintain much of 
the same character as it had during the federal district days with two 
exceptions. First, the city-state was geographically organized into several 
decentralized administrative districts in order to provide residents with 
more adequate services.  Secondly, the city-state would have an elected 
governor who could develop and negotiate policy without the interference 
of the federal government – a matter which proved to be critical for 
understanding the trajectory of initiatives that took place during its short 
lived existence (1960-75).   
 The years 1960-1975 represent a drastic change in the planning of 
the city on numerous levels.  Among the causes of this change in 
planning is the transformation of the political system.  The people 
directly elected the first two governors of the state of Guanabara - Carlos 
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Lacerda (1960-65) and Francisco Negrão de Lima (1965-1971).5  One of 
Lacerda’s major goals early into his administration was to maintain 
Guanabara’s city-state structure. Lacerda stressed that Guanabara 
remain one municipality by introducing decentralized administrations 
throughout the city-state.  This strategy proved successful as a plebiscite 
in 1963 showed voters overwhelmingly favored maintaining Guanabara 
as a city-state with one municipality and governor.  This administrative 
structure, gave governors such as Lacerda and Negrão a great deal of 
power and autonomy in establishing policy, especially in regards to 
urban planning.  While they held the title of governor, both Lacerda and 
Negrão were in essence the mayors of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The third 
(and last) governor of Guanabara, Chagas Freitas (1971-75), was elected 
indirectly as a consequence of the Brazilian military regime’s policy of 
only allowing indirect elections within the government approved two-
party system (ARENA and MDB). Under military pressure in the early 
1970s, Chagas was forced to transform Guanabara’s agencies, 
secretariats, and organizations into the same format as the other states 
of the Brazilian Federation.6  These considerations, combined with an 
                                                 
5To gain insight into the political culture of Lacerdismo and Chaguismo as well as the 
administrative composition of the new city-state State of Guanabara see Marly Silva da 
Motta, Saudades da Guanabara, (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 
2000).  Throughout this and future chapters, I will refer to Francisco Negrão de Lima as 
Negrão. 
  
6 Once the military regime banned all political parties with its second institutional act 
(AI-2), it eventually set up a two party system:  ARENA was the official party in support 
of the military dictatorship, and the MDB – Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, which 
was the “legal” opposition. For an overview of the administrative changes during the 
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assortment of economic development pressures from the military régime, 
led to the end of the city-state of Guanabara and its policies regarding 
urban planning and development.  Not withstanding, the projects and 
level of urban development under Lacerda, Negrão, and to a much lesser 
extent Chagas, not only changed the culture of urban planning and the 
spatial dynamics of the city, but continue to influence many of the 
current planning agendas in the city.  
 In order to fully comprehend the significance of urban renewal in 
Guanabara during Lacerda’s and Negrão’s terms, it is critical to 
understand the demographic and geographic situation of Rio de Janeiro 
during the late 1950s.  This chapter will examine Rio de Janeiro’s 
demographic and geographic conditions by sketching the city’s 
topographic, geographic, and socio-cultural conditions around the time it 
was transformed into the city-state of Guanabara.  Furthermore, I will 
also consider the circumstances that led to the creation of the 
Superintendência de Urbanização e Saneamento (SURSAN) in 1957.   
This special planning entity was established during Negrão de Lima’s 
stint as mayor of the federal district, and proved to be the major executor 
of Guanabara’s urban planning agenda both under Lacerda and Negrão 
de Lima during the 1960s. Many of the debates and issues surrounding 
the urban renewal campaigns emanated from the various architects, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chagas Freitas administration of 1971-1975 see: Carlos Eduardo Sarmento, organizer, 
Chagas Freitas (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1999) and Francisco 
Manoel de Mello Franco, O Governo Chagas Freitas:  Uma Perspectiva Nacional Através 
de Uma Experiência Local (Rio de Janeiro:  Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1977).  
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engineers, and technocrats who worked for SURSAN during one or both 
administrations.  While Guanabara’s urban renewal movement is directly 
attributed to Lacerda’s and Negrão’s leadership, the role of SURSAN is at 
the core of any discussion of the majority of planning agendas of the 
Lacerda and Negrão years.  Furthermore, SURSAN also exemplified the 
“expert” technical approach to planning that became prominent during 
the 1950s and 1960s, particularly with the political culture of 
developmentalism and fever for automobiles that took hold during the 
Kubitschek years.    
 
2.1 Not So Marvelous:  Rio de Janeiro in the late 1950s 
  
Although Rio de Janeiro was the capital of Brazil for almost 200 
years, the newly created city-state of Guanabara was a city in dire need 
of improvements in regards to social welfare and urban services.  Even in 
the more privileged areas of the city such as the zona sul, basic services 
such as the water supply, sewage, affordable and adequate housing, 
public schools, decent roads and overpasses, utility service, and 
sanitation were not reliable.  This was compounded by the fact that most 
of the urban renewal campaigns since the early 1900s were not 
principally concerned with urban services and making the city more 
practical and livable for residents of all social classes and zones of the 
city.  Moreover, the fact that the mayor of the old Distrito Federal was 
appointed by the Brazilian President and not elected by the residents of 
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Rio de Janeiro meant that there was a lack of continuity and 
commitment in developing an urban development agenda.  This was 
especially apparent during the 1950s when Rio de Janeiro experienced a 
frequent turnover of mayors.  Moreover, this was aggravated by the 
demographic explosion that Rio de Janeiro and many other cities in 
Brazil as well as in Latin America experienced during the decade.7
 With approximately 3.3 million inhabitants in 1960, the city of Rio 
de Janeiro had multiplied its population 16 times in a span of 100 years.  
More significant than this statistic is the increase in the city’s 
inhabitants from 1950 to 1960 of slightly over 1 million people.8   
Likewise, even more striking than the overall growth of the city, is the 
substantial growth in the number of favelas (hillside shantytowns) and 
the people who resided in them.  According to official census statistics, 
which are usually conservative and under calculated, the city’s favela 
population grew from approximately 170,000 to 340,000 from 1950 to 
1960.9   With or without an organized urban planning agenda during the 
years Rio served as the federal district, even the most efficient 
                                                 
7 See table in the appendix with the list of the mayors of the federal district in the 
1950s. 
 
8 It should be noted that like in any census, there is a slight margin of error in the 
counting process.  In any case, the growth level of the population is exponential in this 
time period. See IBGE – Conselho Nacional de Estatística, Características Demográficas 
e Sociais do Estado da Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1966), Chapter 1. 
 
9 Ibid., page 94.  While I have taken my information from the official IBGE census, there 
is much dispute over census figures when it comes to favelas.  Aside from the 
population statistics, the semantics on defining an actual favela is one of the obstacles 
in determining accurate population numbers. For more on this issue see Fred B. Morris 
and Gerald F. Pyle, “The Social Environment of Rio de Janeiro in 1960,” Economic 
Geography 47 (June 1971): 286-299. 
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administrations and planners would be challenged to combat the 
pressures placed on the urban landscape by the demographic explosion 
of the 1950s and 1960s.  This population explosion, coupled with Rio’s 
daunting topography, presented major obstacles to the city’s planners 
and residents.       
 In order to discuss urban renewal and the significance that many 
of the urban reforms of the 1960s signified for Rio de Janeiro, an 
analysis of the city’s topography, landscape, and geography must be 
presented.  Historically, Rio’s topography has been one of the 
determining factors in the spatial evolution of the city and its 
neighborhoods. The topography within the city can be separated into the 
basic categories of maciços (massifs), crests, and scattered hills.10  Aside 
from these are the many bays, rivers, lakes, and ocean beaches that have 
also been influential in the city’s development.  
 Of all the natural entities that comprise the city of Rio de Janeiro, 
the Maciço da Tijuca (also known as the Maciço Carioca) has been the 
most influential in the city’s growth.  Also known as the Serra da Carioca 
or Serra da Tijuca, it is an enormous massif that physically separates the 
city into the north and south zones.  Occupying a space of 95 km2, this 
urban massif also contains ranges (serras) such as Gávea, Tijuca, Pico do 
                                                 
10 For a technical analysis of the physical geography and topography of the state of 
Guanabara and city of Rio de Janeiro see Fernando Nascimento Silva, “Dados de 
Geografia Carioca,” In Rio de Janeiro em Seus Quatrocentos Anos (Rio de Janeiro: 
Distribuidora Record, 1965), 29-38.  This publication is significant because it 
commemorates the 400th anniversary of the founding of the city.  The articles published 




Papagaio (Andaraí), Carioca, and Corcovado.11  Within these serras are 
hundreds of smaller hills and forests that also have a significant impact 
on the evolution of neighborhoods and residential patterns.12  The 
Maciço da Tijuca has played an influential political, economic, and 
symbolic role in the evolution of the city, and dictated the city’s linear 
spatial development. The Maciço da Tijuca has certainly been highlighted 
for giving Rio de Janeiro a sense of natural beauty, yet it has also been 
the source of many urban problems because of its influence on 
settlement patterns.13        
 Another natural condition that has played a significant role in Rio’s 
growth is the Baía da Guanabara, as the majority of the city’s 
neighborhoods are wedged in between hills, massifs, and water. The 
expansion in metropolitan growth coupled with haphazard use of space 
for industrial and urban development had serious consequences for the 
physical condition of the bay after 1945.  The water of the Baía da 
Guanabara gradually became highly polluted due largely to haphazard 
sanitation practices by the proper sanitation authorities as well as 
various industries and residents.  By the 1950s, the water in Baía da 
Guanabara was highly polluted from city sewage, as well as remnants 
                                                 
11The latter range (Corcovado) is best known for possessing the statue of Cristo 
Redentor that overlooks the city.  
 
12 For a list of these hills and their names and locations see Silva, 29-38. 
 
13 Maurício de Almeida Abreu, “A Cidade, a Montanha e a Floresta,” In Natureza e 
Sociedade no Rio de Janeiro, edited by Mauricio de Almeida Abreu, (Rio de Janeiro: 
Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, 1992), 54-103. 
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from oil refinery activities and garbage produced by favela residents 
located on edges along the bay such as Maré.14 During the late 1940s 
and 1950s, the Baía’s islands, shoreline, and beaches were consistently 
modified or sacrificed in order to accommodate the building of 
expressways, airports, a university campus, and industrial factories for 
the broader principles of economic urban development.  Just as the 
Maciço da Tijuca divided the city into north and south and created many 
challenges for planners and residents, the presence of the bay has also 
had an integral role in the social, economic, and cultural life in all zones 
of the city.  The Baía da Guanabara and the beaches of Copacabana, 
Ipanema, and Leblon along with the hills of Corcovado, Pão de Açucar, 
and the statue of Cristo Redentor served as the city’s postcard image 
which was consistently marketed in order to attract tourists from around 
the world.  Rio de Janeiro’s natural beauty has also earned it a 
reputation as being uma cidade vaidosa (a vain city) where building and 
planning schemes too often try to harmonize with Rio’s natural elements 
instead of drawing up more pragmatic solutions that in turn would 
compromise the city’s natural splendor.  This point is illuminated by 
architect Roberto Segre who suggests that Rio de Janeiro is an anomaly 
among the world’s metropolitan cities in the fact that its symbol is not an 
                                                 
14 For an environmental history of the Baía da Guanabara see Lisa Sedrez, “”The Bay of 
All Beauties:” State and Environment in Guanabara Bay, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1875-
1975” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 2004.). 
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architectural edifice, but rather the scenic hills such as Pão de Açucar 
and Corcovado.15   
 Rio de Janeiro still maintained its beautiful scenery and sense of 
vanity in the late 1950s, however a journey through its neighborhoods 
and streets reveal a city experiencing immense problems in regard to 
substandard infrastructure and public services for its residents.  Pulitzer 
Prize winning poet Elizabeth Bishop suggested in an article written to 
commemorate Rio’s 400th anniversary in 1965:  “(Rio) is not a beautiful 
city; it’s just the world’s most beautiful setting for a city.”16
2.2 Zones and Neighborhoods in Post 1945 Rio  
 
In order to understand the patterns of growth that occurred in the 
city in the post 1945 area, I will present a socio-geographic sketch of Rio 
de Janeiro’s neighborhoods and zones.  Furthermore, this analysis needs 
                                                 
15 Paulo Knauss, organizador, A Cidade Vaidosa: Imagens Urbanas do Rio de Janeiro 
(Rio de Janeiro:  Sette Letras, 1999); Roberto Segre, “Rio de Janeiro Metropolitano” 
http://www.vitruvius.com.br/arquitextos/arquitextos.asp  Accessed March 17, 2006. 
 
16 Elizabeth Bishop, “On the Railroad Named Delight” New York Times 7 March 1965.  
Elizabeth Bishop wrote this piece as a special for the New York Times in order to 
commemorate Rio’s 400th anniversary.  Elizabeth Bishop had been living in Brazil since 
1952 and had a long-term relationship with Maria Carlota Costallat de Macedo Soares 
(Lota) who would later lead the construction of the Aterro and Parque do Flamengo 
during Carlos Lacerda’s administration of which I will discuss in Chapter 3.  The 
relationship between Lota and Bishop is told in Carmen L. Oliveira, Rare and 
Commonplace Flowers: The Story of Elizabeth Bishop and Lota de Macedo Soares (New 
Brunswick:  Rutgers University Press, 2002). This book was originally published in 
Portuguese as Floras Raras e Banalíssimas: A História de Lota de Macedo Soares e 
Elizabeth Bishop (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora Rocco, 1995).  While the piece written for the 
New York Times does offer a balanced characterization of Rio in 1965, it clearly does 
display Bishop’s uncomfortable feelings of living in Rio as described by Oliveira.  
Ultimately, Bishop was hammered by a journalist of the Correio da Manhã for depicting 
Rio as a “black city” in her piece for the New York Times. Bishop and Lota divided their 
time between their residence in Samambaia in the mountains and an apartment in Rio 
even while Lota was head of the committee that designed and built the Aterro and 
Parque do Flamengo. 
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to be placed in the broader context of the Brazilian political economy 
during the 1950s and 60s. By 1960, Brazil was in the midst of President 
Juscelino Kubitschek’s (JK - 1956-1961) developmentalist economic 
program designed to yield “fifty years of progress in five” which included 
the building of the aforementioned brand new capital city, Brasília. Most 
of the industrial growth that occurred under Kubitschek benefited the 
three large metropolitan areas in the Southeast of Brazil: Rio de Janeiro, 
Belo Horizonte and São Paulo.  Moreover, this growth was most 
prominent in the state and city of São Paulo, which surpassed Rio de 
Janeiro in the 1920s as the premier industrial center of Brazil and Latin 
America.  Due to São Paulo’s industrial supremacy, the importance of 
Rio de Janeiro’s port diminished, while the port city of Santos, located in 
the state of São Paulo, flourished.  Kubitschek’s politically centrist 
Programa de Metas (Program of Goals) focused on the building of a new 
capital, and massive initiatives in the sectors of transportation, 
foodstuffs, energy, and heavy industry. This developmentalist economic 
strategy was employed by applying state investment along with enticing 
multi-national corporations to establish a greater presence in Brazil for 
the purpose of establishing Brazil as a major industrial nation and 
power.17   
                                                 
17 For some background on the Kubitschek years see Angela de Castro Gomes, O Brasil 
de JK (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1991); Celso Lafer, JK e o 




During Kubitschek’s term, Brazil’s GDP increased at a median 
annual rate of seven percent, while steel production remarkably 
increased almost one hundred percent during his term.  The economic 
and industrial growth that Brazil experienced during JK’s term also 
coincided with Brazil winning its first soccer World Cup in 1958, the 
international acclaim of the Bossa Nova, and the critical acclaim of films 
such as Orfeu Negro (Black Orpheus).  It was also during Kubitschek’s 
term that improvements in the standard of living and rights for the 
urban working class were achieved.  These above factors have led many 
to nostalgically refer to the JK years as the Anos Dourados (Golden 
Years), which is not completely exaggerated, although a bit misleading.  
Kubitschek’s initiatives did foster large-scale industry and the rise in the 
standard of living; however it did come at the expense of Brazil heavily 
borrowing on credit and experiencing massive rates of inflation.  
Kubitschek’s program produced regionally inequitable results, and was 
attacked from the right for being inflationary and soft on labor. 
Additionally, the left attacked this form of development for its inability to 
diminish the gap in distribution of wealth and for “selling-out” to foreign 
businesses and doing little for the rural sector. Consequently, the 
population rates of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Belo Horizonte 
skyrocketed, as people began to migrate from the small rural towns of 
the interior.  In his preface to a recent collection of José Carlos Oliveira’s 
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chronicles, Jason Tércio reflects upon the realities of the JK years, 
particularly within the context of Rio de Janeiro: 
“More than just natural beauty, what made Rio the symbol of 
the Anos Dourados was its status as the political and cultural 
capital of the country whose image was constantly reproduced in 
films, music, books, and political discourse. Logically, the city was 
calmer in those days, particularly because the city’s population was 
smaller…During the JK years, Rio was much more than a stage for 
Bossa Nova, beauty pageants, Rádio Nacional, and talk about the 
transfer to Brasília – which also yielded creative samba 
compositions... There were also massive strikes, student protests, 
famine in the favelas, violent crimes, the lack of water, corrupt police 
officers, and high inflation – which exploded to 30.5% during JK’s 
last year in office.  Copacabana, the “little princess of the sea,” was 
an arena for all forms of sexual commerce, drug trafficking, 
muggings, middle-class assassins, and pimps – much like today, 
just with different faces and names.18     
 
 The form of development that Brazil followed in the late 1950s also 
accelerated other patterns of growth that had been evident since the 
1930s19.  Most notably, the rates of rural to urban migration, national 
population growth, and percentage of people living in favelas grew.  The 
intensification of these factors in conjunction with the state of the 
national economy led to Rio’s continuous demographic growth.  On 
account of the high levels of inflation, lack of affordable housing, and 
constant migration, the real estate values increased in certain 
                                                 
18 Jason Tércio, “Caleidoscópio de Uma Cidade em Transe,” 12,  Preface to  José Carlos 
Oliveira and Jason Tércio, O Rio é Assim: A Crônica de uma Cidade (1953-1984) (Rio de 
Janeiro:  Agir Editora, 2005). 
 
19 While the majority of this population growth was due to rural to urban migration 
from all areas of Brazil, it should be noted that foreign immigration to Brazil increased 
again in the 1950s, particularly from Portugal with almost a quarter million alone in the 
1950s.  See Jeffrey Lesser, Negotiating National Identity (Durham:  Duke University 




neighborhoods and districts within the central area of the city.  
Subsequently, this led to the development and chaotic expansion of the 
city towards the periphery as well on the city’s ubiquitous hillsides.20  
The spatial evolution and development of the zona sul, zona norte, and 
subúrbios in the 1950s is critical to understanding the initiatives that 
planners took to remedy these conditions in the following decade.   
Rio de Janeiro is comprised of various neighborhoods in four 
zones: the north, south, central, and suburbs.21 The classification of 
these zones is a product of Rio’s topography, whereas the neighborhoods 
that comprise them are products of social, cultural, and economic 
factors.  In order to understand this better, I will give a concise portrait 
of the zones and neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro in the post 1945 
period.22
                                                 
20 For a more in-depth discussion of the extension of the city towards the periphery, see 
Maurício de Almeida Abreu, A Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro 3rd Edition (Rio de 
Janeiro: IPLANRIO, 1997), 115-125.    
 
21Circa 1960, the city of Rio de Janeiro and its neighborhoods were organized into 
Administrative Districts. Furthermore, many neighborhoods underwent constant 
legislation that limited certain streets and areas to strictly residential, commercial, and 
industrial activity.  Throughout this text I will use the appropriate Portuguese terms to 
distinguish the zones:  Northern Zone – Zona Norte; Southern Zone – Zona Sul; Central 
Areas – Centro; Suburbs - Subúrbios. 
 
22 The best sources to consult for the geographic indicators of neighborhoods and zones 
of Rio de Janeiro are the classic monographs written by urban geographers of the time 
period.  Some of these essays can be seen in Lysia Bernardes and Maria Therezinha de 
Segadas Soares, editors. Rio de Janeiro: Cidade e Região (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da 
Cidade do Rio de Janeiro – Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, 1995), Fred B. Morris, “A 
Geografia Social no Rio de Janeiro: 1960,” Revista Brasileira de Geografia 35:1 (Janeiro-
Março 1973): 3-70, and Pedro Pinchas Geiger, “Ensaio Para A Estrutura Urbana do Rio 
de Janeiro,” Revista Brasileira de Geografia 22:1 (Janeiro-Março 1960) 3-45.  For a good 
overview of sources and the evolution of urban geography in Brazil see Maurício de 
Almeida Abreu, “O Estudo Geográfico da Cidade No Brasil: Evolução e Avaliação - 
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 The central part of the city, or centro, was the economic and 
cultural heart of Rio de Janeiro, particularly since the arrival of the 
Portuguese Royal Family in 1808.23  Being the oldest part of the city, the 
centro by the late 1950s contained narrow streets along with large 
avenues lined with one-story buildings and buildings of up to 30-40 
floors.   Centro was home to most of the major commercial activity in the 
city, as well as the location of the major museums, theatres, art galleries, 
churches, cinemas, banks, restaurants, embassies, libraries, and bars. 
Up until the 1930s, certain quarters of this area were highly residential, 
particularly in the immediate surrounding areas such as the port 
neighborhoods of Saúde, Santo Cristo, and Gamboa, as well as the 
bohemian areas of Lapa and Glória.  In the post 1945 period, residency 
in the centro was predominantly relegated to many low-rent pensões 
(hostels) and apartment-hotels, as private residences and real estate 
ventures shifted more to the south, north, and suburbs.  Although there 
                                                                                                                                                 
Contribuição à História do Pensamento Geográfico Brasileiro,” Revista Brasileira de 
Geografia 56:1/4 (Janeiro-Dezembro 1994): 21-122.  
 
23The central area of the city was the concentrated area of reforms during the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries.  For some examples see:  José Murilho de Carvalho, Os 
Bestializados:  O Rio De Janeiro E A República Que Não Foi.  (São Paulo: Companhia das 
Letras, 1987), Jeffrey Needell, A Tropical Belle Époque: Elite Culture And Society In Turn-
Of-The-Century Rio De Janeiro. (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
Oswaldo Porto Rocha and Lia de Aquino Carvalho A Era Das Demolições: Cidade Do Rio 
De Janeiro 1870-1920/Contribuição Ao Estudo Das Habitações Populares: Rio De Janeiro 
1886-1906. (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro – Secretaria 
Municipal de Cultura, 1995), Giovanna Rosso Del Brenna, editor, O Rio De Janeiro De 
Pereira Passos: Uma Cidade Em Questão II. (Rio de Janeiro:  Index, 1985),  Jaime Larry 
Benchimol, Pereira Passos:  Um Haussmann Tropical (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da 
Cidade do Rio de Janeiro – Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, 1990), and Teresa Meade, 
Civilizing Rio:  Reform And Resistance In A Brazilian City 1889-1930 (University Park:  
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). In the post 1945 period, see Aluizio 
Capdeville Duarte, editor, Área Central Da Cidade Do Rio De Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro:  
IBGE, 1967).   
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was a decline in the residential patterns in this section, it still signified a 
cidade (the city) to many Cariocas.  It was where a large percentage of the 
population worked, shopped, and engaged in cultural and leisure 
activities. The central area was often crowded with pedestrians, 
streetcars, and automobiles particularly during the day and at rush 
hour.  Moreover, the constant influx of new migrants from other regions 
of Brazil and abroad often converged in the centro before dispersing to 
the many neighborhoods throughout the city. José Carlos Oliveira, a 
writer who migrated to Rio from Vitória, Espírito Santo in the early 
1950s, quickly developed a penchant for savoring Rio’s social and 
cultural life – particularly within the mainstream and underground bars 
of the centro and zona sul.  One of his early chronicles offers a detailed 
portrayal of the cultural and commercial activities of one the main areas 
of the Centro, Cinelândia, circa 1960:   
“It isn’t easy to describe Cinelândia. Naturally, there are 
numerous cinemas – which are not the city’s best – however they 
are always packed.  The streets are straight and dark and wedged 
among skyscrapers.  Cinelândia is a popular destination for 
businessmen from the interior as they prefer to stay at hotels such 
as O Ambassador and O Serrador and dining at the restaurant 
Spaghettilândia. Carioca businessmen and journalists love to have a 
cafezinho somewhere in Cinelândia after work. Sometimes they 
either get their shoes shined or get a haircut.  Sometimes, they go to 
the bar at the Hotel Serrador where they drink whiskey until rush 
hour is over. After midnight, Cinelândia remains hectic. The cinemas 
and theatres close but in front of the Hotel Serrador men continue 
chatting.  There are those who come to frequent the famous Night 
and Day club; others come to take a peek at the various 
showgirls…In the main praça in front of the cinemas and theatres at 
the corner of Avenida Rio Branco and theatres, vagrants sleep on 
benches.  A man sells tangerines while all the lights in the 
surrounding windows are unlit…Cinelândia is where all the customs 
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and traditions of Brazil’s smaller cities converge in Rio…All of the 
great festivals and events (including Carnaval) happen in 
Cinelândia…While there are clubs of the same scale in the zona 
norte and zona sul, Cinelândia is still the place where everything 
always happens.24
   
   The geographical boundaries of the central area of the city by 
1960 were the Praça Quinze de Novembro, Praça Tiradentes, Praça Mauá 
and Cinelândia.25  The estimated area of the central zone was 9,436 km2 
with a population of about 25,196 residents in 1960.  It should be noted 
that there was a population decline of 33% in the central area of the city 
from 1950 to 1960 which indicates that the centro did not necessarily 
lose its role as the city’s cultural and economic hub of the city (despite 
challenges from areas such as Copacabana), but did decline as a place to 
reside.26  Furthermore, the lack of a direct connection between the zona 
norte and zona sul made it unavoidable for vehicles, streetcars, and 
pedestrians to pass through the central section of the city. 
 The zona norte, which is connected to the central area of the city 
by the Avenida Presidente Vargas via the Praça da Bandeira, was 
                                                 
24 Most of José Carlos Oliveira’s (1934-1986) work was originally published in the 
Jornal do Brasil; however some of his chronicles have been organized into edited 
volumes.  See José Carlos Oliveira, O Rio é Assim:  A Crônica de uma Cidade (1953-
1984) Organized by Jason Tércio (Rio de Janeiro:  Agir Editora, 2005).  The cited 
chronicle is entitled “Cinelândia” p. 43-44 and originally published in the Jornal do 
Brasil 7 August 1960.  For more background on Cinelândia see João Maximo, 
Cinelândia:  Breve História de um Sonho (Rio de Janeiro:  Salamandra Editorial, 1997). 
 
25This was a geo-political designator that set the city up into administrative zones.  The 
central area was the 1st district according to decrees 6985 of May 5, 1941 and 8283 of 
August 11, 1945.  See Duarte, 12.  
 
26 This is according to the 1960 census found in IBGE, Conselho Nacional de 
Estatística, Características Demográficas e Socias da Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 




composed of various neighborhoods in the period from 1950-1960.  The 
neighborhoods on the fringe of the central area such as Catumbi, 
Estácio, São Cristóvão, Rio Comprido, and Mangue were primarily 
residential areas for middle and lower middle class residents and served 
as buffer between the zona norte and centro.  The residents of these 
neighborhoods mainly lived in houses or small apartment buildings, and 
often were self-employed within the confines of their own neighborhoods 
where small scale industrial and commercial activity predominated.  
Many however, were able to walk or have short commutes to the central 
area via streetcars (bondes) or private automobiles.  Several of the 
neighborhoods, particularly São Cristóvão and Catumbi, had a 
considerable population of immigrants from Portugal, Italy, and Spain.  
These influences were visible in the urban morphology and types of 
shops, markets, bakeries, eateries, and fairs in these areas. Like most 
areas of Rio, these areas gradually became surrounded by favelas that 
played an integral role in the social relations and cultural attributes of 
the neighborhoods.  Since the early 20th century, areas such as Estácio 
and Catumbi, known as the cradle of samba, were characteristic of Rio’s 
dynamic cultural life which since the nineteenth century had exhibited 
the constant blending and acculturation of numerous Afro-Euro social 
and cultural traditions. 
 Farther out from the central area in the zona norte were the 
neighborhoods of Tijuca, Maracanã, Vila Isabel, Andaraí, and Grajaú.  
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The latter two neighborhoods were developed in the 1920s and were 
modeled after the garden city idea that originated in Britain during the 
early twentieth century.27 These neighborhoods by the 1950s were 
primarily residential, but contained a more established middle class than 
the residents of Catumbi or São Cristóvão.  Vila Isabel however, 
contained a more active street life that revolved around music, cafés, and 
bars and was known more simply as “A Vila.”  Vila Isabel in the postwar 
era was predominantly comprised of middle to lower-middle class 
residents and gradually became surrounded by large favelas that gave it 
a diverse population and active street life along its main corridor known 
as the Boulevard 28 de Setembro.  Maracanã, an area which was wedged 
between the Praça da Bandeira, Vila Isabel, Rio Comprido, and Tijuca, 
was the location of the massive stadium, Estádio Municipal, later 
renamed Mário Filho in 1966, which was built to host the 1950 World 
Cup tournament.28
 With the decrease of residents in the centro, many neighborhoods 
in the zona sul, zona norte, and subúrbios developed into sub-centers.  
As distances between neighborhoods and the centro increased, many 
                                                 
27 For some neighborhood specific studies see:  Nilde Nersen. Vila Isabel: Terra de 
Poetas e Compositores  (Rio de Janeiro:  Conquista Editora, 1997), Elizabeth Dezouzart 
Cardoso., O Capital Imobilário e a expansão da malha urbana do Rio de Janeiro:  
Copacabana e Grajaú  (M.S. Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1986); 
idem, “O Capital imobiliário e a produção de espaços diferenciados no Rio de Janeiro:  
O Grajaú.  Revista Brasileira de Geográfia 51: 1 (Jan.-Março 1989): 89-102. 
 
28 The building and debates surrounding the location of this stadium is fascinating and 
can be read in Gisella de Araujo Moura, O Rio Corre Para o Maracanã (Rio de Janeiro: 




neighborhoods developed more extensive commercial and cultural 
activities, rather than relying upon the centro for these services.  In the 
case of the zona norte, the large upper and growing middle class 
neighborhood of Tijuca gained the reputation of being the “capital” of the 
north zone.  Tijuca, which is surrounded by the Maciço da Tijuca and 
has the Maracanã River running through it, was a large neighborhood 
that always had a conservative upper and middle class composition that 
attempted to maintain “traditional family values” in contrast to similar 
areas in the zona sul such as Copacabana and Botafogo.  When the first 
streetcars were built in the 19th century, Tijuca was served well by these 
lines; thus it became an ideal place to reside and commute to the centro.  
Not being directly on the edges of the centro helped it to grow and gain a 
distinct identity within the city.   
By the late 1950s, Tijuca was the capital of the zona norte with 
many movie theatres (América, Olinda, Carioca, and Metro), department 
stores, restaurants, and other specialty stores which rivaled those of the 
centro and even Copacabana.29  The main avenues, Conde de Bonfim 
and Haddock Lobo, had heavy traffic and the main Praças, Saenz Peña 
and Afonso Pena (the former referred to as A Praça), was not only the 
meeting place for the residents of Tijuca, but for people from other parts 
                                                 
29 These theatres are nostalgically linked with Tijuca’s cultural identity within Rio, 
however since the mid 1990s, all of these theatres and the surrounding commerce in 
the Praça Saenz Peña area has been greatly affected by the construction of shopping 
malls with movie theatres.  Many of the ex-movie houses throughout the city of Rio de 
Janeiro such O Carioca have been turned into Evangelical churches.   
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of the zona norte such Andaraí, Grajaú, and Vila Isabel.  Similar to areas 
in the zona sul such as Botafogo, Copacabana, and Flamengo, high-rise 
apartment building became the norm in Tijuca by the 1950s.  
Furthermore, with the housing crunch in many parts of the city, favelas 
were created in and around the hills that surrounded Tijuca.  Many of 
the residents of the favelas came to find work as domestics for the 
Tijucanos, instead of searching for work in the centro or in the zona 
portuário.  From 1950 to 1960 Tijuca grew by 34% whereas the north 
zone grew by 23% overall.30   
The suburban area of the city of Rio de Janeiro was traditionally 
defined as the neighborhoods along the Leopoldina, Central, and Auxiliar 
rail lines that connected to the centro. Additionally, they were 
geographically distinguishable from the northern neighborhoods of 
Tijuca, Andaraí, Vila Isabel, and Grajaú by the existence of crests and 
the small mountainous range of the Engenho Novo and Morro do 
Telégrafo.  Geography, though, was not the only factor that distinguished 
the suburbs from the north zone of the city.  Much of the distinguishing 
classifications of what constituted a suburban neighborhood were based 
along racial, ethnic, and socio-economic class lines.   
                                                 
30 IBGE, Conselho Nacional de Estatística, Características Demográficas e Socias da 
Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro:  IBGE, 1966), 10-11.  For a history of the growth of Tijuca 
see Lúcia Miranda, “Crescimento Desigual: O Bairro da Tijuca: 1907-1945-1980” (Masters 
Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 1987). 
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The suburbs of the city of Rio de Janeiro comprised 66.5% of the 
city’s land where 38.5% of the city’s population resided.31  Although 
these suburbs were modestly served by streetcars and rail lines, basic 
infrastructure such as water, electricity, and paved streets were not 
nearly as accessible as in the zona norte and zona sul. Furthermore, 
these subúrbios were marked by their social make-up and lack of 
infrastructural resources. According to geographer Maria Therezinha 
Segadas Soares, the Carioca concept of the suburbs in the 1950s 
included the following notions:32
• A concentration of buildings in large open spaces that 
resemble a rural to urban transformation, regardless if the 
area was previously settled. 
• an overwhelmingly poor population, that had little upward 
mobility, who also led a peculiar life style 
• Frequent relocation of the residents, particularly along the 
rail lines, which gave them frequent encounters with the 
center of the city 
• The absence of infrastructure and urban reforms which gave 
the area an appearance of being uncomfortable and 
disorderly.    
 
As one can see, the designation of what was a suburban neighborhood 
and what was part of the zona norte or centro area was loaded with not 
just geographical conceptions but with social ones as well – particularly 
in regards to class and race.  Up until the 1940s, the subúrbios were 
overwhelmingly residential, and contained little commerce aside from the 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Lysia Bernardes and Maria Therezinha de Segadas Soares, editors Rio de Janeiro: 
Cidade e Região (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro – Secretaria 
Municipal de Cultura, 1995), passim. 
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local bakeries, markets, and hardware stores.  Still, the numerous 
neighborhoods that comprised the subúrbios of Rio de Janeiro were 
extremely integral to the development of many vibrant forms of popular 
culture and many different forms of samba, especially in the 1950s and 
1960s.33   
   Much like Tijuca in the northern zone, several sub-centers 
eventually evolved in order to relieve the suburbs of their dependence 
upon the central area of the city.  Two suburban neighborhoods in 
particular that assumed these roles were Madureira and Méier.  Both of 
these areas were located along the Central do Brasil rail line and were 
also serviced by streetcar.34  From 1950-1960, Méier grew 23% percent 
in population whereas Madureira increased by 33%. By the 1950s, Méier 
developed a considerable amount of shopping, leisure, and commercial 
activity along the Rua Dias da Cruz that was frequented by residents 
from the surrounding suburban neighborhoods known as Grande Méier 
(Abolição, Lins de Vasconcelos, and Cachambi).  Madureira was best 
known for its eclectic market along the Estrada Marechal Rangel, O 
Mercado de Madureira, which was a hub point for many artisans and 
small-scale merchant from the suburbs and interior.  Additionally, 
Madureira also gained prominence as the areas Escolas de Samba of 
                                                 
33 An interesting “historical journey” through the history of the suburbs and its culture 
can be read in Nei Lopes, Guimbaustrilho e Outros Mistérios Suburbanos (Rio de Janeiro:  
Editora Dantes, 2001).   
   
  34 Antonio Francisco da Silva, “O Centro Funcional De Madureira,” Boletim Geográfico 




Portela and Império Serrano produced noteworthy composers and 
Carnaval productions.     
  In total, the population of the suburban neighborhoods of Rio de 
Janeiro grew 28% from 1950-1960, eventually comprising almost 40% of 
the total population of the city.  Nevertheless, it had the worst forms of 
infrastructure such as paved streets, inter-neighborhood connections, 
utility service, and running water.  It was also from 1950-1960 that the 
number of residents in favelas increased immensely.  Although people 
had lived in the favelas dating back as far as 1898, they served as a form 
of residence for approximately 335,000 people in 1960 (11% of the total 
population), which was an increase of about 98% since the 1950 
census.35  Many of the favelas that were located in the suburbs of Rio 
were either located on hills near the various rail stations or near the 
industries located along the Avenida Brasil.  The growth of these favelas 
coincided with the growth in the various industries that were located 
along the Avenida Brasil and in the various suburban neighborhoods of 
the city.  Jacarezinho, one of the largest favelas during the 1960s, grew 
in number of inhabitants because of its close proximity to the General 
                                                 
35 This data was found in Abreu, Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro, 126.  There is an 
extensive amount of scholarship which has been dedicated to studying favelas within 
the context of Rio de Janeiro.  For some examples see:  Alba Zaluar and Marcos Alvito, 
editors, Um Século de Favela (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1998), 
Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1976), Julio César Pino “Dark Mirror of Modernization:  The Favelas of 
the Rio de Janeiro in the Boom Years, 1948-1960,” Journal of Urban History 22:4 (May 
1996): 419-453, Maurício de Almeida Abreu, “Reconstruindo uma História Esquecida:  
Origem e Expansão inicial das Favelas do Rio de Janeiro,”  Espaço & Debates 37 (1994): 
34-47, and Lilian Fessler Vaz, “Dos Cortiços às Favelas e aos Edifícios de Apartamentos 
-  A Modernização da Moradia no Rio de Janeiro,”  Análise Social 29:3 (1994): 581-597. 
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Electric plant in areas surrounding Maria da Graça and Jacaré.  While 
favelas grew at enormous rates from the 1940s onward, the city and 
federal government began to formulate strategies in order to solve these 
problems, particularly during Getúlio Vargas’ Estado Novo period (1937-
45).  Many of these strategies never came to fruition due the lack of an 
organized agenda and financial commitment; thus it was not until Carlos 
Lacerda’s administration in the 1960s that a more consolidated and 
specific approach would develop in regards to “solving” the proliferation 
of favelas throughout Rio de Janeiro’s landscape.  This approach, known 
as the eradication and resettlement approach would become the most 
contested and dubious of urban renewal policies during the 1960s. 
 The zona sul of Rio de Janeiro has always been the most revered 
area of the city because of its proximity to the ocean and bay. 
Geographically, the southern zone of the city extends from the Santos 
Dumont Airport along the Baía da Guanabara to Flamengo, Botafogo, 
and continues along the Ocean (via tunnels) from Copacabana, Ipanema, 
and Leblon.  There are also the interior neighborhoods of Catete, 
Laranjeiras, Cosme Velho, Gávea, and Jardim Botânico, which are 
wedged between the coast and the Maciço da Tijuca and various other 
ranges.  Lagoa, an area that is characterized by the lake that borders 
Copacabana, Leblon, and Ipanema is also a neighborhood, surrounding a 




 Up until the 1940s, mainly people of the upper middle classes who 
worked in the central area of the city occupied the south zone of Rio.  
Most of these neighborhoods contained a combination of small 
apartment buildings and individual residences along with reasonable 
commercial and cultural activity.   Additionally, the zona sul benefited 
from having the best water supply and sewage system in the city.  After 
1950, with the large population increase in the city, the zona sul 
changed spatially as well as socially. 
 Just as the suburbs grew enormously between 1950 and 1960, so 
did the zona sul.   The best case of this was in the neighborhood of 
Copacabana that developed into the sub-center of the south zone and 
symbol of Brazil for much of the world. In order to develop Copacabana, 
which is wedged between the mountains and ocean, real estate 
companies and the city government opted to gradually “verticalize” urban 
space in the 1940s and 1950s. This meant that one or two floor 
apartment buildings were increasingly demolished along the main 
corridors such as the Avenida Nossa Senhora de Copacabana, Avenida 
Atlântica, and Barata Ribeiro and replaced with high-rises of up to 30 
floors.  Carlinhos Oliveira colorfully depicts the ironies of verticalization 
that occurred in the postwar years with the following anecdote: 
  “…The city’s population grows and it becomes necessary to 
construct new walls of armed concrete which you can clearly 
observe from any hill overlooking Copacabana…One looks at the 
older Portuguese-Style homes sadly as there will never be homes 
like this constructed again…I know people who can’t wait for these 
homes to be displaced by high-rises just so that they can get a good 
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deal on the precious azulejos (tiles) from the walls and floors in 
order to redecorate their beach or mountain home.36
     
 This form of verticalization not only aided in the growth of the 
neighborhood, but also produced a transformation in the social 
composition of residents who resided in the neighborhood.   Many people 
from various social classes who were not able to afford apartments in the 
zona sul before the construction boom in the 1950s, were able to either 
rent an apartment or finance one at a reasonable rate.37  In his classic 
work on Copacabana, anthropologist Gilberto Velho observes that the 
absence or lax enforcement of any building codes and zoning in 
Copacabana during the 1950s fostered haphazard development which is 
characteristic of the high-rises with tiny one bedroom or studio 
apartments. Consequently, these smaller apartments greatly impacted 
the population density of the neighborhood, as it was growing at 
alarming rates in comparison to Botafogo, Ipanema, and Tijuca.38      
 Gradually, Copacabana became the most diverse and densely 
populated area of the city.  The new residents who resided in tiny and 
modest sized apartments came from different regions of the city, Brazil, 
                                                 
36 José Carlos Oliveira, “A Poesia das Casas que vão ser Demolidas.” 41-42. Originally 
published in the Jornal do Brasil 1 August 1960.   
   
  37 For a summary of the “democratization” and verticalization of the south zone and 
Copacabana see Abreu, Evolução Urbana, Chapter 5.  For an overview of housing 
policies and development in Rio de Janeiro see Luiz César de Queiroz Ribeiro “The 
Formation of Development Capital: A Historical Overview of Housing in Rio de Janeiro,” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 17: 4 (December 1993): 547-558. 
 
38 Gilberto Velho, A Utopia Urbana:  Um Estudo de Antropologia Social, 5th Edition (Rio 
de Janeiro:  Jorge Zahar Editor, 1989), 20-28.    
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and abroad.  Furthermore, many of these new residents often hired 
housekeepers who resided in-domicile or chose to reside in the growing 
favelas which in turn contributed to the high population density of 
Copacabana.  The city’s hippest movie theaters, restaurants, nightclubs 
for every lifestyle, shopping galleries, cosmopolitan boutiques, as well as 
a growing number of banks, medical and professional offices, and tourist 
offices began to flourish in Copacabana.  Many doctors, lawyers, 
architects, and other professionals began to relocate their offices from 
the centro to Copacabana, as real-estate prices and rents were favorable.   
The main avenues of Copacabana, most notably the Avenida Nossa 
Senhora da Copacabana and Avenida Atlântica, gradually became lined 
with high-rise apartments and hotels. Avenida Atlântica, the main 
corridor along the beach, evolved into the postcard image of the city 
throughout the 1950s and 60s with its beach scenery and high-rise 
apartments, Bossa Nova beat, hotels, and office buildings.   
 While other elite neighborhoods such as Ipanema, Leblon, and 
Gávea were also experiencing verticalization and population growth, they 
paled in comparison to Copacabana, the cultural capital of Brazil during 
the 1950s.  By the early and mid 1960s, elements such as the 
intelligentsia and literati crowd’s “geography of bohemia” gradually 
shifted from the streets of Copacabana to Ipanema and Leblon.39  
Copacabana however would still hold the title as the capital of the zona 
                                                 
39 For an in-depth look at the bohemian lifestyles of the zona sul from the 1950s to the 
1970s see Jason Tércio, Órfão da Tempestade (Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 1999) passim.   
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sul with its diverse population, street and commercial life, and 
infrastructure for international tourism.  Subsequently, it would also be 
targeted for several urban renewal schemes which will be addressed in 
future chapters. Journalist Joaquim Ferreira dos Santos recollects how 
Copacabana was representative of the broader socio-cultural changes 
that had occurred in Brazilian society since the late 19th century, 
overwhelmingly for the middle and upper classes: 
     “Rio was two cities colliding in 1958.  The future Museum of 
Modern Art designed by architect Afonso Reidy was to be built on an 
Aterro that was initially occupied by the Jesuits…The European 
mirrors of the Confeitaria Colombo continued to be pristine, 
nevertheless the tendencies of  Cariocas were changing as  it was 
much hipper to eat a sandwich at the counter of the Lojas 
Americanas in Copacabana…The city escaped from its placid 
monarchical palaces of São Cristóvão and Praça 15 in order to 
assume its natural premonition for the beach and waves of the 
Atlantic ocean…Rio in 1958 was still charming with its mixture of 
politicians, beautiful women, intellectuals, and sophisticated 
youth…It was pre-euphoric period since in two years it would lose 
its title as the Federal District.40  
 
2.3 Piecemeal Planning of the 1950s and the Invention of SURSAN 
 
By the end of the 1950s, high-rise buildings came to dominate the 
landscape of the city from Madureira to Copacabana.  Increasingly, many 
of the city’s hillsides and unused land were transformed into favelas, 
particularly in the areas surrounding Tijuca in the zona norte and 
Copacabana in the zona sul.  While individual homes were still part of 
                                                 
40 Joaquim Ferreira dos Santos, Feliz 1958:  O Ano que Não Devia Terminar (Rio de 
Janeiro:  Editora Record, 1997), 34-37.  Lojas Americanas is a large all purpose store 
that carries clothing, non-perishable food, toiletries, electronics, and other home goods. 
See http://www.americanas.com.br. The aforementioned Confeitaria Colombo is a 
famous café on the Rua Gonçalves Dias which was an extremely fashionable destination 
with the elite during the early twentieth century.   
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the urban fabric, they became outnumbered by larger high rises 
particularly in the core areas of the zona norte and zona sul.      
The demographic and vertical explosion that Rio de Janeiro 
experienced in the 1950s certainly altered the spatial, social, and 
cultural life of the city of Rio de Janeiro.  Despite numerous attempts to 
reform the city and its neighborhoods throughout the 1950s, there often 
was a lack of continuity in regards to urban planning agendas due in 
part to the rapid turnover in appointed mayors and the lack of a financial 
commitment from federal and local sources to sufficiently address 
problems such as traffic congestion, the lack of water, affordable 
housing, telephone and electric service.  
Rio’s planning community of the 1950s was comprised of various 
municipal commissions, architects, technocrats, engineers, and 
politicians who presented piecemeal solutions to reforming the city of Rio 
de Janeiro.41  Many strategic and proactive plans to help bolster Rio’s 
insufficient infrastructure were devised, however the necessary funds to 
execute these ideas were not readily available.  Furthermore, the lack of 
continuity in mayoral leadership during the 1950s is another factor that 
often led to the lack of an organized urban planning agenda. 
 Francisco Negrão de Lima, a good friend and ally of fellow Mineiro, 
President Juscelino Kubitschek, was appointed mayor of the federal 
district in March 1956.  In a message to the Câmara dos Vereadores in 
                                                 
41 See the introduction and Chapter 1 for urban planning in Rio from 1930-1960.     
 71
 
1956, Negrão lobbied for the necessary funds in order to launch a 
concrete planning agenda for Rio: 
“The topographical and urbanistic conditions of this city are 
not able to endure the present demographic growth that this city is 
experiencing...Since I assumed my position as mayor of the federal 
district, I have increasingly become worried regarding the present 
situation of the city; thus I believe it is necessary to exhaust all of 
our options in order for the city to escape this grave situation.  The 
constant increase in traffic could be alleviated if we could build the 
necessary arterial roads that exist in the Master Plan of the city as 
well as build the often proposed metro system.  The Master Plan, as 
you all know, began when Donat Alfred Agache was invited by 
Mayor Antônio Prado Junior.  The master plan is the fruit of almost 
30 years of research and ideas, however almost nothing has come to 
fruition from this plan…Our present budgetary means are 
insufficient in order to save Rio from the suffocation it is experiencing 
due to population pressure and the lack of an adequate urban 
infrastructure.42
 
Negrão’s comment offers a clear synopsis of the inadequacies of urban 
planning in Rio during the 1950s by highlighting the financial and 
budget constraints, in addition to the dismal situation of the city’s 
infrastructure.  Moreover, his speech also illuminates the realities of the 
city, even during the apex of JK’s Anos Dourados. 
In his message to the Câmara de Vereadores on September 23, 
1957 Negrão de Lima passionately argued for legislation that would 
establish a special commission and fund for much needed public works.  
On November 28, 1957, law 899 was passed that created A 
Superintendência de Urbanização e Saneamento (SURSAN).  SURSAN 
                                                 
42 Quoted from Mensagem N° 77, from December 3, 1956.  Found in Prefeitura do 
Distrito Federal, “Mensagem N° 53 de 20 de Setembro de 1957, Enviada à Câmara dos 
Vereadores pelo Prefeito Francisco Negrão de Lima,” 8-10.   
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essentially subsumed the existing Secretary of Transportation and Public 
Works, being that the president of SURSAN was also the head of the 
aforementioned secretariat.  One critical decision that was made by 
Negrão and his advisors was to structure SURSAN into an autarquia – a 
decision that would certainly prove to be beneficial to future governors 
Lacerda and Negrão de Lima during the Guanabara years.  According to 
public policy scholar Ivan Richardson, an autarquia can be explained in 
the following fashion:     
An autarquia is a somewhat unique institution used to provide 
a variety of governmental services.  Autarquias are unique for four 
principle reasons. First, they are normally completely owned by the 
government.  Second, they occupy different legal positions, being 
legal entities within the governmental hierarchy enjoying the 
privileges of that status plus independence from many of the 
regulations.  In a sense, they have the best of both worlds.  Third, 
they are not independent from the executive.  The executive plays a 
vital role in appointing the leadership, as well as the budgetary 
matters and coordination.  Fourth, they enjoy a greater degree of 
financial flexibility than do the traditional administrative units.  
Their budgets are not considered to be part of the general state 
budget; many have ear-marked monies; and they are exempt from 
some of the detailed financial controls imposed on traditional 
agencies. 43
  
SURSAN was initially created in order to help execute public works 
projects over a ten-year period (1957-1967) that were deemed the most 
critical by the city’s planners and politicians.44  Different sources of 
                                                 
43 Ivan L. Richardson, “Developmental Agencies in Guanabara.” In Perspectives of 
Brazilian State and Local Government, Ivan L. Richardson, Editor, (Los Angeles:  
International Public Administration Center, University of Southern California), 94-95. 
 
44 Some of these initial projects that were included in the initial proposal included the 
Avenida Beira Mar, the razing of the Morro do Santo Antônio, the extension of the 
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revenue were tapped in order to help SURSAN carry out their special 
projects.  Richardson points out that the most critical source of funds 
were derived from ten percent (10%) of all taxes levied on “sales, land, 
buildings, industries, professions, car licensees, building permits, 
property transfers, and inheritances over a ten-year period”, as well as 
from accrued interest as well as water and sewage bills.45  While 
SURSAN was created during Rio’s waning capital days, it was not until 
Carlos Lacerda assumed the governorship of Guanabara in December 
1960 that SURSAN would become the dominant force in planning in Rio 
de Janeiro.  The “special” administrative structure of Guanabara, 
especially during the first two years of Lacerda’s administration (1961-
1962), left a lot of leeway and space for interpretation in carrying out 
tasks such as urban planning.   
As Marly Motta has suggested, the new city-state of Guanabara 
continued to operate much in the same fashion as it did as a federal 
district; except with an elected governor that was a essentially a mayor.  
Furthermore, Rio de Janeiro still remained the political and cultural 
capital of Brazil in the 1960s, despite the inauguration of Brasília. In 
parts of Chapter 3, I will discuss how Guanabara’s unique administrative 
                                                                                                                                                 
Avenida Presidente Vargas between Avenida Paulo de Frontin, the Praça da Bandeira, 
and Avenida Francisco Bicalho, as well as finishing the Túnel Santa Bárbara (Catumbi-
Laranjeiras with connections to the Cais do Porto), the Avenida Radial Oeste (Extending 
from the Praça da Bandeira to the subúrbios), Avenida Radial Sul (Rua do Catete – 
Largo da Glória), as well as the construction and termination of tunnels in Copacabana.   
 
45 Ivan L. Richardson, “Developmental Agencies in Guanabara.” 111.   
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structure proved to be extremely advantageous for SURSAN’s planning 
initiatives.  Lacerda’s first task was to organize every facet of the new 
city-state, and the absence of any previous city-states in Brazil certainly 
gave him and his supporters a strategic advantage regarding the 
direction of Guanabara.   
The material in this chapter has documented that the city of Rio de 
Janeiro in the late 1950s was far from the paradise depicted in the 
postcard images of Copacabana and Pão de Açucar.  It was a city that 
had sub-standard infrastructure, housing and transportation problems, 
numerous socio-cultural conflicts, and the lack of necessary finances 
and leadership to help solve these alarming problems. 
From 1960 to 1970, the city of Rio de Janeiro would experience its 
most intense urban renewal campaign in its history. Expressways, 
overpasses, and tunnels would drastically incise through numerous hills 
and neighborhoods, while millions of dollars were solicited from many 
domestic and transnational sources in order to finance endeavors that 
were envisioned by the city’s planners, politicians, and residents since 
the early twentieth century.   
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Table 2.1 – Population Growth in Rio de Janeiro, 1950-1960 




1° District (Candelária, São José, Santa Rita, Gamboa, 
Ajuda, Sacramento, São Domingos, Santana) 
84,044 65,048 
2° District (Espírito Santo, Rio Comprido, Engenho 
Velho) 
149,927 160,715 
3° District (Santo Antônio, Santa Teresa, Glória) 181,247 219,985 
4° District (Lagoa and Gávea) 147,869 201,505 
5° District (Copacabana) 129,249 240,347 
6° District (São Cristóvão) 76,604 78,002 
7° District (Tijuca) 80,011 107,074 
8° District (Andaraí and Engenho Nôvo) 239,157 285,343 
9° District (Méier, Inhaúma, and Piedade) 281,726 338,283 
10°District (Irajá, Pavuna, and Madureira) 379,624 574,045 
11° District (Penha) 140,628 182,772 
12° District (Jacarepaguá) 107,093 193,792 
13° District (Anchieta and Realengo) 226,312 381,398 
14° District (Campo Grande and Guaratiba) 80,268 154,102 
15° District (Santa Cruz) 31,564 49,377 
16° District (Ilhas) 39,957 68,643 
TOTAL 2,377,451 3,307,163 
Source:  Estado da Guanabara, Características Demográficas e Socias do Estado da 




Table 2.2  Mayors of the Distrito Federal 1947-1960 
Mayors Terms 
General Ângelo Mendes de Moraes June 16, 1947-April 22, 1951 
João Carlos Vital April 23, 1951-December 1, 1952 
Dulcídio Santo Cardoso December 12, 1952-September 4, 1954 
Alim Pedro September 6, 1954-December 2, 1955 
Francisco de Sá Lessa December 4, 1955-March 26, 1956 
Francisco Negrão de Lima March 26, 1956-July 4, 1958 













Chapter 3:  Carlos Lacerda and the Novo Rio de Janeiro 
 
“The State of Guanabara, because of it special administrative situation as 
a City-State, has enormous problems that belong to both State and 
Municipal Spheres.  While Rio de Janeiro was the Federal Capital almost 
75% of its population was engaged in commercial, administrative, and 
service functions.  However, with the move of the Brazilian government to 
Brasília, Rio de Janeiro suffered from a continuous reduction in these 
activities.  This has obliged the State Government to stimulate industrial 
growth by all means available.  Expansion in the agricultural field is 
practically impossible due to the small area of land available for this 
purpose in the State…Guanabara, with a small territory and the highest 
population density of Brazil, needs not only to improve but to greatly 
expand its public services such as water, transportation, housing, 
sanitation, telephone, and electric power.  Even though it is the cultural, 
artistic, and political center of the country, Guanabara has over one million 
people living in degrading conditions.  Doubtless, the state constitutes the 
most fertile field for the propagation of extremist ideas and is actually the 
number one goal of the communists.  Should Guanabara be taken over by 
the communists, their domination of Brazil and even all Latin America 
would be greatly facilitated.  Accordingly, Guanabara’s problems can not 
be considered as only local or national ones, but in fact, affect the whole 
free world…Governor Lacerda is one of the cleverest, most capable, and 
courageous of the democratic leaders, and is an unremitting fighter against 
International Communism.  The Communist danger will diminish if decent 
social conditions including the opportunity for dignified work for the slum 
population of the State are established…President Kennedy’s “Alliance for 
Progress” program seems to be the answer to this challenge. The State has 
already applied to the IADB for financing of specific projects, but there 
have been no indications, except perhaps for one or two projects, that the 
funds will be available shortly.. Something positive has to be done right 
now if Mr. Lacerda is not to lose his battle with consequent victory by the 
left…From the foregoing, it can be seen that the State of Guanabara needs 
urgent help from the US Government either as direct aid or as interim 
financing, while the appropriate groups study the various applications.  It 
is agreed that the most effective way of extending such help is to channel 
it through a joint commission formed by top Brazilian and American 
members…To start with, it is suggested that a 20 million dollar line of 
credit be established in favor of the State to be managed by the joint 
commission… it is proposed that the negotiations be carried on between 
Ambassador Gordon, Minister San Tiago Dantas, and Governor Lacerda.”1
 
                                                 
1 Memorandum: Suggestion for Creation of a Joint Commission to Manage Foreign 
Funds for Projects of the State of Guanabara, Brasil. Coleção Carlos Lacerda – 
Universidade de Brasília, hereafter, CCL.  Unknown author, November 16, 1961.  
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Carlos Frederico Werneck de Lacerda became the first elected 
governor of the newly created state of Guanabara in 1960.  Lacerda was 
elected by running on an anti-Communist, anti-corruption, and center-
right platform on the União Democrático Nacional (UDN) ticket that 
appealed mainly to the middle and upper class sectors who mostly 
resided in the south zone of the city.2  Born into an established family of 
Rio’s elite in 1914, Lacerda was intrigued by and sympathized with 
communist ideas until the late 1930s. He was also an influential political 
journalist and founder of the Rio daily, Tribuna de Imprensa.3  Lacerda is 
largely remembered as the journalist and politician who led the attacks 
against populist President Getúlio Vargas in the early 1950s.  Lacerda’s 
increasingly rabid denunciations of President Vargas in the early 1950s 
led to a series of controversial events, including an attempt on Lacerda’s 
life, which resulted in the death of his bodyguard, Major Ruben Vaz. In 
August 1954, amidst the controversy and chaos surrounding the 
Lacerda-Vargas rivalry, Getúlio Vargas committed suicide.  Many of 
                                                 
2 Although he was the first elected governor, it should be noted that José Rodrigues 
Sette Câmara led a transitional administration from April 21, 1960 to December 5, 
1960.  For more info see the indispensable reference book written by Engineer José de 
Oliveira Reis, A Guanabara e Seus Governadores (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da Cidade 
do Rio de Janeiro, 1977), 9.  For an overview on the ideology of Lacerda see Gláucio Ary 
Dillon Soares, “As Bases Ideológicas Do Lacerdismo,” Revista Civilização Brasileira 1:4 
(Set. 1965): 49-70. 
 
3 For extensive biographical information on Lacerda see John W.F. Dulles, Carlos 
Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader Volume One:  The Years 1914-1960 (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1991) idem, Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader Volume Two: The Years 
1960-1977 (Austin:  University of Texas Press, 1996); Claudio Lacerda, Carlos Lacerda e 
os anos sessenta:  Oposição.  (Rio de Janeiro:  Nova Fronteira, 1998); Bryan McCann, 
“Carlos Lacerda: The Rise and Fall of a Middle-Class Populist in 1950s Brazil,” Hispanic 
American Historical Review 83:4 (November 2003): 661-696. 
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Vargas’ strongest supporters and constituents would never forgive 
Lacerda for his actions against the president.  These harsh feelings 
towards Lacerda were clearly exhibited in the 1960 gubernatorial 
campaign for the new city-state of Guanabara, which he won with only 
35.7% of the vote in October 1960.  Lacerda owed his victory to the fact 
that two other politicians (Tenório Cavalcanti – PST) and Sergio 
Magalhães (PTB) split the vote in the mainly working class subúrbios. 
 During the late 1950s, Carlos Lacerda was one of the most 
outspoken opponents of Brasília.  Aside from his rivalry with President 
Kubitschek (who owed his start in politics to Getúlio Vargas), Lacerda 
also had a great disdain for the Brazilian architect, Oscar Niemeyer, one 
of Brasília’s creators and a stalwart of the Communist Party. But once 
Brasília was a fait accompli, Lacerda shifted his focus to Rio de Janeiro.  
During his campaign for the gubernatorial seat of Guanabara, Lacerda 
criticized his predecessors for their “antiquated” approach and slow pace 
in regards to urban development and planning.  Rafael Almeida de 
Magalhães, who Lacerda groomed as his protégé and hopeful successor, 
commented: “we not only battled against political opposition, but also 
against old methods within the government and planning 
community…We fought hard to promote administrative reorganization, 
fiscal reform, and a renovation of personnel by instituting a 
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meritocracy.”4 These elements combined with Lacerda’s future 
aspirations for the presidency, the dynamics of social tensions within 
Brazil, and the politics of the Cold War are critical in understanding the 
historical context and significance of urban renewal in Rio de Janeiro 
during the 1960s. 
Lacerda and his administration invested a good deal of energy into 
the arena of urban development for various reasons.  Some scholars 
such as Angela Santos have focused on how Guanabara’s intense urban 
development initiatives were intended to provide jobs and stimulate the 
economy in a state that was steadily losing heavy industry.5  
Furthermore, urban reforms such as the construction of expressways, 
tunnels, parks, and other urban infrastructure are directly connected to 
the broader framework of economic developmentalism and the 
importance of the automobile that had taken hold since the mid 1950s 
under Kubitschek.  Historians such as Marly Silva da Motta have 
focused on Lacerda’s efforts to maintain Rio’s status as the de facto 
Brazilian capital despite the inauguration of Brasília.6   Many Cariocas 
                                                 
4 Israel Tabak, “Cidade Teve Quatro Grandes  ‘Viradas Neste Século,” Jornal do Brasil, 
23 October 1988, Caderno A, p.15. 
 
5 Angela Moulin S. Penalva Santos, Economia, Espaço, e Sociedade no Rio de Janeiro 
(Rio de Janeiro:  Editora FGV, 2003), Chapter 6.  Also see Angela Moulin S. Penalva 
Santos, “Planejamento e Desenvolvimento: O Estado da Guanabara” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, FAU/USP, 1990). 
 
6 Marly Silva da Motta, Saudades da Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro:  Fundação Getúlio 
Vargas, 2000); Marly Silva da Motta, Rio de Janeiro: de Cidade-Capital a Estado da 
Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2001). For a 
historiographical overview of the transfer from Rio to Brasília see Marly Silva da Motta, 
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such as Lacerda were determined to prove that Rio (the Belacap), would 
continue to serve as Brazil’s window to the rest of the world, despite the 
inauguration of the new capital city of Brasília (Novacap) and São Paulo’s 
industrial dominance. Additionally, Lacerda claimed that though his 
models for urban and administrative reform, Rio would serve as the 
cornerstone of modernity for Brazil and Latin America’s planning 
community. More importantly, Lacerda was intent upon demonstrating 
that he was an efficient, productive, and democratically progressive 
politician capable of producing concrete results that would hopefully 
propel him to the presidency in 1965.   
Lacerda never did have the chance to run for the presidency, as 
the military seized control of the country in April 1964; however he 
strategically used his skills as a journalist to publicize the daily progress 
of his administration’s achievements to both his constituents and 
opponents by advertising in newspapers and other media outlets. 
Massive public works such as the Túnel Rebouças and the Aterro and 
Parque do Flamengo were publicized and proclaimed as the world’s 
“largest urban tunnel” and “largest urban park,” while the Novo Rio 
constructed by Lacerda’s administration was partly unveiled during Rio’s 
400th anniversary celebration in January 1965. Furthermore, urban 
renewal and massive construction became an integral part of daily life for 
                                                                                                                                                 
“O Rio de Janeiro continua Sendo?” In:  Rio de Janeiro:  Capital e Capitalidade edited by 




most Cariocas as many of the city newspapers, magazines, radio and 
television shows began to cover the city’s spatial transformation in 
greater detail. Aside from examining the aesthetics, politics, and spatial 
consequences of urban planning during the 1960s in Rio, it is worth 
noting that the debates and dialogues surrounding urban planning were 
often illustrative of the broader social, cultural, and political concerns of 
Brazil in the 1960s. 
Urban planning during Lacerda’s term as governor focused on 
improving the new city-state’s decaying urban infrastructure as well as 
social services such. Furthermore, Lacerda and his advisors were 
foremost committed to building new schools and affordable housing, and 
adapting the city’s landscape to the automobile.  In order to finance 
these projects, Lacerda adjusted city-state tax rates and procured funds 
from transnational sources such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank in Washington, D.C. and the Alliance for Progress.  With a leftist 
government in power at the federal level (Jânio Quadros and João 
Goulart), the United States believed that they had a possible ally in the 
anti-communist Lacerda; particularly if he were to mount a successful 
campaign for the presidency in 1965.   
The lack of a legal definition of administrative organization upon 
the creation of the new city-state of Guanabara proved to be the most 
critical measure for explaining how Lacerda, and his successor, Negrão 
de Lima, were able to overhaul the city in a period of ten years.  
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Strategically, Lacerda found loopholes to create a city-state 
administration which vested the majority of power in the executive, while 
maintaining Guanabara as a state with one municipality: Rio de Janeiro.  
This new administration reorganized Guanabara into decentralized 
administrative regions, along with creating traditional executive 
departments (secretarias) and mixed-enterprise entities to administer 
Guanabara’s daily business.  Although it was a city-state with an elected 
governor, the governor of Guanabara was essentially the mayor of Rio de 
Janeiro.  Accordingly, Lacerda had an unprecedented amount of power in 
regards to creating and implementing policy within Rio de Janeiro.  
Guanabara as such, was not only an anomaly within Brazil for being a 
city-state, but for the fact that it was not organized administratively like 
most of the other states. Therefore, while Lacerda certainly was 
ambitious and developed a plan for Rio de Janeiro, he clearly benefited 
from the lack of an established and legalized organizational structure 
which he used in his favor to implement a governmental structure that 
suited his agenda and programs.  
The major projects of the Lacerda period revolved around the 
building of new expressways, tunnels, sewage and water supply systems, 
as well as the building of schools and  “solving” the problem of the 
favelas.  Due to Rio’s topography and spatial layout, the circulation of 
traffic between the zona norte and zona sul could only occur under the 
current conditions by passing through the central area of the city.  Two 
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of the projects that were constructed and finished during the Lacerda 
period were the completion of the Túnel Santa Bárbara (Catumbi-
Laranjeiras) that linked the outskirts of the centro with the zona sul, and 
the gigantic Túnel Rebouças (Rio Comprido-Lagoa) which linked the zona 
norte directly with the zona sul by cutting through the main massif of the 
city, the Maciço da Tijuca.   
Declared by many engineers and planners as the largest urban 
tunnel in the world, the Túnel Rebouças is one of the most significant 
planned projects in the history of the city of Rio de Janeiro to which I will 
dedicate a substantial amount of attention in this chapter.  For the first 
time, there was a direct link between the zona norte and zona sul.  The 
construction of the Túnel Rebouças not only transformed the spatial 
characteristics of the city, but officially reinforced the differentiations 
that existed in the social, cultural, and economic elements of the zona 
norte and zona sul. Once seen as a large nuisance in the physical 
planning process, planners and engineers were finally able to overcome 
the topographical obstacles which often dictated how planning was 
conducted throughout the city.  Geographer Maria do Carmo Corrêa 
Galvão suggests that because Rio de Janeiro is immense and fragmented 
by its topography, it is always vital to rethink the significance of its 
geographic location and the magnitude of the work produced by 
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engineers and planners.7  This point correlates directly with the Túnel 
Rebouças and other tunnels throughout the city’s landscape that will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
3.1 Administrative Organization of the New City-State 
 
 Carlos Lacerda began his term as the governor of Guanabara on 
December 5, 1960.  One of the first tasks at hand when he assumed the 
governorship was to establish an organizational structure for the newly 
formed city-state.  Lacerda and the newly elected Constituent Assembly 
debated three main possibilities regarding Guanabara’s organizational 
configuration. In his work on decentralized administration in Guanabara, 
Ivan Richardson highlighted the three options that the Constituent 
Assembly and Lacerda deliberated: 8   
1. The division of Guanabara into semi-autonomous cities which 
would involve the definition of boundaries, a new tax structure, 
and elections for council members. 
2. The continuation of the centralized structure of the Federal District 
years with minor administrative and organizational adjustments. 
3. The division of Guanabara into decentralized regions or units (not 
municipalities or cities) with administrators appointed by the 
Governor. 
 
                                                 
  7 Maria do Carmo Corrêa Galvão, “Focos Sobre A Questão Ambiental No Rio De Janeiro.”  
In Natureza e Sociedade No Rio De Janeiro, edited by Maurício de Almeida Abreu, 13-26 
(Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro – Secretaria Municipal de 
Cultura, 1992), 20. 
 
8For an informative overview regarding the new administrative organization of the newly 
created state, see:  Ivan L. Richardson, “Decentralized Administration in Guanabara.” In 
Perspectives of Brazilian State and Local Government Ivan L. Richardson, Editor 53-90. 
(Los Angeles: International Public Administration Center, School of Public 
Administration, University of Southern California). As Richardson mentions, the decree 
was liberally interpreted from federal and state law which allowed the governor, as the 
chief person in power, to issue executive decrees.   
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One major obstacle during the first months of Lacerda’s term was 
the lack of a constitution which stipulated the specific powers of the 
governor and the legislature. Lacerda advocated vehemently that 
Guanabara remain a city-state without municipalities; thus on January 
30, 1961 Lacerda issued executive decree 353 which declared that 
Guanabara, on a trial basis, would be organized as a city-state with three 
decentralized administrative regions and no additional municipalities 
(option 3 above).  Due to the lack of a ratified constitution, Lacerda based 
this executive decree on two previous federal laws which gave governors 
the ability to issue decrees.9  This decentralized administrative structure 
vested tremendous power into the governor’s hands, and is critical to 
understanding how Lacerda was able to initiate many of his programs in 
such as short period of time.  Unlike other governors in Brazil, Lacerda 
did not have to compete or negotiate with various other elected leaders 
(mayors) throughout the state for revenue, aside from the members of the 
Constituent Assembly.   
With the promulgation of Guanabara’s constitution in March 1961, 
the Constituent Assembly ultimately decided to let Lacerda experiment 
with his decentralization program, and let the voters of Guanabara 
decide on its merits with a plebiscite vote in 1963. Lacerda was given two 
                                                 
9 Richardson, “Decentralized Administration in Guanabara,” 62-63.  The decree was 
liberally interpreted from laws that allowed the governor or mayor, as the chief person 
in power, to issue executive decrees.  They were based on laws 3.752 of April 14, 1960 
which made official the transfer of the capital and the election of a new governor and 
Constituent Assembly and Law 217 from January 15, 1948 which was the organic law 
of the federal district. 
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years to experiment with decentralized administration.  While Lacerda 
and his staff were clearly dedicated to establishing a decentralized 
administration, there were many politicians, residents, businesses, and 
labor unions concerned with this new administrative structure.  Aside 
from the lack of precedent within Brazil concerning this sort of 
administrative structure, many suggested that it would disrupt 
patronage networks in addition to business, professional, and personal 
relationships which took decades to establish.  Indeed, one of Lacerda’s 
constant missions in the early days of his tenure was to destroy the 
clientelistic manner in which the public and private sectors operated and 
interacted during the federal district years.  Ultimately, Lacerda intended 
for his decentralized system of government to create a government and 
workforce that valued competition, competency, and accountability and 
in turn offered better service for the city’s residents.    
Many government employees from the federal district days were 
concerned about their job security, benefits, supervision, and duties as a 
result of newly created city-state with a decentralized administration.  
Moreover, while there were many concerned about the ultimate power 
Lacerda would hold with his handpicked regional administrators, many 
people were worried that they would get lost in the transition from the 
centralized federal district structure to Guanabara’s decentralized one. 
Contrarily, Lacerda argued that his plan offered citizens and employees 
more efficient governmental services and that there would not be an 
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adequate way to provide for a sufficient tax base in some areas of 
Guanabara should it be divided into individual municipalities.10   In 
1963, the voters overwhelmingly elected to maintain Guanabara’s status 
as a city-state without municipalities.  In turn, the whole state was 
converted into decentralized administrations as was outlined in the 
provisions of the initial voting legislation regarding decentralization.11  
The initial lack of an administrative structure was critical to 
Lacerda’s success.  While there was some competition from several of the 
members elected to the Constituent Assembly, the continuous daily 
improvisations regarding Guanabara’s administrative structure gave 
Lacerda enormous power and leverage in establishing his programs and 
initiatives.  The benefit of this administrative structure, combined with 
transnational aid, autarquias such as SURSAN, and an aggressive public 
relations staff helped Lacerda launch one of his primary goals of his 
campaign:  rebuilding and renewing Rio de Janeiro.  Maurício Perez’s 
recent work on public administration in Guanabara suggests that 
Lacerda was able to accomplish and reform Rio largely due to a “rational, 
efficient, and well designed public administrative model that included 
technocratic competency.”12 Perez also claims that while the 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 70-71. 
 
11 Richardson calculated that out of 953,679 voters, only 49,707 voted to divide 





implementation of this new decentralized model was critical to Lacerda’s 
success, his desire to establish an entire public administration built 
upon meritocracy and competition instead of the patronage system that 
existed while Rio was also the federal district is also fundamental to 
understanding the results produced by Lacerda.  
It is critical to comprehend that while many of his predecessors 
(appointed mayors of the Distrito Federal) did at least have some desire 
to reform Rio, many lacked the power locally, federally, and 
internationally that Carlos Lacerda was able to attain as a consequence 
of being elected the governor of a city-state that had an undetermined 
administrative structure.  Lacerda’s insistence on running a government 
where efficiency, accountability, and competition for jobs and contracts 
is extremely well-documented within the context of urban planning, 
although he was indeed guilty of violating some of his own rules several 
times as I will clearly identify later.  In order to understand how and why 
the city of Rio de Janeiro experienced such a drastic change during the 
first two administrations of Guanabara, it is also important to consider 
the administrative foundation of the city-state, as well as the changes 
that were created in Rio’s planning culture.   
 Lacerda still remains a controversial and polarizing figure in 
Brazilian history, although many recent accounts have reconsidered his 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Maurício Dominguez Perez, “Estado da Guanabara:  Gestão e Estrutura 
Administrativa do Governo Carlos Lacerda (Ph.D. Dissertation, Universidade Federal do 
Rio de Janeiro, 2005). 
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savvy administrative qualities.  A cover story from Veja Rio magazine in 
1995 was published to commemorate “30 years without Lacerda.”  The 
articles in the aforementioned piece offer differing perspectives on 
Lacerda’s role as a politician, administrator, and person from politicians 
of various leanings, while posing a question that I seek to investigate 
throughout this chapter: 
“[It is] impossible to imagine Rio without the Aterro do 
Flamengo, the Rebouças and Santa Bárbara tunnels, and the 
Guandu water supply system - works that the loved and hated 
Carlos Lacerda carried out between 1961 and 1965.  Why can’t 
anybody do what he did?13
 
3.2 Organizing and Financing an Urban Development Agenda 
 
After the inauguration of Brasília in 1960, Rio de Janeiro 
continued as the cultural and artistic capital of Brazil, in spite of having 
an urban infrastructure insufficient to support the rates of rural to 
urban migration that was constant throughout most of Latin America 
since the late 1940s.  A plethora of planning projects were devised in the 
1950s, however the available funds for their implementation were far 
from adequate to carry out these projects.  Much of Lacerda’s campaign 
for the governorship of Guanabara was centered on an urban planning 
agenda that would address traffic, housing, sewage, the construction of 
public schools, and the supply of water. In order to deliver on his 
promises, Lacerda was aware that the procurement of abundant funds 
was critical to his agenda to rebuild and reform the urban fabric of Rio 
                                                 
13 “30 Anos Sem Lacerda,” Front Cover Veja Rio 29 November 1995.  
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de Janeiro.  During his gubernatorial campaign, Lacerda reiterated the 
priorities of his administration’s urban planning initiatives:  
“Transportation and traffic, an old problem which has never 
been resolved, affects our everyday lives and happiness, aside from 
creating serious obstacles to the progress of the state. . .  As we look 
at the financial situation, we will have small resources, at the very 
least, to transform the city into an inhabitable place. The basic order 
of our priorities is transportation, education, and the supply of 
water.14
 
Thirteen initial Secretarias, which were executive departments led 
by a Secretária/o appointed by the governor, were introduced into 
Guanabara’s administrative organization. Unlike many other Brazilian 
states, Guanabara still lacked an official planning department, preferring 
to leave these tasks to its various autarquias and indirect administrative 
agencies. The Secretaria de Govêrno, which was an executive department 
that reported directly to the governor, was strategically put in charge of 
all budgetary issues including the procurement, application, and 
management of all state funds related to urban development.15  Lacerda 
eventually decided to appoint his protégé (and envisioned successor), 
Raphael Almeida de Magalhães (Rafa), as the Secretário de Govêrno, in 
                                                 
14 These quotes are from two different speeches written by Governor Carlos Lacerda.  
They can be found under “A Cidade Devastada e Sua Reconstrução” and “Soluções Para 
O Transporte” In Carlos Lacerda, O Poder das Idéias 4th Edition (Rio de Janeiro:  
Distribuidora Record Editôra, 1964), 163, 170-171. 
 
15 The initial secretarias consisted of: Education and Culture, Economy, Tourism, 
Finance, Justice, Public Works, Administration, Health, Public Services, Public 
Security, without Portfolio (Sem Pasta), and to the Governor.  Additional secretaries 
were eventually created during the Lacerda and Negrão terms such as Civil Household 
(1964), Science and Technology (1968), and Agriculture (1969).  For more info see Ivan 
L. Richardson, “Decentralized Administration in Guanabara,” 75-77; Angela Moulin S. 
Penalva Santos, “Planejamento e Desenvolvimento:  O Estado da Guanabara, Chapter 
4, p. 43-44.  
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order to supervise the budgetary and financial matters regarding urban 
development in Guanabara. This organizational scheme clearly displayed 
the desires of Governor Lacerda to keep urban development issues within 
his immediate control by strategically delineating an administrative 
framework where the planning process was aligned directly to the 
executive and out of the reach of other politicians. 
The main force behind the process of planning and execution of 
planning projects was assumed by SURSAN early into Lacerda’s term.  
An autarquia, SURSAN was to oversee and implement planning schemes, 
as well as to solicit funds for ambitious urban renewal projects.  Since it 
was a state-owned enterprise which was controlled by the executive 
(Lacerda), SURSAN was able to operate with fewer constraints than 
normal planning departments in other cities and states throughout 
Brazil. SURSAN’s budget enabled it to hire architects, engineers, and 
urbanists at competitive market salaries which made it a desirable place 
of employment vis-à-vis the regular state departments.16  Still, Lacerda 
was adamant that positions in both SURSAN and the other state 
agencies and companies be earned through a merit-based application 
process.  This merit-based system that Lacerda keenly wished to 
implement is extremely apparent through Lacerda’s colorful and often 
                                                 
16  Pedro Teixeira Soares interview by Américo Freire, Carlos Eduardo Sarmento, Lúcia 
Lippi, and Marly Motta (Rio de Janeiro, 12 June 2000 and 16 October 2000). Capítulos 
da Memória do Urbanismo Carioca, organizadores, Américo Freire and Lúcia Lippi 




sarcastic memorandas addressed to various personnel throughout his 
governorship.  The content of a memo from early January 1962 from 
Lacerda to the Secretário de Viação contextualizes this approach: “Sr. 
Secretário de Viação: The next open competition for engineers begins 
(pause), when? We should recruit those who are young, new to the field,  
have the capacity to learn, do not have bad habits, preconceived notions, 
and biases.17
 The memo cited above, as with the many others throughout 
Lacerda’s private archive, certainly conveys Lacerda’s desire to rid 
Guanabara of attitudes he viewed as counterproductive to his 
administration’s mission to reform the city-state through measures of 
accountability, efficiency, and competition.  Lacerda believed that this 
new spirit would weed out unqualified personnel as well as break away 
from clientelism practiced by his political adversaries in the PSD and 
PTB.  In tune with the principles of social science and modernization 
theory of the late 1950s, Lacerda envisioned that his model of 
governance in Guanabara would foster more individual socio-economic 
mobility and democratic values among the population and deter any 
communist mobilization. 
 During the first months of Lacerda’s administration, ample time 
was spent drafting urban planning and economic development strategies 
that would generate revenue and improve the city’s infrastructure.  A 
                                                 
17 Memorandum N° 3 16 January 1962.  Carlos Lacerda to Secretário de Viação, CCL.   
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critical reorganization of SURSAN was made for the purposes of 
maximizing the executive supervision of all planning and economic 
initiatives within Guanabara.  SURSAN was divided into five specific 
departments for the purposes of streamlining responsibilities regarding 
urban development: urbanization, water, sewage, finances, and 
sanitation.  Furthermore, the CEO/President of SURSAN also held the 
position as the Secretária de Obras Públicas of Guanabara (Public 
Works) who was advised by a control board council appointed by the 
governor for the purposes of monitoring the financial, technical, and 
efficiency of the agency.  While this council was primarily composed of 
technocrats such as engineers, accountants, and architects, it also had a 
branch that was represented by taxpayers in order to oversee the 
efficiency of SURSAN.18  
 SURSAN assumed the primary role in planning and rebuilding Rio 
de Janeiro during the 1960s, but the government of Guanabara also 
developed other organs and agencies in order to complement an urban 
renewal agenda that intended to redefine the fabric of the city-state. 
Since the 1950s, the culture of the automobile that was cultivated under 
Juscelino Kubitschek’s developmentalist programs invested millions of 
dollars in order to develop and expand Brazil’s road and highway 
networks which also meant to spark economic and industrial 
                                                 
18  Ivan L. Richardson, “Developmental Agencies in Guanabara,” 110-112.; Angela 
Moulin S. Penalva Santos, “Planejamento e Desenvolvimento:  O Estado da Guanabara, 
Chapter 4, p.49.  
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development and growth.  One such organ that enjoyed the spoils of this 
new fever for roads (febre viária) and cars was the Departamento de 
Estradas e Rodagem of Guanabara (DER-GB – Department of Highways 
and Roads). The DER-GB was an agency of the Secretaria de Obras 
Públicas, responsible for the application of funds that originated from the 
National Highway Fund (Fundo Rodoviário Nacional - DNER); thereby 
also largely responsible for building and allocating funds for the 
construction of roads that would link Guanabara with other regions of 
Brazil – primarily São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Brasília.  Whereas the 
DER-GB was responsible for Guanabara’s highways, the construction of 
overpasses, viaducts, and the maintenance of city streets was assigned to 
SURSAN’s Departamento de Vias Urbanas (DVU). According to Santos, 
while integrating the automobile into Guanabara’s neighborhoods and 
streets was of primary importance for planners of SURSAN and the DER-
GB, the overarching goals of all urban reforms under Lacerda and Negrão  
was to help stimulate economic growth and industry that had 
continuously diminished in Rio since the postwar period.19   
 In order to address the diminishing presence of industry within 
Guanabara, a mixed-enterprise company, Companhia de Progresso do 
Estado da Guanabara (COPEG) was established in October 1961.  
COPEG was created to produce an “incentive for industrial production, 
                                                 
19 Angela Moulin S. Penalva Santos, “Planejamento e Desenvolvimento:  O Estado da 
Guanabara, Chapter 4, p.48; Angela Moulin S. Penalva Santos, Economia, Espaço, e 
Sociedade no Rio de Janeiro , 141.  
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farming, cattle raising and poultry, with a view to raising the standard of 
living and improving the social welfare of the population through the 
encouragement, and enticing and the coordination of any private and 
public capital investments aiming at the installation, expansion or 
remodeling of industrial enterprises.”20  Aside from developing strategies 
to attract new industry to Guanabara, COPEG also was concerned with 
the decentralization and expansion of new industrial areas in 
Guanabara, particularly in Santa Cruz.  A credit subsidiary bank, 
COPEG Credito e Financiamento (COTEG), was established in order to 
provide financial support to the various industrial, cultural, and 
commercial entities within Guanabara.  Through medium and long term 
loans, as well as capital subscriptions, COTEG would help existing and 
new industries build and modernize their plants and factories within the 
city-state. Additionally, the law firm of Joshua B. Powers of New York 
City was hired by COPEG and its subsidiaries in order to “disseminate in 
the industrial and financial sectors of the United States of America, news 
and information on the possibilities and advantages of industries in the 
state of Guanabara, and to orient and put the interested parties in touch 
with the grantor’s Board of Directors, with a view to making said 
investments and installations possible.”21    
                                                 
20 “Law N° 47 of October 23, 1961:  Institutes the Companhia Progresso do Estado da 
Guanabara (COPEG)” Document written in English found in CCL.   
 
21 “Notas Sôbre a Primeira Reunião Conjunta dos Conselhos de Desenvolvimento e 
Fiscal e a Diretoria da COPEG” Original meeting was on January 4, 1962 at 9am.  CCL.   
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The creation of new industrial districts on the periphery of the 
state was a priority for COPEG and the state of Guanabara.  Aside from 
alleviating the central area of the city from traffic and pollution, the early 
technocrats of COPEG argued that existing and new industrialists 
needed more open space that would give the incentive to produce more 
efficiently and offer lower operational costs in the long run.  Initiatives to 
create new industrial districts on the periphery of the city-state were 
related with plans to construct nearby housing complexes for lower 
income groups. The passage below foreshadows how another mixed-
enterprise company in Guanabara, the Companhia de Habitação Popular 
do Estado da Guanabara (Popular Housing Company of Guanabara -
COHAB-GB), would introduce initiatives, albeit rather polemical, to build 
new housing developments for members of the working class families 
who resided in favelas located in areas of the zona norte, sul, and centro. 
These matters regarding industrial development and the subsequent plan 
to construct nearby housing is colorfully cited in an internal memo 
written by a North American attorney who represented COPEG’s 
international matters: 
“Through the development of the industrial districts, a large 
number of new jobs will be created.  The labourers will have a 
shorter trip to and from work, especially after our parent company 
has built or induced other agencies to build housing for labourers in 
the neighborhoods of the plants.  By moving a number of industries 
from the downtown areas into the industrial districts, we help to 
disencumber an overcrowded area on one hand, and to re-quip, 
remodel and expand these same industries in their new quarters.  
The industrial districts will make it easier for the Government to 
provide for adequate public services.  What the manufacturers lack, 
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and constitutes therefore our task to supply, is the financial aid to 
effect such a move.” 22  
 
While Carlos Lacerda and his staff established an innovative and 
creative administrative framework to address the city-state’s problems by 
using autarquias (mixed enterprise government owned companies) and 
foundations, they still lacked the necessary funds in order to carry out 
ambitious projects that would rebuild and modernize Rio de Janeiro.  
In order to fund and support most of his programs including urban 
development, Guanabara relied upon three main sources of funding:  
state and municipal revenue derived from sales, property and 
miscellaneous taxes, federal aid, and loans from programs and agencies 
such as the Alliance for Progress-USAID, the Inter-American 
Developmental Bank, and the Fundo do Trigo.23 In their research 
                                                 
22 The above quote is from a document written in English summarizing the details of 
COPEG by Robert W. Bialek who was a special assistant to Joshua B. Powers, a New 
York based lawyer who represented COPEG and its subsidiaries.  No date given.  CCL.      
 
23 The “Fundo do Trigo” was a program established in 1961 that was tied to the United 
States’ Alliance for Progress program. According to Pedro Cezar Dutra Fonseca, the 
Fundo do Trigo was “a deal between the Brazilian and American governments whereby 
the United States, due to overproduction, had agreed to sell wheat to Brazil under 
advantageous conditions.  It was not a gift but a loan with favorable terms:  the cost of 
the wheat was to be paid over forty years, with two installments per year, at a five 
percent annual interest wheat; meanwhile, Brazil had the use of income from the sale of 
wheat.  There was a US requirement that the funds thus made available should be 
linked to specific projects.” Pedro Cezar Dutra Fonseca “Banco Regional de 
Desenvolvimento do Extremo-Sul: A Regional Pro-Development Institution” Business 
and Economic History 27:2 (Winter 1998): 368. For perspectives on the Alliance for 
Progress see Ronald Scheman, editor, The Alliance for Progress – A Retrospective (New 
York: Praeger, 1988); Michael Latham, “Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny:  
Modernization and the Kennedy era Alliance for Progress,” Diplomatic History (Spring 
1998): 199-230.  Furthermore, while extremely complex, Guanabara did benefit from 
being a city-state in that it was able to capture all streams of state and municipal 




regarding the application of finances during the Guanabara period, 
economists Angela Santos and Mauro Osorio have concluded that federal 
aid played a minimal role in financing Guanabara’s operations. Although 
the federal government had promised to fund a large slice of Guanabara’s 
expenditures during its first gubernatorial term as a consequence of the 
transfer of the capital to Brasília, this money had a marginal role in 
contributing to the city-state’s overall expenditures. Marly Motta 
attributes the difficulty of obtaining these promised federal funds largely 
to Lacerda’s shaky relationship with both the Quadros and Goulart 
administrations, and his failure to have a majority within Guanabara’s 
legislative assembly. During both the Lacerda and Negrão de Lima 
administrations, Guanabara ultimately paid for its expenses through 
revenue obtained through various taxes, state revenue, and foreign aid.24      
The introductory quote of this chapter contextualizes the broader 
social, political, and cultural tensions within Rio de Janeiro and Brazil 
during the early 1960s, as the gap and struggles between the center-
right (UDN) and center-left (PSD-PTB) intensified particularly after the 
Cuban Revolution of 1959.  Lacerda was keenly aware that in order to 
implant his ambitious agenda he strategically needed to publicize to the 
United States how underdevelopment and left-leaning ideas could 
destroy the democratic future of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil.  Lacerda 
                                                 
24 This is a central theme in both works by Angela Santos (1990, 2003), as well as in 
the work by Mauro Osorio.  For more details see Mauro Osorio Rio Nacional, Rio Local:  
Mitos e Visões da crise Carioca e Fluminense (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora SENAC Rio, 
2005); Motta, Rio de Janeiro: de Cidade-Capital a Estado da Guanabara, Chapter 4. 
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became known as Brazil’s most outspoken anti-communist figure 
domestically and internationally, however this rhetoric alone did not 
secure his government the aid it needed to rebuild Guanabara - even if 
the Kennedy administration and subsequent lending agencies were 
certainly more inclined to offer their support to Lacerda. The process of 
securing aid, which came mainly in the form of loans, was a complex 
process for Guanabara as noted by Lacerda shortly before his death: 
“[One] asks if Guanabara was privileged in receiving foreign 
loans, which indeed was the case – although it wasn’t the only state 
in Brazil to receive such funds…With the development of sectors 
such as the automobile industry during Kubitschek’s presidency, a 
large worldwide movement emerged in believing in the future of 
Brazil which eventually coincided with the Alliance for Progress. 
Thus, Guanabara benefited more than other states because we were 
proactive in exploring these programs…Yes, my government was 
privileged with receiving external funds, however they were 
overwhelmingly in the form of loans paid for by the tax payers of 
Guanabara, which had to be approved by the legislative assembly 
where I didn’t have a majority – in addition to creating a new tax for 
water – water that the city’s residents would only have several 
years down the line.25
     
1961 and 1962 were spent by members of Lacerda’s staff 
formulating plans to finance and rebuild Guanabara by requesting funds 
from sources such as the Alliance for Progress/United States Agency for 
Development (USAID) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
in Washington, DC.  The main priority for the solicitation of foreign loans 
                                                 
25 Lacerda here is referring to the tax that was instituted in order to help subsidize the 
new water supply (Adutora do Guandu) system that his administration constructed.  
The majority of loans from the Inter-American Developmental Bank went into financing 
this project which would become known as the “Public Work of the Century.”  There is 
indeed copious letters of correspondence located in Coleção Carlos Lacerda (CCL) 
among the various engineers of SURSAN, Lacerda, USAID, and IADB regarding the 
loans for this project.  For more on this and the above quote see Carlos Lacerda, 
Depoimento (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1977), 225-239.  
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and aid was to continue with the construction of the new water supply 
system, known as the Adutora do Guandu, along with accompanying 
sewage systems.  According to official statistics reported by the state of 
Guanabara, five loan installments totaling US$36 million were extended 
by the IADB in order to help finance the procurement and solicitation of 
external funds came with Lacerda’s meeting with John F. Kennedy at the 
White House in March 1962.  Prior to their meeting, Lacerda drafted a 
five point letter regarding the importance that aid programs such as the 
Alliance for Progress had for Rio de Janeiro.  The letter, which was given 
to Kennedy during their meeting, highlighted Lacerda’s beliefs on how 
the funding of educational and youth vocational training programs could 
preserve the democratic future of Brazil.  Lacerda concluded his letter to 
Kennedy with a point that he knew would resonate with the democratic 
principles and social development components of Kennedy’ Alliance for 
Progress: 
“Rio de Janeiro, the new state of Guanabara, has the biggest 
potential labor market in Brazil.  It is the second industrial center 
and the focus of national migration.  It has a deficit of ten thousand 
housed per annum an accumulated deficit for ten years.  My state is 
and could be even more the showcase for Democratic progress in 
Brazil.  It is the main center of the Communist effort.  Powder may 
lie in the Northeast of Brazil but the wick is in Rio.26     
 
                                                 
26 “Letter from Lacerda to the Honorable John F. Kennedy,” March 26, 1962, CCL.  The 
details regarding the meeting with JFK are contained in Carlos Lacerda, Uma Rosa é 
Uma Rosa é Uma Rosa 2nd Edition, (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1965), 45-72.  
Lacerda was a great admirer of JFK, as he had written the preface to a Brazilian edition 
of Kennedy’s book. Lacerda’s future publishing company, Nova Fronteira (New Frontier), 
would be named in honor of JFK. 
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Alliance for Progress and donations from the Fundo do Trigo 
eventually did manage to reach Lacerda, and was subsequently applied 
mainly to COHAB’s public housing initiatives on the periphery of the 
city-state, and the construction of public schools.   The first two housing 
communities constructed in Guanabara, with the help from the Alliance 
for Progress, consequently were named in order to honor the donors:  
Vila Aliança and Vila Kennedy.   
   The government of Guanabara also looked to procure loans for 
other sectors such as public housing, industrial development, and the 
building of public schools.  While Guanabara was successful in acquiring 
loans and funds from the agencies listed above to help finance projects 
the water works, sewage, public housing, and schools, requests for the 
financing of certain projects that would bolster Rio’s tourism industry did 
not fare as well.  In response to Lacerda’s request for help with the 
funding of the construction of new hotels in Rio de Janeiro, IADB 
President, Felipe Herrera, replied: “While the IADB is aware of the 
importance of tourism to the state of Guanabara, the executive council of 
the IADB considers these concerns as secondary in nature, rather 
prioritizing more immediate economic development concerns.”27   
During Lacerda’s administration, federal assistance and financial 
support never accounted for more than 4% of Guanabara’s total 
expenditures.  Similarly, external loans and aid never comprised more 
                                                 
27 Letter from Felipe Herrera to Carlos Lacerda, 21 May 1962, CCL. 
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than 5% of Guanabara’s annual spending; even though from 1962 to 
1964 this source of aid was slightly greater than that of the federal 
government’s.  Moreover, donations from the Alliance for Progress and 
Fundo do Trigo accounted for a mere 10% of all foreign funds (both loans 
and donations), whereas Guanabara only received 5% of all Alliance for 
Progress funds that was earmarked for Brazil.28    
The makeover that the city of Rio de Janeiro would experience from 
1960 to 1970 ultimately was obtained from revenue generated from 
within the city-state through revenue derived from investment and the 
increasing of tax rates. Transnational and foreign sources of aid were 
certainly critical in order for the state of Guanabara to initiate or 
implement its ambitious urban renewal agenda, particularly regarding 
the water works, however I would argue that the fierce debates regarding 
the use of foreign capital by Lacerda’s administration is more symbolic of 
the broader socio-cultural and political tensions within Brazil during the 
early 1960s than in their overall importance in funding urban renewal.   
3.3 Projects for a Novo Rio: A Febre Viária and Tunnel Vision 
 
  By the late 1950s, the urban reform agenda in Rio de Janeiro, like 
many cities, began to focus more on the modernization of the city’s 
infrastructure and developing strategies to incorporate the automobile 
into the urban landscape. While Rio de Janeiro was still revered for its 
natural beauty and rich and diverse cultural scene, the city had daily 
                                                 
28 Perez, 83-87. 
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struggles with the lack of water, traffic, sewage, housing, and the 
circulation of traffic. Solutions to these problems eventually became 
central components to both Carlos Lacerda’s and Negrão de Lima’s 
administrations (1960-71), as the city experienced its most intense phase 
of both urban development and population growth. 
 Many of the projects that were constructed during the 1960s 
originated from plans that were developed by various urbanists and 
engineers during the federal district years of the 1950s.  In a span of ten 
years, the growth of the city’s infrastructure increased miraculously 
compared to all other recent administrations combined. My approach in 
the remainder of this chapter will be to focus on some of the major 
planning schemes that transformed the spatial configuration of Rio de 
Janeiro during Carlos Lacerda’s administration (December 1960 to 
December 1965).  Rather than broadly focus on all of the reforms during 
this time period, I intend to dedicate my analysis to the major roadway 
projects of the period such as the Aterro and Parque do Flamengo, as 
well as the Túneis Santa Bárbara and Rebouças (obras viárias).  
 Lacerda’s government also addressed many other sectors of 
Guanabara’s infrastructure such as the building of public schools, 
hospitals, sewage systems, and the supply of water. The construction of 
a new water supply system known as the Adutora do Guandú, was 
planned and constructed during Lacerda’s term and declared the “public 
work of the century” among planners and technocrats.  This project was 
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the recipient of approximately $US 36 million dollars of aid from the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and unquestionably altered 
the quality of life for millions of cariocas throughout all zones of the city.   
The debates, politics, and legacies of the eradication of favelas and 
the subsequent building of popular housing complexes such as Vila 
Aliança (Senador Camará), Vila Kennedy (Bangu), Vila Esperança (Vigário 
Geral), and Cidade de Deus (Jacarepaguá) have been fully investigated by 
numerous scholars, and contextualize some of the most vigorous 
controversies regarding urban renewal in the 1960s.29 Conversely, the 
investigation of public works such as tunnels, parks, viaducts, and 
overpasses have usually been given secondary or little focus in most of 
the scholarship written on Rio in the second half of the twentieth 
century, as the city continued to grow and expand. While many scholars 
have shown through the study of favelas and housing how the socio-
cultural and spatial dynamics of Rio de Janeiro were transformed during 
the 1960 and 1970s, my approach is to emphasize how the febre viária 
played a critical role in the reformulation of urban space and socio-
spatial identity in Rio de Janeiro.  
Among the numerous urban renewal and embellishment plans 
that will be unveiled for the 400th anniversary of the city of São 
                                                 
29 For the most informative study regarding the eradication and resettlement policies 
regarding the favelas of Rio de Janeiro in the 1960s and early 1970s see Licia do Prado 
Valladares, Passa-Se Uma Casa: Análise do Programa de Remoção de Favelas do Rio de 
Janeiro, 2nd Edition (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1980).  Also noteworthy is Janice 
Perlman, The Myth of Marginality:  Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro, (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1976).  Also consult the interviews with José Arthur Rios 
and Sandra Cavalcanti in Capítulos da Memória do Urbanismo Carioca, Chapter 2 
entitled “O que fazer com a população pobre?  A favela nos anos 1960.”     
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Sebastião do Rio de Janeiro, many are already under 
construction…Engineer Enaldo Cravo Peixoto acknowledged that 
projects under his supervision such as the construction of tunnels 
and overpasses, as well as the pavement of roads and avenues 
throughout the city, particularly in the subúrbios, are well 
underway.  Tunnels have always been the ideal solution to open 
passageways and cut down on distances in a city that is full of hills 
and lowlands; as they offer a practical solution to disperse the 
turbulent congestion of traffic in a growing metropolis. Numerous 
tunnels are being constructed and excavated and should be ready in 
order to commemorate the city’s 400th anniversary.  One of them is 
the Rio Comprido-Lagoa, which will be constructed in two segments:  
Rio Comprido to Cosme Velho (from the end of Avenida Paulo de 
Frontin to the Rua das Laranjeiras, at the juncture of the Largo do 
Boticário approximately) and Cosme Velho to Lagoa.  Another tunnel 
that will aid in the circulation of transit will be the one of Catumbi-
Laranjeiras which will extend from the Rua Pinheiro Machado in 
Laranjeiras to the end of the Rua dos Coqueiros in Catumbi…The 
túnel Toneleros-Pompeu Loureiro has also been promised to be ready 
for 1965.30  
 
“When the tunnel (Santa Bárbara) is completed next year, it 
will be possible to drive in a matter of minutes from the western 
industrial complex to the residential areas of the south, by passing 
midtown Rio.  The trip can now take more than one hour during rush 
hour.”31  
 
 Prior to the 1950s, many engineers and planners had devised 
numerous plans to improve the circulation of traffic in Rio de Janeiro.  
Aside from the tremendous growth in population, Rio de Janeiro was 
extremely hindered by its topography and inability to go from the north 
and south without passing through the centro.  Gradually, the main 
corridors of the centro, Avenida Central and Avenida Presidente Vargas 
                                                 
30 “Rio, IV Centenário: Novos Túneis Cortarão a Cidade e Lagoa Ficará Livre da 
Mortandade.” Diário de Notícias 22 June 1962. The tunnel of Toneleros-Pompeu 
Loureiro would later be called Túnel Major Vaz in honor of Major Rubens Vaz who was 
killed in an attempt on Carlos Lacerda life by some of Getúlio Vargas’ followers in 1954.   
 




became constantly congested due to the confluence of pedestrians, 
antiquated streetcars, and increasing numbers of automobiles.  The 
main solutions that evolved in the postwar period involved the 
construction of numerous tunnels, expressways, overpasses, and several 
proposals for a new mass transit system (metrô).  This emphasis on 
accommodating the automobile had numerous consequences for the city 
and its residents as many of Rio’s neighborhoods suffered tremendous 
consequences as a result of these tunnels, expressways, viaducts, and 
elevated ramps.     
Although the amount of public works and urban reforms that were 
realized during the 1950s were insufficient to relieve the city from the 
pressures of population growth, a new generation of architects and 
planners drafted plans for new arteries, expressways, and tunnels that 
would circumvent the centro as well as connect the zona norte with the 
zona sul.  Many of these projects that were either drafted or initiated in 
the 1950s would become the core urban renewal and obras viárias of 
both the Lacerda and Negrão de Lima administrations.  The majority of 
all road and urban renewal projects were executed by the autarquia 
SURSAN, along with other indirect administrative entities such as the 
DER-GB.  As much as these projects were implemented in order to help 
relieve the problems of traffic congestion and population density in some 
of Rio’s neighborhoods, they also coincided with the spirit of 
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developmentalism and enthusiasm for the automobile that was cultivated 
during Juscelino Kubitschek’s presidency (1956-61).   
Many of these engineers that were employed by SURSAN were 
eager to demonstrate how their “expert” technocratic approach to 
planning would not only improve Rio’s urban infrastructure, but also 
serve as a benchmark for the rest of the planning community of Brazil 
and Latin America.  In his quantitative work on public works in Rio from 
1938 to 1965, Mauro Kleiman concludes that expressways, overpasses, 
and viaducts joined with skyscrapers to form the base of Brazilian 
national development.  Even after the transfer of the capital to Brasília, 
the engineers of SURSAN, many Cariocas, and politicians such as 
Lacerda were eager to show that Rio would be the pioneer of a style of 
urban planning that would integrate the automobile into an urban 
setting where high-rise buildings and expressways began to dominate the 
scenery throughout all neighborhoods of the city.32  
Beginning in the 1950s, a new strategy was developed concerning 
the design and implementation of roads and expressways throughout the 
city.  According to an official SURSAN planning document, five main 
principles were established in formulating Guanabara’s road planning 
strategies:33
                                                 
32 Kleiman, 315. 
 
33 See the “compilation” booklet published by the Estado da Guanabara, Os 19 Viadutos 
do Plano Viário no Govêrno Carlos Lacerda (Rio de Janeiro: Estado da 
Guanabara/SURSAN/Govêrno Carlos Lacerda). Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de 
Janeiro.  No date given – filed under Viadutos.   
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1. The development of new arteries and expressways that 
would facilitate the connection between populous areas of 
the city as well as with the centro. 
2. Improvements along the existing main corridors of the city. 
3. Projects that aid in the better flow of traffic in all zones of 
the city. 
4. Better integration of the road network with the industrial 
zones of the city-state. 
5. The improvement, expansion, and restoration of arteries 
which have the most intense traffic.    
 
One of the first projects initiated by Lacerda’s administration in the 
early 1960s was to finish the construction of the Túnel Catumbi-
Laranjeiras (Túnel Santa Bárbara). This tunnel was designed to link the 
zona sul neighborhood of Laranjeiras with Catumbi located between the 
centro and zona norte. Seen as a practical solution to alleviate the traffic 
congestion that the centro had experienced since the inauguration of 
Avenida Presidente Vargas in the mid 1940s, the initial construction of 
the tunnel began during General Ângelo Mendes de Morais’ tenure 
(1947-51) in the late 1940s. However, it stalled numerous times 
throughout the 1950s mainly due to the lack of finances as well as 
engineering and excavation difficulties.  
The broader scheme of this tunnel extended beyond solely linking 
Catumbi with Laranjeiras, as the Túnel Santa Bárbara was envisioned as 
a portion of the Linha Lilás expressway that eventually would link Santo 
Cristo (zona portuária) and Copacabana (Avenida Atlântica). Originally 
planned in the early 1920s, this route’s was designed was to connect 
Santo Cristo to Catumbi via viaducts over the Avenida Presidente Vargas, 
and then eventually extending to Laranjeiras by way of the Túnel Santa 
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Bárbara. In Laranjeiras, this route would extend from the Rua Pinheiro 
Machado and Rua Farani to the Praia de Botafogo and continue via the 
Túnel Pasmado and the Túnel do Leme to Avenida Princesa Isabel, 
eventually ending at the Avenida Atlântica in Copacabana.34   In order to 
facilitate the flow of vehicles entering the tunnel, SURSAN built two 
complementary viaducts on both the northern (Catumbi) and southern 
(Laranjeiras) sides of the tunnel.35
Even before the tunnel opened it gained notoriety as the “túnel da 
morte (tunnel of death)” as several workers’ lives were sacrificed in the 
construction of the tunnel.36  In order to honor these workers, a small 
chapel was built in a grotto within the confinements of the tunnel, which 
was decorated with a tiled mural designed by the Brazilian artist Djanira 
da Mota e Silva.  The moniker given to the tunnel was derived from Santa 
                                                 
34 José de Oliveira Reis, “Principais Vias e Arterias do Plano Diretor do Rio de Janeiro,” 
Revista de Engenharia do Estado da Guanabara (Janeiro-Junho 1960):11; ““Linha Lilás” 
arraste-se há 55 anos e Tamoio aceita desafio,” Jornal do Brasil 16 February 1976. The 
eventual Santo Cristo-Copacabana connection, known also as the Linha Lilás, would 
not be completely finished until the early 1980s. According to the aforementioned Jornal 
do Brasil article, the total length of the route would extend about 12 km, and took 27 
different administrations to complete the entire project.    
 
35 In Catumbi it was known as Viaduto Doutor Agra which passed over the street with 
the same name, and in Laranjeiras Viaduto Engenheiro Noronha was designed to cross 
over Rua Pinheiro Machado and connect to the Rua das Laranjeiras, the main corridor 
of that neighborhood. See Araldo de Oliveira Monteiro Santos, “Viaduto Engenheiro 
Noronha,” Revista de Engenharia do Estado da Guanabara (Janeiro-Dezembro 1962): 
25-29.  
 
36 “Túnel da Morte: Ligação Norte-Sul em Condições Precárias,” Diário de Notícias 9 
January 1962.  According to this report and other studies, a total of 18 workers died 
throughout the 15 years of construction.  See Ronaldo Cerqueira Carvalho, “Rio de 
Janeiro:  Uma Cidade Conectada por Túneis,” (Coleção Estudos da Cidade:  Instituto 
Pereira Passos, 2004), 28. 
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Bárbara’s designation as the patron saint of subterranean workers and 
miners.37   
The Túnel Santa Bárbara was opened to limited traffic in July 
1963, and later operating at full capacity in April 1964.  Interestingly, 
this tunnel and the larger network of roads in Guanabara 
overwhelmingly catered to the individual automobile, as evidenced by a 
SURSAN advisory that warned that access to pedestrians, bicycles, large 
trucks, buses, and any vehicles carrying gaseous material were 
prohibited from navigating through the tunnel.38    
The Túnel Santa Bárbara and several of its complementary 
viaducts was the first major roadway project terminated by SURSAN 
during Lacerda’s administration. Consequently it was accompanied by a 
massive publicity campaign to display the efficiency and progress of his 
administration.  Some of the ways that he did this was by taking out full-
page advertisements in newspapers to announce the completion of a 
certain project, or by printing up pamphlets and brochures describing 
the present and future projects that his administration, along with 
SURSAN and organs such as the DER-GB, that would create a modern 
Rio de Janeiro.39  It is noteworthy that in many of these pamphlets and 
                                                 
37 Carvalho, 29.  The tiled mural by Djanira (1914-1978) began to decompose over time 
from intense humidity and pollution, thus in the mid 1980s the mural was removed 
from the tunnel for restoration.  Presently, it has been refurbished and is located on the 
Pátio Lily e Roberto Marinho at the Museu das Belas Artes in Rio de Janeiro.  
 





advertisements, Lacerda’s name always appears in them above the state 
of Guanabara and entities such as SURSAN or the DER-GB.  In a 
pamphlet regarding the tunnels of the city, the following is written about 
Túnel Santa Barbara (Catumbi-Laranjeiras): 
 Túnel Santa Barbara was opened on July 29, 1963 which 
links Catumbi to Laranjeiras in the span of five minutes, currently 
serving about one million vehicles a month.  1,357 meters long, it is 
one of the most modern in the world.  Its construction makes it 
possible to avoid the centro while going from north to south.  
Initiated almost 16 years before, only now is the tunnel available 
for use.  The government of Carlos Lacerda, aside from all the 
installations of illumination, ventilation, and traffic signs, also 
constructed complementary works in order to permit the complete 
use of the tunnel.40
 
There are several ways to read this passage. On the surface, it 
appears as a plain description of the tunnel and its function, however 
underneath there are a few interesting points that highlight the broader 
urbanistic and political implications of the tunnel.  Urbanistically, the 
tunnel represented a major accomplishment in adding a major north-
south route within the city, even if the traffic was limited to individual 
automobiles.  At the time of inauguration, the tunnel was declared the 
largest and most modern within Latin America, which also fits into the 
greater agenda of Lacerda and SURSAN: to show that they had the 
technocratic and administrative aptitude to transform Rio into a model 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 See the “compilation” booklet published by the State of Guanabara, A SURSAN E O 
Novo Rio.  (RJ:  Estado da Guanabara/SURSAN/Govêrno Carlos Lacerda). No date given 
on the pamphlet (circa 1963), but it is available in the Library Collection at the Arquivo 
Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro (AGCRJ) under the filing of viadutos. 
 
40 Estado da Guanabara - Govêrno Carlos Lacerda, Os Túneis da Guanabara.  No date 
given on the pamphlet - AGCRJ under the filing of túneis. 
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for modern city planning throughout Brazil and Latin America.  The aim 
of this propaganda was also to remind the public (and voters), that his 
leadership produced efficient results, particularly in reference to his 
populist rivals in the PTB, PSD, and even his own party (UDN). Thus, 
Lacerda utilized his political, journalistic, and marketing skills to remind 
the public that he had the “know-how,” connections, and résumé to 
become a viable candidate for the presidency of Brazil in 1965. 
 The Túnel Santa Bárbara did alleviate some of the traffic 
congestion from the central areas of the city, however a more direct 
connection between the zona norte and zona sul was still necessary as 
traffic from cars and the new combustible buses increased dramatically 
throughout the city.41 Since the times of the Plano Agache (1930), one 
proposed remedy for the lack of a zona norte-zona sul connection was to 
excavate a tunnel from Rio Comprido in the zona norte to Lagoa in the 
zona sul via the maciço da Tijuca.  An actual project, the Túnel Rio 
Comprido-Lagoa was proposed during Alim Pedro’s mayoral 
administration in 1955, however the necessary funds and commitment to 
the project faltered.  This urban tunnel would become a reality in the 
early 1960s, as a group of engineers employed by SURSAN and the DER-
GB lobbied Lacerda to undertake this massive project. 
 According to Mauro Magalhães, Lacerda opposed the Rio 
Comprido-Lagoa project, on the grounds that it was an elitist endeavor 
                                                 
41 Starting in the early 1960s, the trolleys (bondes) that circulated throughout all 
regions of the city, began to get replaced by electric and then combustible buses.   
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that would primarily benefit the wealthiest sectors of the city’s 
population.42  Lacerda later revealed that it was the insistence of Marcos 
Tamoyo, an engineer who specialized in tunnels, that persuaded Lacerda 
into initiating construction of the gigantic public work.43 Aside from 
Lacerda’s concerns regarding the benefits of the tunnel to the majority of 
Rio’s residents, there were also major apprehensions regarding the 
affordability of such an immense venture.  Rather than raising taxes as 
they did to pay for the water supply system (Adutora do Guandu) or 
procure foreign funds or loans, Lacerda and his advisors relied on 
creative financing and negotiation in order to construct the “largest 
urban tunnel in the world.” 
 Since its creation in the 1940s, the Departamento de Estradas e 
Rodagem (DER) was responsible for allocating and supervising the funds 
distributed from the Fundo Rodoviário Nacional (National Highway Fund 
or DNER).  The majority of these funds were obtained through tax 
revenue, and each state and municipality subsequently received a 
varying amount of funds primarily based upon population and 
                                                 
42 Mauro Magalhães, Carlos Lacerda:  O Sonhador Pragmático 2nd Edition (Rio de 
Janeiro:  Civilização Brasileira, 1993): 133.  Mauro Magalhães was the UDN leader in 
the Assembléia Legislativa do Estado da Guanabara during Lacerda’s governorship.   
 
43 Lacerda, Depoimento, 234.  Marcos Tamoyo, also known as Marcos Tamoio, 
eventually became mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro in the late 1970s after the state of 
Guanabara and state of Rio de Janeiro fused.  Some of the initial sketches of his ideas 
for the Túnel Rio Comprido-Lagoa (later named Rebouças), are contained in his archive 
at the Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro (AGCRJ).  Many of these initial 
sketches were eventually published in official planning documents and journals such as 
the Revista de Engenharia do Estado da Guanabara. 
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geographic size.44  Since Guanabara was an urban city-state, Lacerda 
convinced the DNER as well as the DER-GB that federal highway money 
would be best used within the broader plano viário of the city of Rio de 
Janeiro rather than on the underdeveloped peripheral areas of the 
state.45  After intense negotiation and organization of finances, it was 
decided that the Túnel Rio Comprido-Lagoa would serve as a part of the 
Rio de Janeiro-Santos federal highway known as BR-101; thereby 
justifying use of DNER and DER-GB money for a road within the 
confines of the city.  Therefore, while serving as a much needed link 
between the zona norte and the zona sul, the Túnel Rio Comprido-Lagoa 
also would be part the state and federal road network and become a joint 
financial and engineering endeavor between the DER-GB and SURSAN 
(Division of tunnels, public works, and urban roads). 
    The Rio Comprido-Lagoa tunnel (later named Túnel Rebouças) 
was designed to be approximately 2,800 meters long with two separate 
galleries for traffic going in each direction (north-south).46  The first part 
of the tunnel linked Rio Comprido with Cosme Velho in the zona sul by 
                                                 
 
44 Perez, 200-01.  Perez calculates that the DER funds never exceeded more than 20% 
of the costs for urbanization or expressway projects in the state of Guanabara during 
Lacerda’s administration. 
 
45 It should be noted that while Lacerda was at odds with both Presidents Jânio 
Quadros and João Goulart, the Minístro da Viação e Obras Públicas was Virgílio 
Távora, a national member of Lacerda’s party – UDN.  Furthermore, in his Depoimento, 
Lacerda commented that he had to fire the head of the DER-GB because he would not 
use DER funds to build expressways inside of Rio.  
 
46 The tunnel was named in the honor of two engineers of African descent – brothers 




cutting through the maciço da Tijuca for a total of 760 meters, and 
continue in another tunnel from Cosme Velho to Lagoa in the zona sul 
for a length of 2,040 meters.47 Similar to the Túnel Santa Bárbara, 
several accompanying viaducts were built in order to facilitate the 
entrance and circulation of automobiles within the tunnels such as the 
Viaduto Machado de Assis above the Rua Cosme Velho, and the Viaduto 
Saint Hilaire above the Rua Jardim Botânico, at the exit of the tunnel in 
Lagoa.  Shortly after the inauguration of the tunnel in 1965 and 1967, 
work began on the construction of a viaduct on the northern end of the 
tunnel in Rio Comprido – the Elevado de Paulo de Frontin.48   
  Comparable to the Túnel Santa Bárbara, vehicles passing 
through the two tunnels of the Túnel Rio Comprido-Lagoa could travel 
through the city from the zona sul to the zona norte and be able to 
access areas such as Tijuca, São Cristóvão, the port, and the various 
suburbs along the Avenida Brasil as well as the Leopoldina and Central 
do Brasil rail lines without having to pass through the central area of the 
city.  Likewise, passengers going from North to South would be able to 
reach the Lagoa, Jardim Botânico, Humaitá, Botafogo, Gávea, 
Copacabana, Leblon, and Ipanema at a much quicker pace than ever 
                                                 
47 For background information and statistics on the Túnel Rebouças see Marcos 
Tamoyo, Head of SURSAN’s tunnel division, “Túnel Rebouças” Revista de Engenharia do 
Estado da Guanabara (1962): 36-42.  See map in appendix. 
 




before and eventually continue along to Barra da Tijuca and the Rio-
Santos highway (BR-101).49  
The initial contracts for the construction of the tunnel were signed 
between SURSAN and the firm of L. Quattroni in March 1962 at a 
favorable price for the city-state, however this particular company was 
unable to fulfill the obligations of the contract as construction fell behind 
schedule by late 1963.  The firm of SERVIX-Engenharia S/A soon 
inherited the construction of the Cosme Velho-Lagoa portion of the 
tunnel, while the company of TENCO assumed the construction of the 
Rio Comprido-Cosme Velho section of the tunnel.50  Aside from the 
disarray left by the firm of L. Quattroni, there also appeared to be 
extreme difficulties in accessing the necessary allocated funds for the 
building of the Túnel Rebouças.  Furthermore, the excavation process on 
the northern end of the tunnel (Rio Comprido) was extremely arduous 
due to the geological composition of the maciço da Tijuca as well as the 
need to offer a fair market price to displaced residents.51
                                                 
49 The planning and connection to Barra da Tijuca by tunnels, known as the Auto-
Estrada Lagoa-Barra, would be implemented during Negrão de Lima’s administration 
(1965-71).  See chapter 5 for more details.   
 
50 Two internal documents convey the contractual, financial, and engineering difficulties 
with the construction of the Túnel Reboucas:  “Relatório sôbre a Contrato da Firma 
Servix Engenharia S/A para Execução das Obras do Túnel Cosme Velho-Lagoa,” 5 
March 1964, CCL; “Reunião do Dia 20 de Abril 1964,” Arquivo Marcos Tamoyo – 
AGCRJ.  While Lacerda certainly had his opinions in these meetings regarding 
organizational and merit of the tunnel, it is apparent that the role of Marcos Tamoyo 
(Director of SURSAN’s Tunnel Division) and Jorge Bauer (Director of the DER-GB) were 




Lacerda opened the Túnel Rebouças to experimental traffic in 
September 1965, however it was not until Negrão de Lima’s 
administration (October 1967) that the tunnel received regular 
automobile traffic - albeit only during the morning and evening rush 
hour.52  Aside from administrative and financial difficulties that the 
Lacerda and Negrão administrations had in finishing the tunnel, the 
engineers of SURSAN and the DER-GB also dealt with obstacles 
regarding ventilation and the excess of carbon monoxide particles, as 
well as the unstable condition of the tunnel’s inner structure and lanes.  
On November 10, 1972, “the largest urban tunnel in the world,” began to 
function at full capacity in both tunnels and in both directions.53
 Even though the Túnel Rebouças was not opened to the public 
during Lacerda’s term, he was still on intent on displaying how his 
leadership was responsible for the modernizing the city of Rio de Janeiro.  
The various technocrats of organizations such as SURSAN and the DER-
GB were also keen to display their positions of being at the vanguard of 
city planning in Brazil.  Similar to the Túnel Santa Bárbara and the 
numerous constructed viaducts throughout the city, Lacerda and 
                                                                                                                                                 
51 This information is conveyed by an engineer in a recent short documentary on the 
Túnel Rebouças available in the series entitled “Histórias do Rio.”  Accessed online 
http://rjtv.globo.com 4 March 2006.   
 
52 “Povo Ganha mas Negrão Perde com a abertura do Rebouças,” Jornal do Brasil 1 
October1967;  “Túnel Rebouças entra hoje en Funcionamento,” Jornal do Brasil 3 
October 1967; “Negrão Abre ao Tráfego o Rebouças sem Formalidades,” 4 October 1967;   
 
53 “Túnel Rebouças funciona hoje com sua capacidade total depois de 11 anos,” Jornal 
do Brasil 10 November 1972, Primeiro Caderno. 
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SURSAN developed pamphlets and published advertisements regarding 
the importance and achievements of this “technocratic expertise.”  
Lacerda and the head of SURSAN, Engineer Enaldo Cravo Peixoto, issued 
a variety of publications regarding the projects and progress during their 
tenure together.  In most of these publications and advertisements, they 
highlighted their accomplishments not only with words, but also with 
graphs and charts as with the following excerpt which refers to the Túnel 
Rebouças: 
“From 1887 to 1960 (73 years) 3,098 meters of tunnels were 
opened to solve the problem of transportation in Rio. This total 
includes Túnel Santa Barbara.  The government of Carlos Lacerda 
already has opened the 220-meter Túnel Major Vaz, and with the 
completion of the Túnel Rio Comprido-Lagoa, this grand total will 
come to 5,820 meters.  In five years - that practically doubles the 
amount that all the previous administrations took 73 years to 
construct.” 54
 
    
 The building of tunnels, roads, viaducts, water and sewage 
systems, and schools were certainly the hallmark of Lacerda’s 
administration, along with his initiatives to build public housing 
complexes for the residents of the numerous favelas that were removed 
throughout the city.  The termination and subsequent construction of 
the Santa Bárbara, Rebouças, and Major Vaz tunnels were major public 
works that were tied to a broader scheme of making the automobile more 
integral to Rio’s neighborhoods and topographical makeup.  In order to 
accompany the increasing flow of traffic and new routes established 
                                                 
54 Os Túneis da Guanabara, 15 (AGCRJ).   
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throughout the city-state as developed through the SURSAN and DER-
GB road plan, several new overpasses and viaducts were constructed and 
inaugurated during Lacerda’s administration.  These viaducts solved the 
problems of traffic congestion within the streets of numerous 
neighborhoods, as well as a more direct connection to the new arteries 
and expressways being constructed throughout Guanabara.   The design, 
construction, and inauguration of these viaducts carried a slogan:  1 
viaduct, every 3 months, during 5 years.  By the end of Lacerda’s term in 
December 1965, SURSAN and the DER eventually built 19 new viaducts 
throughout all regions of the city, most notably in the subúrbios.55
3.4 Collision Course:  Park Design and the Febre Viária 
 
“The foremost enemy of beauty and comfort in a large city is 
the automobile.  Large lanes and parking lots are continuously 
destroying the city’s historic buildings, streets, gardens, squares, 
and the urbanistic character that has distinguished (Rio) from other 
large cities.56
 
Another major public work that was undertaken by SURSAN 
during Carlos Lacerda’s tenure as governor of Guanabara was the design 
and termination of the Aterro and Parque do Flamengo.  The process of 
                                                 
55 Estado da Guanabara, Os 19 Viadutos do Plano Viário no Govêrno Carlos Lacerda, 3.  
Much like the tunnels, the inaugurations of these viaducts were greatly publicized in 
the press.  For some examples see “O Viaduto José Lins do Rego,” O Globo 6 September 
1965, 5; “O Governador Carlos Lacerda Inaugura a Viaduto dos Fuzileiros, o 15° do 
Nôvo Rio,” Diário de Notícias 30 September 1965; “CL inaugura Viaduto com 
Solenidade,” Diário de Notícias 25 February 1965; “Rio ganha hoje seu viaduto mais 
largo,” Diário de Notícias 14 September 1965; “Viaduto Abrirá Caminho Para 
Trabalhador,” Diário de Notícias 26 February 1965; “Nôvo Rio com Viadutos vai servir 
600 mil Suburbanos,” Diário de Notícias 3 October 1964; “Quatro Viadutos que Serão 
Símbolo da Atual Remodelação do Rio,” O Globo 25 February 1964.   
 
56 Maria Carlota de Macedo Soares, “A Urbanização do Aterrado Glória-Flamengo,” 
Revista de Engenharia do Estado da Guanabara (Janeiro-Dezembro 1962): 6.  
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making landfills and building above the water, known as aterros, was a 
common practice in Rio de Janeiro since the beginning of the early 20th 
century.   By the postwar area, the use of aterros became more common 
in order to create new roads and open space in the city.  Similarly, the 
razing of hills (morros), throughout the city’s neighborhoods was also 
seen as a solution in order to incorporate the automobile to the city’s  
physical geography.   
The 1,200,000m2 Aterro and Parque do Flamengo, was built on a 
landfill extending from the Santos Dumont Airport (Avenida Beira Mar) 
on the fringes of the centro to Botafogo.  The razing of the Morro do 
Santo Antônio and subsequent filling in the surrounding area coincided 
with the construction of the Avenida Perimetral and the XXXVI 
International Eucharistic Conference in January 1955, which displaced 
many lower class residents without any compensation. Initiatives to 
bulldoze the Santo Antônio hill had gone back decades, as new arteries  
such as the Avenida Perimetral and Avenida Chile were proposed to 
connect the centro with the zona sul and Avenida Brasil.  
 The aterro was built during the 1950s primarily with the dirt 
accumulated from leveling the Morro do Santo Antônio.  The northern 
end of the aterro and park would house the future Museum of Modern 
Art (MAM) designed by Affonso Eduardo Reidy and a modernist 
monument to honor the Brazilian troops who served in World War II.  An 
article from the New York Times in 1961 synthesizes the significance of 
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the transformation of urban space in this section of Rio de Janeiro with 
the following commentary: 
“Where São Antônio Hill, an ugly landmark covered by 
squatters’ shacks and old houses once stood in the middle of Rio, 
new, tree-shaded, broad avenues now are being completed to speed 
up traffic.  Guanabara Bay has been filled in with the rubble and 
stone of São Antônio Hill to create a two-mile long, half mile-wide 
strip of new land, maintaining the old, graceful curve of the 
shoreline, and providing space for two expressways carrying fast 
traffic to southern residential suburbs. So that the beach- going 
habits of the inhabitants of the areas along the new boulevards will 
not be disturbed, an artificial sand beach is being added at the new 
water line.  The entire expanse of land between the freeways will be 
landscaped so as to preserve the old atmosphere of the bayside 
boulevards.  At the northern end of the filled-in area, the Museum of 
Modern Art has risen near the impressive, modernistic monument to 
Brazil’s war dead of World War II.  Driving from the far end of 
Copacabana to Rio’s business center, one can now avoid most of the 
heavy traffic by using the new system of tunnels, freeways and 
elevated highways.  And in spite of its financial difficulties, the city’s 
engineers come up every day with big and little ideas to improve the 
metropolis as it continues to grow.57   
  
SURSAN’s plans to continue with the design and construction of 
the new park coincided with the election of Carlos Lacerda in 1960.  
Rather than entrusting the higher-ups in SURSAN with the design and 
construction of the park, Lacerda appointed his longtime friend, Maria 
Carlota Costallat de Macedo Soares (Lota), as the head of a new working 
group that would advise and support SURSAN in the design and creation 
of the Parque do Flamengo.  A socialite from one of Rio’s elite families, 
Lota was extremely well connected with the upper crust of Rio’s 
intelligentsia and politicians, as author Carmen Oliveira notes: 
                                                 
57 Tad Szulc, “Rio Pushes its Expansion,” New York Times 15 January 1961, xx1.   
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 “Like most of the upper-class women of her generation, Maria 
Carlota Costallat de Macedo Soares had had tutors and studied in 
Europe, but she had not gone to university. Yet she knew everything 
about architecture.  Her library on the subject was exemplary.  She 
had closely followed the work of the young architects in the 
vanguard of the construction of the Ministry of Education in Rio de 
Janeiro.  She was a friend of the most respected Brazilian 
architects.”58
 
Appointing Lota as the head of a commission that reported directly to the 
governor had adverse consequences for Lacerda as well as Lota.  Lota 
assured Lacerda that the park would be his greatest legacy, but many of 
the SURSAN technocrats opposed working for someone who had no 
technical expertise or a university-level degree. These sentiments were 
further compounded by the fact that Lota was a woman and one who 
barely concealed her lesbian relationship with a North American poet. 
Along with their distaste for Lota’s reputation for being temperamental, 
domineering, and longstanding friend of the governor, there was a strong 
belief and tradition among the male dominated planning community that 
urbanism and planning were activities solely for trained architects, 
engineers, and other technical professions. This clearly exemplifies the 
                                                 
58 Carmen L. Oliveira, Rare and Commonplace Flowers: The Story of Elizabeth Bishop 
and Lota de Macedo Soares (New Brunswick:  Rutgers University Press, 2002).  This 
book was originally published in Portuguese as Floras Raras e Banalíssimas:  A História 
de Lota de Macedo Soares e Elizabeth Bishop (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Rocco, 1995), 11. 
While the theme of this book is dedicated to the relationship between Lota and Bishop, 
the history of Lota’s role in the design of the park is an integral part of the book.  
Ultimately, it was Lota’s obsession with the details of the park, aside from Bishop’s 
alcoholism that put a strain on their relationship during the 1960s.  Interestingly, many 
of the same letters exchanged among Lota, Lacerda, various SURSAN engineers, and 
Roberto Burle Marx that I uncovered in the Coleção Carlos Lacerda (CCL) in Brasília 
formed the basis for Oliveira’s history of the park.  This is significant because although 
many of Lota’s letters were marked confidential, they often were circulated among 
Lacerda’s closest advisors such as Rafael Almeida de Magalhães and did not solely 
remain in possession of the governor.  Note:  Oliveira does not cite or document the 
specific date of such letters. 
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“top-down” technocratic and expert notion that was cultivated by 
organizations and entities such as SURSAN during the 1960s and 1970s.   
Since his campaign for the governorship, Lacerda had promised to 
introduce a system that encouraged competition for jobs and merit-based 
promotions. By arbitrarily nominating Lota the head of an advisory 
commission, Lacerda’s fiercest critics noted his own hypocrisy in 
handing out favors to a longstanding friend.  Amidst the criticism from 
his allies and rivals, Lacerda instructed Rafael Almeida de Magalhães to 
nominate Lota the head of this new advisory commission on January 18, 
1961.59  Through their conversations and letters, Lota maintained that 
the Parque do Flamengo was a project of an urbane and sophisticated 
governor and ultimately, nobody would remember him for constructing 
schools, supplying the city with adequate water supply, and new and 
improved roads.60  Although Lota had a passion for architecture and a 
love for city life, her disdain for focusing urban planning schemes that 
centered on the role of the automobile clearly influenced her own agenda 
in embellishing and designing the new park. 
 In order to design and build the “largest urban park in the world,” 
Lota called on an all-star cast of Brazilian architects and designers to 
                                                 
59 Memorandum from Carlos Lacerda to Rafael Almeida de Magalhães, 18 January 
1961, CCL. 
 
60 Many examples of these letters are in the CCL.  For one example see the letter written 
by Lota to Lacerda on 20 August 1963 where Lota declares that overage in costs are 
warranted since “é uma obra de governador culto!!” 
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assist her in giving Lacerda his Central Park à Carioca.61  Joining Lota 
as part of the Grupo de Trabalho were famed architects Jorge Moreira, 
Sérgio Bernardes, and Affonso Eduardo Reidy, landscape architect and 
designer Roberto Burle Marx, and botanist Luiz Emygdio de Mello Filho.  
This team of notables, along with the technocrats of SURSAN and 
consultants such as the Laboratório Nacional de Engenharia de Lisboa 
completely urbanized and designed the majority of the park between 
1961 and 1965.   
Major debates regarding the direction of the park’s design 
developed between Lota and the SURSAN technocrats soon after Lota 
assumed her position as the head of the special commission in 1961.  
While the SURSAN engineers were not completely against the 
beautification plans for the park, their principal concern was to 
construct four expressways that would connect the centro with the zona 
sul.  Lota and her team of architects argued that the park’s principal 
function should serve as a hub for the city’s leisure activities and argued 
that two expressways were more than sufficient.  Furthermore, they 
stressed that the landscape and design of the park should harmonize 
with the surrounding scenery of Guanabara Bay, Pão de Açucar, 
Corcovado, and the Enseada da Glória.  After intense battles between the 
                                                 
61 “Central Park à Carioca,” O Globo 5 November 2005. Accessed online 
http://www.oglobo.globo.com March 18, 2006. Similar to the tunnels and roads that 
were given slogans, the Aterro and Parque do Flamengo was dubbed as the largest 
urban park in the world, but as a New York Times article mentions in 1964, Central 
Park is more than 3 times larger.  See “Oceanfront Playground Down in Rio,” New York 
Times, 25 October 1964, xx25.  
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technocrats of SURSAN, Lacerda’s advisors, and the press, it was finally 
agreed upon that the Park would only contain two expressways of four 
lanes each. Lota’s battles over the smallest of details continued 
throughout the park’s construction with the technocrats of SURSAN, 
Carlos Lacerda, and her own handpicked colleagues of the commission, 
especially Roberto Burle Marx. 
Along with building two expressways in the park for the high-speed 
circulation of traffic, numerous pedestrian overpasses, playgrounds, 
pavilions, underground walkways, soccer fields, a beach, puppet theatre, 
bandstand, and other amenities for leisure were built in the park.  
Additionally, a beach in Botafogo was also built in order to give some 
form of continuity to the work done in the section from the Santos 
Dumont Airport to the Morro da Viúva.  Lota and Burle Marx argued that 
the park’s botanical landscape brilliantly juxtaposed with the 
skyscrapers of the centro, Glória, and Flamengo neighborhoods while 
also harmonizing with the natural beauty of the bay and surrounding 
mountains.  Roberto Burle Marx’s meticulous crafted gardens gradually 
gave the park over ten thousand trees and plants of almost 200 different 
species.62  In order to illuminate the park, Lota contracted (at an 
astronomical price) North American Richard Kelly, who had designed 
projects for Lincoln Center and the Washington International Airport.63   
                                                 
62 Luiz Emygdio de Mello Franco, “Inventário Florístico do Parque do Flamengo,” Revista 




Even before the decoration of the park and its facilities were 
finished and inaugurated, automobile traffic already began circulating 
through the lanes of the park.  Much like all the other public works of 
the Lacerda administration (tunnels, roads, viaducts, schools, water 
supply, and sewage), the park was targeted to be inaugurated for Rio’s 
fourth centennial in 1965.  Most of the park’s design and construction 
had been completed by 1965, and unveiled to major festivities during 
Children’s Week (Semana da Criança) in October 1965.  Once it was 
clear that Lacerda’s candidate to be his successor, Secretary of 
Education Flexa Ribeiro, would not win the gubernatorial election, Lota 
began to pressure Lacerda and even military president Castello Branco to 
legally transform her park commission into a foundation.  By turning the 
park into a foundation, Lota felt that she would be free to operate and 
oversee the park’s development and maintenance even when Lacerda’s 
successor, Negrão de Lima, assumed the governorship.  Indeed, one of 
the last matters that Lacerda attended to before ending his mandate 
several week early, was to legally transform the Parque do Flamengo into 
a foundation.  Soon after, under Negrão de Lima’s administration, the 
decree which Lacerda issued was overturned by Guanabara’s legislative 
                                                                                                                                                 
63 Oliveira, 122. This section of Oliveira’s story is rather interesting in that it illuminates 
some of the greater tensions that were voiced regarding the cost and imperial nature of 
Lota’s leadership.  As Oliveira suggests, Lota was keen on making the same technology 
and infrastructure available in the US and other places accessible in Brazil.  According 
to Oliveira, “Lota’s firmness, based on passionate commitment and at the same time 
solidly grounded, silenced the nationalist Luddite-technocrats.” 
 128
 
assembly, and Lota abandoned the “park of the century” with much 
regret and sadness.64    
3.5 – Drastic Incisions and the Transformation of Space in Rio de 
Janeiro  
 
 The rapid construction of numerous tunnels, viaducts, overpasses, 
and parks exemplified the technical turn that the urban planning 
community in Rio de Janeiro embraced since the inauguration of Carlos 
Lacerda’s administration in 1960.   The miles of expressways, tunnels, 
viaducts, parks, and freeways built and reformed during this five year 
period managed to acclimate the individual automobile around the city’s 
topography.  With the advent of these new tunnels, freeways, viaducts, 
and overpasses, certain neighborhoods and the distinctiveness of certain 
parts of Rio de Janeiro drastically began to change during the 1960s; 
particularly in neighborhoods such as Rio Comprido and Catumbi that 
were considered “traditional” and “in the way of cars.” 
 Both Catumbi and Rio Comprido were wedged between the centro 
and zona norte and had gradually come to contain a growing number of 
favelas in the surrounding hills.  These two neighborhoods were also 
composed of individual homes rather than the high-rise apartment and 
office buildings that increasingly came to characterize the majority of the 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 138, 173.  Lacerda vacated his mandate early as he became increasingly 
disillusioned and irritated with President General Castello Branco and the military 
régime’s decision to cancel presidential elections and extend the General’s mandate by 
3 additional years.  Consequently, Rafael Almeida de Magalhães finished out Lacerda’s 
term from the end of October to early December 1965.  Lota petitioned and filed various 
motions in order to uphold Lacerda’s decree and pleaded aggressively with Negrão de 
Lima to leave the foundation intact.  Almost one year later, September 25 1967, Lota 
died in New York City.     
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zona norte and sul of Rio de Janeiro.  By the 1960s, Catumbi and Rio 
Comprido were predominantly residential with a small portion of 
industrial and commercial activity such as textile workshops, print 
shops, butcher shops, fruit stands, bakeries, and street fairs.  While both 
Rio Comprido and Catumbi were “noble” areas where populated by some 
of the city’s aristocrats during the late 19th and early 20th century, the 
majority of the residents of these neighborhoods by the 1960s were 
renters of the lower-middle class who relied on public transportation.  
The residents of both areas, particularly Catumbi, included large 
numbers of immigrants from Portugal, Italy, and Spain, as was reflected 
in the morphological character of the homes, streets, and commercial 
activity of the areas. Catumbi and Rio Comprido were also popular 
destinations for newly arrived migrants from other regions of Brazil, who 
attempted to maintain a “small city in the metropolis” style of life while in 
Rio de Janeiro, albeit on the fringe of the central business district.   
    The problems of these two neighborhoods continued well after the 
inauguration of the two tunnels that linked the zona norte and zona sul. 
One case in point is the neighborhood of Rio Comprido and its main 
avenue, Paulo de Frontin, which served as the north entrance to the 
Túnel Rebouças. Many apartment buildings and homes along the main 
corridor of the Avenida Paulo Frontin and the surrounding streets saw 
their land values drop dramatically because of the traffic, noise pollution, 
and loss of sunlight due to the location of the tunnel.  Following the 
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construction of the tunnel in the early 1960s, Rio Comprido would later 
suffer when a large piece of an elevated avenue constructed above the 
Avenida Paulo de Frontin collapsed and killed several people. The 
opening of the Túnel Santa Bárbara in Catumbi in 1963-64, and the 
Túnel Rebouças in Rio Comprido in 1965, 1967, and 1972 respectively, 
were only the first in a series of drastic incisions that would sacrifice 
these areas in the name of urban renewal as more projects for urban 
development would continue to alter drastically the character of these 
neighborhoods.65  A small article published in the Correio da Manhã in 
1972 clearly underscores the transformation of daily life in these two 
neighborhoods:     
“As recent as eight years ago, the neighborhoods of Catumbi 
and Rio Comprido maintained their suburban and residential 
qualities of life with peaceful surroundings, groups of kids flying 
kites and playing soccer in the street, as elderly ladies gossip on the 
sidewalks in front of quaint homes. Consequently, the various 
neighborhoods of the zona sul and Tijuca have benefited from urban 
development at the expense of these two neighborhoods…With the 
opening of the Túnel Santa Bárbara and Túnel Rebouças, both direct  
zona norte-zona sul routes, automobiles accelerate rapidly and 
nervously through these traditional neighborhoods…Among the 
chaos of the loud engines, horn honking, and breaks squealing, 
these two areas still try to preserve their traditional identity with 
their uneven sidewalks, villas from the turn of the century, and 
street vendors selling oranges or fresh sardines to the thousands of 
automobiles who pass through daily.” 66  
 
                                                 
65 See Chapter 6 for a case study on Catumbi.  For Rio Comprido see the first part of 
Chapter 7. 
 
66 “Túneis levam tumulto ao Rio Comprido e Catumbi,” Correio da Manhã 10 and 11 
December 1972, 7. 
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Neighborhoods on the south sides of the tunnels such as 
Laranjeiras, Cosme Velho, and Lagoa also suffered problems due to the 
construction of the tunnels and viaducts. Like Rio Comprido and 
Catumbi these areas suffered from an increase in noise and air pollution, 
traffic congestion, and population density due to the construction of 
high- rises in lieu of one or two story homes. Laranjeiras was also 
characterized as primarily a residential neighborhood with a mixture of 
lower-middle, middle, and upper class residents, but the tunnels did not 
overwhelmingly change the character of the neighborhood.   
Interestingly, although Laranjeiras and Cosme Velho technically were 
part of the zona sul, they too became passageways for cars to go from the 
zona norte to the beaches of the zona sul.  Still, both Cosme Velho and 
especially Laranjeiras had developed significantly in the post 1945 period 
by expanding cultural, commercial, and leisure activities in the 
neighborhood.  While the tunnels and the viaducts were seen as a 
nuisance to the neighborhoods, the strong middle and upper middle 
class community of residents, many of whom owned their apartments 
and houses, helped to maintain the neighborhood’s characteristics.  
There were, however, residents of Laranjeiras and Cosme Velho who 
opted to relocate to other areas of the city, notably Ipanema, Leblon, and 
Gávea, in order to flee the commotion imposed by the dominance of high- 
rises and increased automobile traffic and pollution.67  
                                                 
67 For background on the history of Laranjeiras see Hélia Nacif Xavier,.  “Transformações 
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As statistics show, the majority of car owners during the 1960s 
resided in the neighborhoods and administrative regions of the zona sul 
and Tijuca, with Copacabana in the number one position. In the family 
section of the Rio daily, O Globo, the opening of the tunnels was cited as 
not only linking the city together geographically, but with making Tijuca 
a part of the south zone of the city. 68  This article attributes Tijuca’s 
zona sul “worthiness” to its solid middle class who were more in-tune 
with the cosmopolitan leanings of the residents of the zona sul, rather 
than the samba and forms of popular culture of the zona norte and 
suburbs. While the popular rhetoric of engineers and politicians declared 
that tunnels such as Santa Bárbara and Rebouças were going to unite 
the city, this unification was rather superficial and based solely on 
physical geography. 
   Geographical theoretician Henri Lefebvre defines the meanings of 
abstract space, social space, and spaces of representation.69  According 
to Lefebvre, abstract space is above all the space of commodification, 
while social space is the space of everyday social relations and activities. 
As Kevin Fox Gotham and other urban sociologists have demonstrated, 
Lefebvre’s work is relevant to the current discussion since he contends 
                                                                                                                                                 
Recentes em um bairro Residencial - Laranjeiras: O papel de legislação Urbanística.”  M.S. 
Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1981; Folha da Laranjeira – Edição 
Histórica Ano XIII Abril/Maio 1993. 
 
68 See the table at the end of the chapter for the statistics on car ownership during the 
1960s in Guanabara. 
 
69 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), passim. 
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that “uses provided by government and business for abstract space, such 
as the building of a new highway or redeveloping older areas of the city, 
may conflict with existing social space, and the way residents use and 
think about space.”70   This certainly was the case with the two tunnels, 
overpasses, and other major roadway projects constructed during Carlos 
Lacerda’s tenure as the governor of Guanabara as the objective of these 
two tunnels was to facilitate the flow of automobile traffic rather 
geographically uniting the city’s population socially and culturally.  
Consequently, the everyday life and socio-economic space of the 
neighborhoods of Rio Comprido, Catumbi, and Laranjeiras were greatly 
altered in order to achieve the goal of making the city more 
accommodating to the automobile.   
Despite the delight that the technocratic and planning community 
expressed over conquering Rio’s topography and uniting the zona norte 
and zona sul via tunnels, many Cariocas questioned the short and long 
term objectives of these tunnels.  Even though a resident from the zona 
norte could now travel to the zona sul areas of Copacabana, Ipanema, 
and Leblon without going through the centro, the use of an automobile 
was required to pass through the tunnels. Accordingly, aside from 
residents of Tijuca in the zona norte, car ownership was significantly 
lower in the neighborhoods of the zona norte and subúrbios than it was 
                                                 
70 Kevin Fox Gotham, Jon Shefner, and Krista Brumley, “Abstract Space, Social Space, 
and the Redevelopment of Public Housing,” In Critical Perspectives on Urban 
Development edited by Kevin Fox Gotham (Oxford:  JAI-Elsevier, 2001), 314. 
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in the zona sul.  Furthermore, the new fleet of buses that debuted in the 
mid 1960s were prohibited from passing through both tunnels, thereby 
excluding many of the city’s residents from making a direct trip to the 
ocean beaches of the zona sul without going through the downtown 
areas. 
 The advent of the two tunnels clearly reinforced the divisions of 
Rio’s social and cultural space rather than serving as a force of 
unification.  Although Rio’s socio-cultural spatial dynamics became more 
complex by the mid 1970s with the proliferation of favelas in even the 
wealthiest areas of the city such as Copacabana, Leblon, Ipanema, 
Tijuca, and Gávea, there was a growing divide between the cosmopolitan 
zona sul and the working class of the zona norte.  Indeed, the zona norte 
and the subúrbios had a lively cultural scene in their own right, however 
the media, government, tourism, and real estate industry greatly invested 
in the development of the zona sul’s neighborhoods that combined high-
rise apartment and hotel buildings with the splendor of the beach.  Even 
though the tunnels were designed to make the city more accessible and 
democratic, they in fact fortified existing stereotypes about the city’s 
space and its residents. 
When the Túnel Rebouças opened to full capacity in the early 
1970s, a new term, além-túnel (those from beyond the tunnel), evolved in 
order to differentiate residents of the zona sul and everybody else (the 
ones from beyond the tunnel).  This characterization was loaded with 
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several social, cultural, ethnic, racial, and geographic connotations.   
Even though car ownership rose significantly during the early 1970s, 
many residents of the zona norte and subúrbios, of which many were 
poor, black or mixed-race, did not have the means to purchase 
automobiles.  Additionally, even though the “largest urban tunnel in the 
world,” united the zona norte and zona sul, it was not until the 1980s 
that public buses began to transport passengers from the zona norte to 
the zona sul.71   
  In his work on the contemporary geography of class in Rio de 
Janeiro, geographer James Freeman observes that “transportation 
systems have become grist for the mill of social distinction precisely 
because of their very material power to enable and constrain certain uses 
of public space.” 72  The realities of these tensions that the tunnel 
represented in socio-spatial relations among the residents of the zona sul 
and zona norte is evidenced by a resident of the zona sul who 
commented: “they (Suburbanos) bring all of their children and food and 
make an awful mess…next week we will go to a beach only accessible by 
car.”  A resident from the subúrbios countered, “I may be poor but I’m 
                                                 
71 According to a recent article in O Globo the first two bus lines to pass through the 
tunnel were in 1976. See “Uma Passagem que removeu pedras para unir a cidade,” 5 
November 2005.  This issue became the subject of intense debate during the 1980s, as 
new bus lines to transport from the zona norte to the zona sul were seen as the reason 
for the increase in crime and indecency on the beaches.  See “Ligação pelo túnel 
Rebouças facilita o acesso à praia, Jornal do Brasil 15 October 1984, 5. 
 
72 James Freeman, “Face to Face but Worlds Apart:  The Geography of Class in the 




not ugly….Am I banned from the beach just because I’m poor?  I’m not 
going to stop coming just because these dummies think I’m strange.”73  
Rather than uniting the city’s residents and fostering more democratic 
public spaces, the new expressways and tunnels that were built during 
the 1960s and early 1970s reinforced the differentiations among the zona 
sul, norte, and subúrbios. In their ethnographic work on the 
neighborhood of Ipanema, both James Freeman and Marisol Rodriguez 
Valle declare that many residents of the neighborhood and zona sul 
dichotomize the neighborhoods history and composition into “before and 
after the tunnel.”74
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The city of Rio de Janeiro was given a major overhaul from 1960 to 
1965 through the construction of new expressways, tunnels, parks, 
public schools, planned housing communities, as well as miles of new 
sewage and water lines.  Many of these projects were drafted during the 
1950s, however due to the lack of funds and administrative inefficiency, 
hardly any of these projects were realized in that decade.  Although 
Carlos Lacerda won the 1960 election for governor by the slightest of 
margins, he still was intent on implementing an agenda that focused on 
urban renewal and the rebirth of his native city of Rio de Janeiro. 
                                                 
73 Alan Riding “Brasília got the capital but the beaches stay put,” New York Times 11 
May 1985, 2.  
 
74 Freeman, 299-304; Marisol Rodriguez Valle, “A Província da Ousadia:  
Representações Sociais sobre Ipanema” (Masters Thesis, UFRJ, 2005), 77-80.  
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Through a creative organization of the state’s government, Lacerda 
was able to directly control the financial and administrative operations of 
the various entities such as SURSAN, the DER, and COHAB that directed 
Guanabara’s planning activities.  This massive urban renewal agenda 
was primarily financed through city AND state tax revenue, with 
additional help from foreign loans and grants, as well as federal 
assistance.  While foreign loans and donations from overseas entities 
were criticized by Lacerda’s opponents, these loans never exceeded more 
than 5% of Guanabara’s annual spending, as the bulk of this money 
went to funding the much needed water supply lines known as the 
Adutora do Guandu.  Nonetheless, these minimal loans and donations 
often exceeded the funds that Guanabara was promised by the federal 
government as compensation for the transfer of the capital to Brasília. 
The major goal of the technocrats of SURSAN and other planning 
entities was to find solutions to improve the city’s overall infrastructure 
as well as to incorporate the automobile into the city’s landscape.  Due to 
Rio’s daunting topography, the major solutions to resolve this problem 
entailed the construction of tunnels, overpasses, viaducts, and new 
expressways.  Although funding had been secured by French investors to 
build a rapid mass transit system, these plans eventually stalled as 
Lacerda was not able to gain the necessary financial support and 
cooperation from João Goulart’s administration. Strides were made 
however in improving public transportation as the old streetcars 
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(bondes), gradually were removed and replaced with electric and gas 
buses throughout the city by 1965.  Nonetheless, the buses were not 
permitted to pass through the Santa Bárbara and Rebouças tunnels, 
which signified the priority given to the automobile. 
Interestingly, the majority of urban reforms during Lacerda’s 
tenure were executed in the subúrbios, followed by the zona sul, and 
zona norte respectively.  Conversely, the zona sul received the majority of 
investment during his period in office, largely due to the fact that 2/3 of 
the Túnel Rebouças as well as the Aterro and Parque do Flamengo were 
geographically within the zona sul.  Although Lacerda’s initiatives did 
improve the streets, infrastructure, and quality of life in the suburbs, 
these actions did not help his party’s successor in the 1965 
gubernatorial election.  Aside from his polemical decision to remove 
certain favelas and relocate their residents to newly constructed housing 
communities on the periphery of the city-state, many voters still viewed 
Lacerda as the man who had killed Getúlio Vargas, the “father of the 
poor.”  Ironically, Vargas had attempted the same eradication and 
settlement approach to favelas in the 1940s, but was unsuccessful due 
to the lack of financial commitment to the project. 
The administrative model established by Lacerda as well as the 
urban planning agenda established by SURSAN and the DER would 
remain intact during Francisco Negrão de Lima’s administration from 
1965-1971.  Accordingly, Negrão’s administration would continue with 
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the eradication and resettlement of favelas, the building of tunnels, 














Projects and Programs 1961-1964 
Sanitation Programs 36.11% 
Water Supply 20.64 
Sewage 10.49 
Drainage and Basic Sanitation 3.72 
Street Cleaning 1.26 
Urbanization, Roadways, and Communications 34.37% 
Roads, Expressways, and Tunnels 20.80 
Transportation 4.04 
Communications 4.05 
Traffic and Parking 0.09 
Parks 1.60 
Other 3.79 
Education and Culture 8.89% 
Education 8.43 
Physical Education and Sports 0.38 
Cultural and Artistic Activities 0.08 
Social Services 6.46% 
Miscellaneous Supplies 0.36 
Housing 3.16 
Social Assistance 0.70 
Public Security 2.03 
Penitentiary System 0.21 
Health 5.27% 
Public Administration 5.01% 
Economic Development 3.89% 
Energy 3.11 




Table 3.2   Family / Passenger’s Cars per 1,000 Inhabitants 
  
Number of Cars Cars per 1,000 
inhabitants Administrative Zones 
1957 1964 1957 1964 
Zona Portuária 870 2,360 13.68 40.00 
Centro 2 010 3 400 24.42 52.31 
Rio Comprido 2 690 5 900 19.42 39.07 
Botafogo 10 010  21 360 49.70 89.75 
Copacabana 14 050   30 200 79.02 124.79 
Lagoa 7 390  14 560 59.50   84.75 
São Cristóvão 1 810 4 670  19.70  48.14 
Tijuca 6 310 13 660 45.43 84.84 
Vila Isabel 3 900 9 370  26.32  57.13 
Ramos 2 090 4 530  11.72 20.78 
Penha 1 410 3 330  7.75 14.17 
Meier 3 230 5 450 11.93 17.36 
Engenho Novo 2 550 6 400 15.37 35.56 
Irajá 870 2 720 3.98  9.41 
Madureira 1 810 3 920  6.29 10.54 
Jacarepaguá 740 2 620 5.87  15.59 
Bangu 740 1 460 3.61 5.05 
Campo Grande 470 1 670 3.62  9.13 
Santa Cruz 60 450 1.18 5.77 
Governador 740 1 970  15.04 28.55 
Paquetá --   -- -- -- 
     
Guanabara – Total  63,750 140,000   21.03 37.50 
Source:   Estado da Guanabara, Mensagem à Assembléia Legislativa: 
      5 Anos de Governo, 1965. 




Table 3.3 Distribution of Projects by Zone and Year during Lacerda’s Government 
(1960-1965) 
 
   Source:  Diário Oficial do Estado da Guanabara/Kleiman, 1994. 
Years 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Total 
Zones        
SUL 21 22 53 44 61 61 262 
NORTE 8 17 22 18 24 36 125 
BARRA 2 1 0 0 3 2 8 
JACAREPAGUÁ 9 6 16 10 21 24 89 
OESTE 27 6 29 9 15 25 111 
CENTRO 7 11 21 10 7 12 68 
CENTRAL 28 14 33 9 21 15 120 
LEOPOLDINA 35 32 63 52 62 56 300 
RIO DOURO 4 7 12 6 10 10 49 
ANCHIETA 3 5 2 2 1 3 16 
PORTUÁRIA 0 1 1 6 4 6 18 
        
TOTAL 144 122 232 166 229 253 1,166 
 
   





















Zona Portuária 1.5% 
Centro           7.0% 
Jacarepaguá  7.7% 
Zona Oeste  9.8% 
Zona Norte  11.0% 
Zona Sul  23.0% 
Subúrbios  40.0% 
 
Source: Diário Oficial do Estado da Guanabara/Kleiman, 1994
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Figure 3.4  Fleet of SURSAN trucks purchased with Alliance for Progress Funds 
 





Figures 3.6  Aterro do Flamengo Construction in the Early 1960s 
 
 





















Figure 3.11 Construction of the Túnel Rebouças 
 
 













Chapter 4:  O Negócio Grego: Constantinos Doxiadis and the Master 
Plan for Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro)  
 
While many famous foreign planners and urbanists such as Le 
Corbusier, Donat Alfred Agache, and Marcelo Piacentini visited and 
designed plans for Rio de Janeiro throughout the twentieth century, it 
may be the work of Constantinos Doxiadis (1913-1975) that has had the 
most enduring impact and influence for the city of Rio de Janeiro.1  Few 
people however outside of a small group of planners and scholars have 
acknowledged Doxiadis’ watershed master plan for the city of Rio de 
Janeiro. Nonetheless, his plan has greatly influenced the transformation 
of city space and infrastructure in Rio de Janeiro since the late 1960s.  
Whereas many other planners designed grandiose plans to embellish and 
beautify the city, Doxiadis’ work represented the shift to a more 
technocratic, quantitative, and “practical” approach to city planning in 
Rio de Janeiro that was exemplified by SURSAN during Carlos Lacerda’s 
(1960-65) and Negrão de Lima’s administrations (1965-71).2
                                                 
1There are multiple spellings of Doxiadis’ name which can be encountered in the 
literature.  Additionally, for the most complete bibliography of literature on Doxiadis, 
see the Doxiadis Foundation and archives recently organized online:  
http://www.doxiadis.org
 
2 There is good secondary literature on the presence of foreign planners and their 
influence on Rio city planning. See Fernando Diniz Moreira, “Shaping Cities, Building a 
Nation: Alfred Agache and the Dream of Modern Urbanism in Brazil (1920-1950), (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2004); David Underwood. “Alfred Agache, 
French Sociology, and Modern Urbanism in France and Brazil.”  Journal of the Society of 
Architectural Historians (June 1991): 130-166; Marcos Tognon, Arquitetura Italiana no 
Brasil: A Obra de Marcello Piacentini (Campinas: Editora da UNICAMP, 1999); Margareth 
da Silva Pereira, “Pensando a metrópole moderna:  os planos de Agache e Le Corbusier 
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The hiring of the Greek firm by Governor Carlos Lacerda in 1964 
generated intense debates and protests from many of Guanabara’s 
architects, engineers, and planners and was heavily covered by the print 
and electronic media.  Although on the surface these debates can be 
immediately discussed within the framework of the politics of urban 
planning, nationalism, and power, it is evident that the controversy and 
debates regarding the Doxiadis Plan highlight the numerous socio-
cultural and socio-political tensions that were present in Brazil before 
and after the military coup of April, 1964.   
 This chapter will deal with a number of questions surrounding the 
Doxiadis Plan for Rio de Janeiro.  My approach will be to comment upon 
the numerous plans and proposals that Doxiadis Associates produced for 
Rio de Janeiro, as well as an analysis of the numerous debates and 
protests that occurred during the years that the firm worked in Rio de 
Janeiro, 1964-65. Although Negrão de Lima’s administration never fully 
adopted the Doxiadis Plan, many of the ideas for projects that evolved 
during his administration were derived from Doxiadis’ study.  
Additionally, since the late 1960s, the Doxiadis Plan has served as a 
reference tool for the plans and projects such as the construction of the 
Linha Vermelha and Linha Amarela expressways during the 1990s 
                                                                                                                                                 
para o Rio de Janeiro.”  In Cidade, Povo e Nação, edited by Luiz César de Queiroz 




implemented by the city government and other entities involved in urban 
planning.  
4.1 - Lacerda, CEDUG, and Doxiadis 
 
Despite the fact that Carlos Lacerda was an extremely well read 
and well traveled man, even he admittedly was unaware of the résumé 
that the Doxiadis Associates (DA) had mounted since the mid 1950s. 
Lacerda, who wrote a nostalgic article to honor Doxiadis shortly after the 
latter’s death in 1975, attributed his knowledge of Doxiadis to a profile 
piece shown to him by friends that appeared in The New Yorker magazine 
in 1963.3  Soon after reading the piece, Lacerda explained how he sent a 
telegram to Doxiadis in Athens inviting him to visit Rio and design some 
sort of project for urban development issues and housing in Rio de 
Janeiro.4  Aside from the details regarding the theory of Ekistics, which 
was Doxiadis’ trademark, the profile piece written on Doxiadis contained 
biographical information and a thorough summary of Doxiadis’ career 
that obviously appealed to Lacerda.5  
                                                 
3For Lacerda’s article see Carlos Lacerda, “Doxiadis, Criador e Criatura” Jornal do Brasil 
(Rio de Janeiro) 28 July 1975, Primeiro Caderno.  For the profile piece in the New 
Yorker magazine see “Profiles:  The Ekistic World:  Constantinos Doxiadis,” New Yorker 
11 May 1963:  49-87.                       
 
4 Lacerda, “Doxiadis, Criador e Criatura.” Interestingly, Lacerda favorably refers to this 
as a second project, while citing Agache’s plan for Rio in the 1930s as the first master 
plan for Rio.  Sources discussing the Agache Plan in depth can be seen in footnote 1 of 
this chapter.  There is also evidence from Lacerda’s correspondence with Maria Carlota 
Costallat de Macedo Soares (Lota), that he sought out copies of Doxiadis’ publications 
before formally inviting Doxiadis to visit Rio.      
 
5 Konstantinos Apostolou Doxiadis, Ekistics: An Introduction to the Science of Human 
Settlements (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968).  It is important to remember 
that Ekistics was the backbone to Doxiadis’ career. Over time, he dedicated himself to 
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 Doxiadis was born in 1913 in a heavily populated Greek 
community in Bulgaria, although his family relocated to Athens a few 
years after his birth.  After completing his undergraduate studies in 
architecture in Athens, Doxiadis went to Berlin to pursue his doctorate 
in urban design.  Shortly after returning from Germany, Doxiadis served 
as a corporal in the Greek Army and became a major dissenter to the 
Nazi occupation of Greece.  His education and military service landed 
him several prominent posts in Greece in the postwar period, including 
the head of the Marshall Plan and United Nations reconstruction efforts.  
Despite these prominent positions and international connections, 
Doxiadis soon became a victim of the numerous Greek administrative 
turnovers, and left Athens in 1951 for Australia where he became a 
tomato farmer.  After a two-year stint in Australia, he returned to Athens 
in 1953 to attempt to build an urban planning and design firm from 
scratch. Doxiadis Associates was founded in 1953, and in a short span of 
a decade would work in several continents and generate lucrative profits. 
Through practice and education, Doxiadis and his firm would become 
                                                                                                                                                 
refining, testing, and writing on the subject.  According to the journal published by the 
Athens Center of Ekistics of the Athens Technological Institute, “Ekistics is the science 
of Human Settlements.  The term is derived from the Greek Verb OI K Ω meaning 
settling down.  Ekistics demonstrates the existence of an overall science of human 
settlements, conditioned by man and influenced by economics, social, political, 
administrative, and technical sciences and the disciplines related to art.  Ekistics is a 
science whose task is to examine all human settlements from every possible point of 
view in order to develop skills for the solution of the problems involved.” The previous 
description was quoted from the inner front cover of Ekistics Volume 21 Number 122, 
January 1966 edition. 
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synonymous with spreading the practice and philosophy known as 
Ekistics.6         
The Ekistic approach is a concept that is inseparable from 
Doxiadis and one that he dedicated his career to refining and developing 
entrepreneurially and educationally, as he explained to a New York Times 
reporter in 1969: 
“The theory of Ekistics has 15 units, progressing from man 
himself to the space of the room around him, to the house, small 
neighborhood and large neighborhood, and on to the megalopolis – 
the smear of today’s converging settlements – and finally 
ecumenopolis, the urbanized world…We must think of planning as a 
long-term process; What we decide must be the future.  And the 
decisions must be made on scientific data.” 7
 
One particular matter that probably resonated with Lacerda was 
Doxiadis’ leadership position and involvement in the construction of 
public housing with funds provided by the Marshall Plan just after World 
War II.  Even though Lacerda was probably most intrigued by the 
credentials of Doxiadis’ résumé for working in the developing world, the 
political and ideological values of Doxiadis’ past certainly perked 
Lacerda’s interest even more as somebody who he could see as an 
ideological ally in addition to his views on city planning.8  This point 
                                                 
6 For bio info see http://www.doxiadis.org and the article in The New Yorker. 
 
7 Ada Louise Huxtable, “Urban Planning Boasts a World Supersalesman,” New York 
Times 8 July 1969, 45.  At the time of this interview and article, Huxtable mentions that 
Doxiadis had served as a consultant to more than 100 different city, national, regional 




regarding the trajectory of Doxiadis’ career and target clientele for his 
firm Doxiadis Associates (DA) is highlighted in Ray Bromley’s recent 
article on the Greek planner.  Bromley notes in his text, 
 “Though Doxiadis tried to avoid petty politics by identifying 
himself as a planner, designer, and manager, his record of 
resistance to Nazi occupation combined with his disdain for 
communism identified him as clearly pro-Western and pro-
capitalist…He saw fluency in English and links with internationally 
oriented Americans as the keys to the reconstruction of Greece and 
his own success”.9    
  
 Thus, soon after reading the profile piece in May 1963, Lacerda 
and his advisors invited Doxiadis and his firm for a brief visit to Rio de 
Janeiro in September 1963.10  Shortly before Doxiadis’ arrival, Lacerda 
asked his trusted advisors to conduct research regarding the Greek firm.  
The resulting multi-page report contained a good deal of information on 
the specific projects the Greek firm executed in Greece in addition to 
many places around the globe including Spain, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, 
Nigeria, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, Venezuela, and the United 
States.  Additionally, the memo and report contained information 
regarding the administrative structure of Doxiadis Associates, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
8One extremely interesting fact presented in The New Yorker biography is that at one 
point in his career, 90% of Doxiadis’ income came from international contracts and 
jobs.  
 
9Ray Bromley, “Toward Global Human Settlements: Constantinos Doxiadis as 
Entrepreneur, Coalition Builder and Visionary,” in Urbanism: Imported or Exported?  
Native Aspirations and Foreign Plan, ed. Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait (West Sussex: 
Wiley, 2003), 319.  
 
10Letter transcription of a cable message from Carlos Lacerda to Constantinos Doxiadis 
19 August 1963.  Available in the Coleção Carlos Lacerda (CCL) – Universidade de 
Brasília.   
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number of employees and their credentials, as well as the locations of 
their overseas offices in cities such as Frankfurt, Washington, DC, 
Karachi, Madrid, and London.11  Furthermore, a brief memorandum was 
presented to Lacerda concerning the status of Greco-Brazilian relations 
and other pertinent public relations material.  One interesting item was 
the advisement to refrain from expressing any sort of opinion regarding 
the tensions that existed between Greece and Turkey over the situation 
in Cyprus.12
On January 7 1964, the state of Guanabara and the Greek firm of 
Doxiadis Associates signed a detailed contract with the intention of 
producing a growth management plan for the city-state of Rio de Janeiro.  
The research for the plan commenced on February 1, 1964, and 
commanded an unprecedented amount of fiscal and personnel resources.  
Aside from contracting the Greek firm, Lacerda created the Comissão 
Executiva do Desenvolvimento Urbano do Estado da Guanabara 
(CEDUG) that was to oversee and assist in the research, data collection, 
and design of the master plan.13 Americo Fontenelle and Hélio Modesto 
                                                 
11 “Projetos Estudados e/ou Supervisionados por Doxiadis Associates.”  Internal memo 
– CCL.  The memo mentions that Doxiadis Associates contained around 500 employees, 
of which 300 worked at the headquarters in Athens and around 200 around the world.  
At the time of the memo (late 1963), the firm had worked in 18 different countries.  By 
the time of his death in 1975, the firm would eventually design and work in over 40 
countries. 
 
12Undated memo from 1963 – CCL.  Lacerda is advised in this report to avoid any 
sympathetic alliance with the Greek position vis-à-vis Turkey and is urged to suggest 
that the actions of the United Nations is the appropriate course for such actions. 
 
13CEDUG can be translated as the Executive Commission for the Development of the 
State of Guanabara was created by Decreto “N” no. 159 on March 19, 1964.  
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were subsequently responsible for coordinating the activities and 
interaction of CEDUG with the Greek firm.  It is also noteworthy that the 
majority of data collecting, design, and planning of the Doxiadis Plan was 
an equitable endeavor conducted by both Greek and Brazilian 
professionals in Rio and Athens, and that Constantinos Doxiadis’ (Dinos) 
involvement was essentially that of a consultant and CEO than a 
researcher who collected data.  Nonetheless, Lacerda was eager to use 
Doxiadis’ reputation as one of the world’s prominent planners in order to 
give credibility and approval to his administration’s ongoing and future 
urban renewal campaigns in Rio de Janeiro.     
 The language of the contract signed between the government of 
Guanabara and the Greek firm dealt with issues such as proposed 
timelines for portions of the plan, as well as many details regarding 
financial and other material resources.  According to the contract, each 
Greek consultant working in Rio de Janeiro was to be paid an annual 
salary of US$27,000 a year plus all living expenses for their family - an 
exorbitant salary and benefits package for the mid 1960s in Brazil. 
Additionally, consultants working on the Rio plan in Athens were to be 
paid $17,000 a year.  Aside from these extravagant salaries, the state of 
Guanabara pledged to pay all office, living, travel (including round-trip 
airfares for spouses and children), and research expenses that were to be 
incurred during the two-year length of contract.  Although financial 
                                                                                                                                                 
Information on this legislation can be found in José de Oliveira Reis, A Guanabara e 
Seus Governadores.  
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details are not entirely accurate, it has been estimated the Doxiadis Plan 
cost roughly US$700,000 excluding some small incidentals to produce.14
4.2 - “O Negócio Grego” 
 
The foremost demonstration of ignorance that one can display 
is that urban development is exclusively an art and skill for 
architects and engineers -which constitutes in art and technique an 
arena for the exhibition of your xenophobia…The contract with 
Doxiadis has been signed and will be honored in spite of your 
protests and notes -which underlines your organization’s need to 
improve not only its technical proficiencies, but its moral ones as 
well.15
After the contract was signed between the two parties, the Rio 
press reported to the public that the Greek and Brazilian consultants 
would begin working in Rio and Athens at the beginning of February 
1964.  These initial reports soon led to heated debates, battles, and 
exchanges between Carlos Lacerda and numerous Brazilian and Carioca 
engineers, architects, and planners who had no previous knowledge 
regarding the contract signed with Doxiadis Associates which can largely 
be attributed to the flexibility and power that Lacerda had attained as the 
governor of a city-state. These debates and exchanges were made 
extremely accessible in the press throughout the months of January and 
                                                 
14 Carlos Lacerda, “Doxiadis, Criador e Criatura” Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro) 28 
July 1975, Primeiro Caderno. 
 
15Letter from Carlos Lacerda to Maurício Roberto, President of the Architects Institute, 
February 1964. CCL.  An informative summary and detailed history of the press 
coverage of these debates can be seen in David Mars, “Greeks in Guanabara: A Case 
History” in Perspectives of Brazilian State and Local Government, editor, Ivan 
Richardson (Los Angeles:  International Public Administration Center, University of 




February 1964 and became labeled as “O Negócio Grego” by numerous 
journalists reporting on the situation. 
The two main figures who publicly opposed the hiring of Doxiadis 
were the presidents of the Instituto de Arquitetos Brasileiros– Guanabara 
Division (IAB-GB, Maurício Roberto) and the Clube de Engenharia (Hélio 
Almeida).  Throughout the month of January 1964, these debates and 
exchanges were fully covered and documented by the press in Rio as well 
as nationally. Many others, including Lacerda’s political opponents 
registered their displeasure at the hiring of the foreign firm. Notable 
sympathizers with IAB-GB and CE were President João Goulart, former 
President Juscelino Kubitschek, as well as other professional 
associations from other states across Brazil. They manifested the same 
disapproval that their Carioca colleagues exhibited regarding the contract 
by sending letters and telegrams to Lacerda.  The leading publications 
that were sympathetic to those outraged by Lacerda’s hiring of Doxiadis 
were the Correio da Manhã and the Última Hora.  Since the 1950s, these 
two newspapers were consistently in opposition to Lacerda’s politics and 
agenda; hence many of the official telegrams and memos exchanged 
among Lacerda and his detractors were openly published in these two 
dailies, which only added to the tension between the two sides.  
The key reasons cited by those who vehemently opposed the hiring 
of the Doxiadis Associates firm stemmed from the fact that they saw the 
contract as a threat to national (Brazilian) forms and planning practices.  
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In their messages to Lacerda, both Maurício Roberto (IAB-GB) and Hélio 
Almeida (Clube de Engenharia) expressed repeatedly how the hiring of a 
foreign firm directly undermined, discouraged, and intensely insulted 
Brazilian engineers and architects. The main criticisms by the outspoken 
detractors of Lacerda expressed how Brazil possessed extremely 
reputable planners who were certainly capable of providing the necessary 
“know-how” to project and manage Rio’s urban growth. With the 
inauguration of the newly constructed capital of Brasília noticeably fresh 
in the minds of Brazilians, as well as the history of planning successful 
new cities such as Belo Horizonte (1897) and Goiânia (1940), these 
concrete examples justifiably served as reputable proof for various 
architects and engineers who asserted the competency and brilliance of 
Brazilian architects and urban planners.    
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to also understand that Lacerda was 
not only the most vocal opponent of Getulismo during the 1950s, but one 
of the fiercest critics of Kubitschek’s decision to build Brasília.  This 
contempt for Brasília was further compounded through Lacerda’s 
devotion to his native city of Rio de Janeiro and the fact that one of 
Brasília’s chief architects, Oscar Niemeyer, was a dedicated communist.  
Another major issue for those who opposed Lacerda’s hiring of the Greek 
firm was that even though they were “international experts” of urban 
growth problems, a foreign firm such as Doxiadis Associates could not 
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have the best possible solutions or first-hand knowledge to remedy and 
plan the development of the city-state.16    
Lacerda’s political rivals also continued to denounce his proclivity 
for dealing with foreign aid, loans, and capital, to develop Rio de Janeiro, 
despite the fact that these funds never comprised more than 5% of 
Guanabara’s annual spending.17  In the minds of many Brazilians, the 
hiring of Doxiadis Associates signified an imperial presence from the pre-
Vargas years, which they felt undermined national values and regard for 
the recent achievements of Brazilian architects and engineers.  An article 
regarding the hiring of Doxiadis in the socialist newspaper, Novos Rumos, 
claimed that Doxiadis and his firm were intimately linked to international 
imperialist endeavors since the time of the Marshall Plan to its 
continuous work in the underdeveloped nations of Africa and Asia where 
he exploits and puts national architects and engineers to work for his 
dubious causes.18   
The Clube de Engenharia added that the signed contract was 
illegal according to a 1933 decree that required any foreign firm working 
in Brazil to be registered with the appropriate commissions of 
                                                 
16 There are many newspaper articles that can be cited that contain similar and often 
repetitive information regarding the disapproval of the contract.  One good example that 
summarizes the opposition’s opinion are “Arquiteto Brasileiro Tem “Know-How” Para 
Seu País” Correio da Manhã (Rio de Janeiro) 6 February 1964:  Primeiro Caderno.    
 
17 See Chapter 3 for background on this information. 
 
18 “Arquitetos Reagem à Importação de Estrangeiros Para Guanabara.” Novos Rumos 
(Rio de Janeiro) 7-13 February 1964, p. 7.  Also see Bromley, p. 318-320 for Doxiadis’ 
early involvement with the Marshall Plan and UN efforts.  
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engineering and architecture.19 Moreover, the Instituto dos Arquitetos 
argued that a copy of the contract was not even made available to the 
public for analysis.20  Lúcio Costa, one of the architects responsible for 
the design of Brasília, declared that Doxiadis was a “show-off whose 
philosophy of urbanism was obsolete, and lacked prestige in the 
international community.”21  Oscar Niemeyer, another creator of Brasília, 
added more fuel to the fire when he declared that he personally was not 
acquainted with Doxiadis nor was he aware of the Greek firm having any 
form of prestige in the international community.  Yet, it is rather ironic 
that Niemeyer and Costa decided to sympathize with the nationalist 
positions of the IAB and the Clube de Engenharia and their protestations 
of cultural imperialism when both Niemeyer and Costa in particular 
worked in the developing world in places such as Ghana and Lebanon.   
These logical inconsistencies were not missed by Lacerda who accused 
his opponents in the media of opposing the contracts out of insecurity, 
xenophobia, leftist (communist in the case of Niemeyer) political 
propaganda, and technocratic ignorance. According to Mauro Magalhães, 
the height of Lacerda’s refutation to his critics occurred on the live 
television show, Falando Francamente, in early 1964.  During this 
                                                 
19“Ilegal o Contrato,” Última Hora (Rio de Janeiro) 22 January 1964.  
 
20The contract was finally published in the Rio daily Correio da Manhã.  See “Contrato 
com Doxiadis” Correio da Manhã 31 January 1964: pg 3.  Previously the IAB-GB 
received a copy upon request.  Reported in “IAB Recebeu do Govêrno o Contrato” 
Correio da Manhã 19 January 1964:  2  
 
21Lúcio Costa Fala Sobre Doxiadis.” Correio da Manhã 4 February 1964, 1.  
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lengthy television forum, Lacerda took the opportunity to denounce Hélio 
Almeida’s opposition to the hiring of Doxiadis Associates. Aside from 
serving as the president of the Clube de Engenharia, Almeida was also 
President João Goulart’s Minister of Highways and Roads. Lacerda 
maliciously accused Almeida of mounting an “unsubstantiated” 
mobilization campaign against his decision to hire Doxiadis, while also 
holding him personally responsible for sabotaging Guanabara’s plans to 
build a much needed subway system.22  Lacerda also inquired why 
professional associations such as the Clube de Engenharia were not 
outraged when Soviet engineers came to work as consultants for the 
nationally run company, Petrobras.  In response, Lacerda’s opponents 
asked why he arbitrarily hired the Greek firm instead of holding an open 
competition for a new growth management plan.  After all, had he not 
spent a good part of his term in office declaring that favors, nepotism, 
and a lack of competition for contracts and jobs fostered an inefficient 
government and workforce? Clearly, members of the IAB-GB and Clube 
de Engenharia were eager to publicize Lacerda’s blatant violation of his 
own principles. 
Carlos Lacerda and many others involved with urban planning in 
the government consistently defended the hiring of Doxiadis Associates 
by maintaining that the knowledge, philosophy, and resources that the 
Greek firm employed such as the use of computers, data extrapolation 
                                                 
22 Mauro Magalhães, Carlos Lacerda: O Sonhador Pragmático (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização 
Brasileira, 1993), passim. 
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and analysis, and traffic engineering were either underdeveloped or non-
existent in Brazil.23  Furthermore, he suggested that if Brazilians had the 
“know-how” necessary to propose such a plan, with the same 
philosophies, techniques, and skills employed by the Greek firm would 
be taught in Brazilian planning schools. The Governor continuously 
claimed that the attacks against the hiring of the firm had nothing to do 
with urbanism and planning, but were motivated by political and 
ideological preferences.  
Lacerda’s commitment to rebuilding Rio in the early 1960s must 
always be placed within the broader context of his ambitions to run for 
the presidency in 1965.  Lacerda avidly attempted to show the United 
States that he supported the foreign policy agenda they had adopted 
towards Latin America since the Cuban Revolution of 1959; especially 
vis-à-vis the Quadros and Goulart administrations. Lacerda hoped that 
his anti-communist and progressive democratic policies would appease 
the United States, and consequently benefit his current administration 
through favorable loans, aid, and grants. The evidence presented in 
chapter 3 suggests that foreign loans and grants played a minimal role in 
the overall expenditures for Guanabara’s urban redevelopment; however 
many nationalists, particularly on the left (PTB), did not approve of these 
                                                 
23Lacerda went to the papers to explain his point of view regarding the plan.  See “O 
Governador da Guanabara Rebate Críticas ao Contrato da Doxiadis” O Globo (Rio de 
Janeiro) 3 February 1964, p. 6.  
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loans and grants as they would be paid for by raising taxes and 
symbolically selling out to the United States. 
  Portions of the money that Guanabara received from the Alliance 
for Progress were utilized in the construction of new public housing 
complexes in the distant suburbs of the state such as Vila Aliança and 
Vila Kennedy, though several officials from the USAID questioned the 
architectural design of the homes. During a meeting regarding the status 
of and controversy surrounding the contract with Doxiadis Associates, 
Lacerda specifically mentioned that the opinion of an international expert 
such as Doxiadis regarding housing and urban development could make 
a difference in securing more aid from the United States’ Alliance for 
Progress and other international investors for the urban development of 
Guanabara: 
“We prefer that individuals have their own homes and that 
they do not reside in favelas. Mr. Doxiadis visited the Vila Aliança 
Housing Complex and declared that the style of homes we have built 
in these complexes indeed has value - contrary to the type the 
Alliance for Progress has suggested.  The opinion of Mr. Doxiadis is 
a critical form of international credibility that supports our use of US 
loans, in spite of their wishes for us to build more complete 
residences. If we are to secure more loans in the future, the hiring of 
Doxiadis can help solidify and give enormous credibility to the 
validity of our approach.24     
                                                
  
These forms of credibility and acceptance, in addition to popular 
support, were certainly factors and tools that Lacerda knew he needed to 
unite his own party (UDN) as well as political centrists (PSD) in order 
 
24 Contrato Doxiadis – Reuniao Realizada em 3/2/1964 – 18hs e 30 minutos. Page 5.  
Coleçao Carlos Lacerda (CCL) – Universidade de Brasília. 
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advance his own future political aspirations that included running for 
the presidency of Brazil.  Additionally, the contracting of Doxiadis’ firm in 
Brazil also served as an indication that Lacerda could negotiate and 
secure internationally reputable personnel to improve Rio and Brazil.  
Nonetheless, the hiring of Doxiadis to project Rio’s urban growth until 
the year 2000 was extremely worrisome to many nationalists and leftists 
in Brazil.    
 Although many of the initial debates regarding the Doxiadis 
contract had to do with urban planning and development, they also 
speak to the larger realm of transnational values, cultural politics and 
power, and social, political, and cultural divisions that had emerged in 
Latin America particularly since the Cuban Revolution of 1959.  The 
recent urban planning theory literature has considered the numerous 
issues that arose regarding foreign planners, locals, and the diffusion of 
planning models.25  In many ways, the work of Doxiadis Associates in 
Guanabara encapsulates several of the tensions that developed between 
foreign experts and local professionals.  With many Brazilians working as 
researchers and coordinators in conjunction with the Greek firm’s 
consultants, one might argue that the presence of Doxiadis Associates 
operated within the rubric of helping fortify the local planning skills and 
                                                 
25 Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait, Urbanism: Imported or Exported?  Native Aspirations 
and Foreign Plans, ed. Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait (West Sussex: Wiley, 2003); 
Stephen Ward, Planning the Twentieth Century City: The Advanced Capitalist World 
(West Sussex: Wiley, 2002); Bishwapriya Sanyal, editor, Comparative Planning Cultures 
(London:  Routledge, 2005).   
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techniques of Brazilian planners.  Additionally, it is credible to suggest 
from examining some of Lacerda’s confidential testimony, Doxiadis’ 
hiring was meant to show the international community and Lacerda’s 
critics that the planning agenda that was well underway before the 
arrival of Doxiadis Associates in 1964 was logically and urbanistically 
sound. Moreover, as Nasr and Volait suggest, the justifications and 
motives for the inviting of a foreign expert is an understudied subject in 
planning history.26  Doxiadis’ experience of working in the developing 
and developed world and pro-western ideological views undoubtedly 
meshed with Lacerda’s contempt for communism, corruption, and 
administrative inefficiency. Furthermore, both Doxiadis and Lacerda 
were extremely cultured, fluent in several languages (English notably), 
and possessed charismatic personalities which in certain ways benefited 
each individual politically and entrepreneurially. In other words, the 
relationships between the foreign/local dimensions in the case of 
Doxiadis Associates cannot be explained solely with reference to urban 
planning. Rather, they must be considered as a smaller slice of the 
broader tensions and divisions that were omnipresent in Brazilian society 
before and after the military coup of April 1964.     
4.3 - The Plan 
 
“The main objective of the Plan is to create a framework for 
the infrastructure that will permit the future balanced growth of the 
                                                 
26Nasr and Volait, xviii-xix.  
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city, and will help solve the problems of the present city, without 
unduly destroying its charm and character.”27  
 
The Doxiadis Plan for Rio de Janeiro/Guanabara was different 
than any other one that the city had seen during the twentieth century.  
The Doxiadis Plan, which was not concerned with aesthetics, 
beautification, and design, was a highly technical plan that offered long-
term (up to the year 2000) and short-term solutions to problems in the 
growing metropolis of Rio de Janeiro through the aforementioned model 
of Ekistics. The plan used polychromatic maps, lines, and designs in 
reference to transportation networks, land use, zoning, and settlement 
patterns, and revolved around the framework of Ekistics and the idea of 
the hierarchy of communities.  The plan proposed two standard goals:  
1. To create the necessary framework for the physical 
infrastructure that will permit the future healthy growth of 
the city of Rio and the State of Guanabara 
2. To solve the pressing problems with the existing tissue of 
the city without doing undue violence to the quality, beauty 
charm and character of the city.” 28   
 
Revolving around an Ekistic principle known as the hierarchy of 
communities, the study identified nine distinct community levels that 
“locate work, residential, and recreational uses in a functionally related 
manner in accordance with the general pattern of the urban area as a 
whole.” The hierarchy of communities was established from Class I to 
                                                 
27 CEDUG and Doxiadis Associates, Guanabara: A Plan for Urban Development (Rio de 
Janeiro: The State of Guanabara, Document Dox-Bra A6, 20 November 1965.) VII. A 
short abstract of the plan can be found in Ekistics 21:122 (January 1966): 59-69. 
 
28 Doxiadis Associates and CEDUG, 258. 
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Class IX:  Class I - cluster of houses; Class II - small neighborhood; Class 
III-Sub-Neighborhood; Class IV -Neighborhood or Human Community; 
Class V - Metropolitan District; Class VI - Major Community; Class VII - 
Metropolitan Community; Class VIII - Metropolitan Area; and Class IX - 
Megalopolis.29   
According to the authors of the study, one of Guanabara’s major 
problems was the amount of time consumed in commuting to locales of 
employment, residence, and recreation.  Another focal point of the 
Doxiadis Plan was to develop and renovate Guanabara’s total 
infrastructure (utilities such as gas, electric, water), transportation 
systems, and open space as well as to create new employment and 
recreation centers in newly urbanized areas.  Furthermore, the plan 
stressed the decentralization of over-saturated commercial, residential, 
and recreational areas by “providing a framework for the creation of new 
employment and recreation centers in the areas to be urbanized in the 
future; as well as for the gradual decentralization of existing over-
concentrated employment and recreation centers, so that these may be 
closely related to areas of residential development.”30
 The Doxiadis Plan was very concerned with the viability of the 
central business district (centro in the case of Rio) and subsequent 
expansion of commercial activities of Guanabara. Despite the 
                                                 
29 Table 40:  Hierarchy of Communities, ibid. 185. 
 
30 Ibid., 258.  
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recommendations of the plan’s authors and researchers that 
Guanabara’s urban infrastructure should be reorganized in a more 
decentralized pattern, they widely acknowledged that Rio’s Central 
Business District would continue to “be the main focal point around 
which urban development and growth will take place.”31 The plan’s 
authors attributed some of Rio’s economic growth problems to its 
outdated urban infrastructure, as well to an overburdening on the city-
state’s CBD.  Aside from proposing that the immediate areas (Mangue, 
São Cristóvão) surrounding the CBD be utilized to accommodate the 
future growth of the functions of the CBD, the plan also stressed that 
many of the CBD services and functions be redistributed throughout the 
city in order to better serve the city’s residents.   
The concerns that had been expressed since the 1950s regarding 
Rio’s economic and industrial growth were also of importance in the 
Doxiadis Plan.   The areas on the periphery of the state were proposed to 
host the plants and factories of heavy industry, while spaces along 
Guanabara’s transportation routes should be reserved for utility and 
service industry in order to serve the city and its residents efficiently.  
The plan also stressed that the opening of a new port at the Baía de 
Sepetiba would be advantageous not only for economic growth, but for 
the burdens placed upon the existing port areas of Saúde, Santo Cristo, 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 256. 
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and Gamboa, which were located too close to the CBD, and considered to 
be deteriorated neighborhoods. 
The emphasis on the expansion of Guanabara’s road and highway 
system is the most ambitious feature of the Doxiadis Plan.  Synchronized 
with other features of the plan, one of the objectives of the new proposed 
expressways was to solve the inadequate configuration of space and 
services that many Cariocas experienced, but to also properly inspire and 
control the future growth of the city-state and greater metropolitan 
region.  Using dressed-up urban planning terminology, the following 
quote contextualizes an obvious recommendation for the development of 
roads in Guanabara:   
“The proposed main road network follows basically a grid 
pattern adapted to the physiography of the state.  By a gradual 
transformation of the presently existed radial system which 
converges upon the Central Business District into a grid system of 
North-South and East-West arteries, a favourable setting is created 
for a more balanced urban growth and traffic distribution.”32
 
The Doxiadis Plan considered the improvement and construction of new 
freeways and expressways in Guanabara a priority in the first five years 
of its implementation (1966-1971).  Moreover, aside from proposing the 
initial new construction of 59.5km of expressways, they also encouraged 
the widening, paving, construction of medians, and interchanges along 
the existing main arteries of the city-state.33  
                                                 
32 Ibid., 265. 
 
33 Ibid., 344-346. 
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 The plan’s focus on the improvement of traffic throughout the city 
state by means of remodeling and constructing new expressways did not 
signify that the planners had completely neglected the role of mass 
transportation.  The authors clearly stated that Rio was greatly in need of 
a metro (subway) system, as well as the need to reconfigure the bus and 
suburban train systems.  While the question of car ownership and the 
use of the private automobile is a variable that is emphasized and 
privileged throughout several facets of the plan, the proposals concerning 
mass transportation state that it “should be organized to provide 
inexpensive, fast and convenient movement in order to be able to 
compete with the private car, especially as far as movements to and from 
work are concerned.”34  In his study on the evolution of transportation in 
Rio de Janeiro, scholar Josef Barat claims that one of the problematic 
parts of the Doxiadis Plan was its overwhelming emphasis on the 
automobile and expressways, with not enough attention paid to the role 
of public transport in the urban development of the city-state.35
 Questions and solutions for the constant growth and presence of 
favelas throughout Rio de Janeiro was also a central focal point of the 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 265.  Numerous efforts to construct a subway in Rio had stalled since the 
1950s.  Early into his administration, Lacerda had secured enough financing from 
French investors to begin construction on a metro system, however he did not receive 
the backing of the federal government, hence the aggressive attacks on Hélio Almeida of 
the Clube de Engenharia and Minístro de Viação.  A future study was commissioned by 
Negrão de Lima in 1968 on which agreements were signed in order to build a much 
needed mass transit system.  
 
35 Josef Barat, Estrutura metropolitana e sistema de transportes:  Estudo do Caso do Rio 




Doxiadis study.  By examining the demographic conditions surrounding 
the growth of favelas, the plan considered the long-term efforts needed in 
the way of financing, construction, and maintenance that were needed to 
alleviate the growth of favelas.  In 1964, the researchers calculated that 
approximately 405,000 people resided in 211 favelas, with an annual 
growth rate of 6.2 percent.36  Furthermore, the plan recognized that 
those who resided in favelas were not social outcasts in the city, and that 
more adequate forms of housing that were accessible to the favelas 
residents’ places of employment throughout the city were vital 
considerations in the construction of housing.  The plan recommended 
that “space for the relocation of the favela population in new well-
organized communities must be found within each of the existing 
communities of the city as well as the new areas to be opened to urban 
development.” The Doxiadis Plan set up a 15 year program that they 
considered would be of great help to solving the favela problem in Rio de 
Janeiro.  While the State of Guanabara already had begun the relocation 
through its housing agency COHAB in 1962, the Doxiadis Plan 
envisioned the construction of 126,000 dwellings that would eventually 
house 600,000 people.  Furthermore, the plan suggested that the State 
Government, private investors, and the favela residents through creative 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 349.  Again, while these numbers are of the most accurate of the time period, it 
is important to keep in mind the underreported residents or the constant growth of new 
favelas.   
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and generous financing, be the actors responsible for the construction of 
new housing throughout the city.  
As much as the Doxiadis Plan dealt with the metropolitan area of 
Rio de Janeiro on a macro level, it also identified two distinct areas that 
were ideal for urban renewal.  The two targeted areas in the plan for 
urban renewal were Copacabana in the zona sul, and the other was the 
area known as Mangue between the centro and the zona norte. 
Copacabana was a densely populated upper and middle class 
neighborhood that mixed high rise office buildings, large avenues, 
apartments, hotels, stores, bars, and cafés, with the natural splendor of 
the beach that served as a postcard image for the city.  It was Rio’s most 
cosmopolitan area and the symbol of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil to the 
international community during the 1950s and 1960s, albeit densely 
populated and growing haphazardly.    
In order to solve the haphazard patterns of development and traffic 
congestion caused by the increasing amount of automobiles and new 
buses, the Doxiadis Plan envisioned a new utilization of space within the 
immense neighborhood.  
“The only solution to the problems of Copacabana is to 
organize the space and group various related functions in a radical 
way.  There should be a complete separation between pedestrians 
and vehicles.  The functions, uses and movements of pedestrians 
should be gathered together in areas that will be safe from traffic 
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and be agreeable and relaxing.  This can only be achieved by a 
vertical separation between man and the car in Copacabana. 37
 
Thus, the proposed plan for Copacabana suggested the creation of a new 
style of buildings that designated several levels for residences, parking, 
shopping, and leisure activities.38  The planners were deeply concerned 
with the hazards and problems that the intense auto traffic generated in 
the densely populated neighborhood, thus the proposed idea entailed 
that roads should be for cars and not pedestrians.  Hence, commercial, 
residential, and leisure activity would be reorganized so that is was as far 
as possible from the street.  This concept of building and design 
ironically went entirely against the grain of Rio’s urban character, as the 
street had always served as the main arena for socio-cultural relations 
among people of all social classes.  The plan for Copacabana, which 
focuses on the redistribution of space in the neighborhood, also 
considers the decline of open space in the neighborhood.  While 
reforming the beach areas along the Avenida Atlântica is suggested 
together with an increase in playgrounds, this seems to be a secondary 
concern in the plan.  Rather, the design schemes are undoubtedly 
preoccupied with incorporating the automobile into the fabric of Rio’s 
most populous and vibrant neighborhood, as well as finding solutions to 
alleviate the pressures on the neighborhood’s infrastructure.   
                                                 
37 Doxiadis Associates and CEDUG, Chapter 2.  An extremely concise report on the 
CEDUG and Doxiadis proposal for Copacabana can be accessed in Ekistics 21:124 
(March 1966):208-209. 
 
38 See the diagram in the appendix for an example of a proposed block building. 
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The plan for Mangue was slightly different.  While Copacabana was 
growing exponentially and vertically, the greater area of Mangue (Estácio, 
Catumbi, Praça Onze, and surrounding favelas) was gradually decaying 
and turning into a high speed passageway for cars flowing from the zona 
norte and zona sul.  The deterioration of the area began during the 
1950s primarily due to the construction of the Túnel Santa Barbara and 
its accompanying overpasses and viaducts.39  Doxiadis’ plan for Mangue 
called for a renovation of the area that would preserve some of its 
remnants, but mainly called for redevelopment by constructing new 
housing complexes and office buildings.  Located on the fringes of the 
centro, Mangue was seen by the authors of the plan as an ideal and 
strategic location for the extension of the oversaturated CBD. 
Similar to Copacabana, the plan for Mangue involved a complete 
reorganization of the streets and building patterns in the area.  Whereas 
the plan proposed to separate pedestrians from cars in Copacabana, the 
idea in Mangue was to verticalize and construct high rise office towers 
and apartment buildings.  The greater Mangue neighborhoods of Estácio 
and Catumbi were largely categorized by one or two story buildings, of 
which many dated back to the previous century and were in a range of 
physical conditions. Furthermore, while Copacabana was a cosmopolitan 
neighborhood that offered numerous residential and recreation options, 
many parts of Mangue were occupied by a precarious mix of lower middle 
                                                 
39For a detailed analysis of the plan for Mangue see chapter 6 regarding Catumbi.  
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class families, workers, immigrants, gypsies, prostitutes, and migrants of 
many different ethnicities.   The Doxiadis Plan saw this section of the city 
as ripe for urban development: 
“It is very probable that the plan for Mangue will propose a 
different internal street system and larger size blocks more 
compatible with the function and design of large scale central area 
building complexes, to permit the erection of modern office, 
commercial or residential buildings.  Therefore, it would seem 
necessary for the reparcellation of the land.”40
 
The Doxiadis Plan was finished too late in 1965 for it to be officially 
approved by Guanabara’s legislative assembly partly because Lacerda 
vacated the governorship early over his disgust with General Castello 
Branco and the military regime.  Even if the plan had been approved by 
the legislative assembly, it is highly unlikely that subsequent 
administrations for the following thirty years would adhere to the 
programs, financing, and growth management schemes that were 
proposed and outlined in the plan. While the study produced by CEDUG 
and Doxiadis Associates certainly contained many interesting proposals, 
it was impractical, even in a country with extreme material resources 
and without political and economic turmoil, for it to be adopted in its 
entirety.  Doxiadis Associates was commissioned for hundreds of studies 
similar to the one for Guanabara, and they were continuously optimistic 
and committed to the notion that their Ekistic model was the  path to 
achieving  a positive urban renewal experience, even if they were well 
                                                 
40 Doxiadis Associates and CEDUG, 312. 
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aware that long-term financial commitments to such plans were 
unrealistic for their clients. 
  Aside from proposing a myriad of urban development strategies, 
another purpose of the Doxiadis Plan was to help institute an 
organizational framework for planning in the city-state.  While Carlos 
Lacerda’s administration had made tremendous strides in reforming the 
city-state, they still did not have an official department of planning.  
Rather, they had relied upon various secretaries, mixed enterprise 
companies such as SURSAN, and foundations to urbanize and develop 
the city. The Doxiadis Plan recommended that a formal planning 
department be created in order to improve the organization and efficiency 
of urban renewal and planning within Rio.  
The Doxiadis study was not just another plan that “ficou na 
gaveta.”41 Francisco Negrão de Lima, Lacerda’s successor, neither 
outlawed nor legalized the plan, but evidently followed advice from 
planners and urbanists who participated in the CEDUG and Doxiadis 
venture.  Numerous ideas from the plan such as the re-urbanization of 
the Avenida Atlântica in Copacabana, and the construction of the Cidade 
Nova in the vicinities of Mangue, Catumbi, and Estácio in 1967 were two 
critical projects that Lacerda’s successor brought to fruition starting in 
1967.42  Although initially they might not have admitted to deriving their 
                                                 





ideas from the Doxiadis Plan for political, ideological, or professional 
reasons, it is obvious that the root of their ideas came from the 1965 
master plan.  In the case of the Mangue and Cidade Nova redevelopment 
plans, the actual execution of the projects liberally followed the initial 
proposals and recommendations, especially regarding matters such as 
displacement, affordable housing, and compensation for expropriated 
properties.  As I will investigate in Chapter 6, many urban planning and 
development entities selectively borrowed ideas from the Doxiadis Plan, 
largely at expense of some of Rio’s residents. 
 Several stories concerning actual hard copies of the Doxiadis Plan 
have emerged over the years since its publication in 1965.  In a recently 
published interview, Pedro Teixeira Soares, a former SURSAN architect, 
recalled how Negrão de Lima and his advisors demanded that every 
encountered copy of the plan be confiscated and hidden in an abandoned 
house in Vila Kennedy which was one of the hallmarks of the favela 
resettlement program built during Lacerda’s administration.  Several 
others have memories of finding copies of the plan in elevator shafts in 
city hall; however presently it is extremely difficult to encounter an 
original copy of the plan in used book stores in comparison with other 
studies such as the Agache plan of 1930.43 Negrão de Lima’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 See Chapter 6 regarding the detailed case study regarding this redevelopment project.   
 
43 Lacerda commented how Chagas Freitas, the third and final governor of Guanabara, 
though about reinstating the plan.  According to Lacerda, copies of the plan were often 
encountered hidden in the elevator shafts of the main government administrative 
building in Guanabara; Pedro Teixeira Soares interview by Américo Freire, Carlos 
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administration also produced a less ambitious plan for the city in 1970 
entitled Rio Ano 2000.44  This plan was a much smaller volume, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, and addressed topics such as 
urbanization, education, energy, and science.  Similar to the Doxiadis 
Plan it was designed to project Rio’s growth until the year 2000 and was 
never implemented or adopted with any success.      
Even though the presence of planners in Rio such as Agache, Le 
Corbusier, and even Piacentini have generated more discussion than 
Doxiadis within planning history circles, the plan itself has still left a 
remarkable imprint on many of the planning agendas and projects in Rio 
de Janeiro since the mid 1960s.  Many of the projects and proposals that 
are presented in the plan from 1965 came to fruition during the 1990s 
such as the construction of two expressways, the Linha Vermelha and 
Linha Amarela.  For over a generation the two volume study produced in 
tandem by the Greek firm and Brazilian researchers has served as a vital 
source for data and statistics regarding population, housing, 
infrastructure, technology, and other sociological variables for scholars 
conducting research on Rio in the 1960s. This extensive statistical data 
and research also displays the new technocratic approach to planning 
that took hold in Rio de Janeiro and internationally with the advent of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Eduardo Sarmento, Lúcia Lippi, and Marly Motta (Rio de Janeiro, 12 June 2000 and 16 
October 2000). Capítulos da Memória do Urbanismo Carioca, organizadores, Américo 
Freire and Lúcia Lippi Oliveira (Rio de Janeiro:  Folha Seca, 2002) 
 
44Estado da Guanabara/Comissão do Ano 2000/Secretaria de Ciência e Tecnologia, Rio 




the automobile and newly developed computer systems that offered a 
scientific rationalization to urban planning models. 
Ultimately, the merit and the multi-faceted implications of the 
plan’s proposals can be evaluated endlessly and debated, however the 
tensions and fierce debates regarding the presence of the Doxiadis 
Associates firm working in Guanabara should never be forgotten.  Not 
only did the debates represent the conflicting interests that those 
immediately and professionally involved in urban planning possessed, 
but those that many ordinary Brazilians held concerning multiple 










































Figure 4.7  Population Density of Copacabana 
 
 





















Chapter 5 – Urban Renewal during Negrão de Lima’s Administration: 
1965-1971 
 
Through the construction of new tunnels, parks, schools, 
expressways, housing complexes, and new water and sewage systems, 
the city of Rio de Janeiro achieved what appeared to be a miraculous 
amount of progress in a five year period during Carlos Lacerda’s 
administration (1960 to 1965).  Despite the different party affiliations 
between the first and second governors in Guanabara, much of the 
administrative organization and urban planning agenda established 
during Lacerda’s administration (UDN 1960-65) was continued under 
Negrão’s from 1965 to 1971 (PSD/PTB). Moreover, it was during these 
five years that Brazil changed from a democratic republic to a repressive 
military dictatorship. Ultimately, by the end of Francisco Negrão de 
Lima’s term, the city was remarkably different spatially, socially, and 
culturally than 11 years before when it was still the federal district. 
One main reason for this continuity can be attributed to Negrão’s 
commitment to SURSAN which he established during his brief stint as 
the mayor of Rio in 1957. Many of the engineers that worked for SURSAN 
during Lacerda’s mandate continued to be employed in the autarquia 
during the Negrão years, as Guanabara continued to grow 
demographically and spatially. The Negrão years were filled with 
questionable policies and an ambitious urban planning agenda, yet the 
difference is that Negrão avoided being personally identified with the 
more controversial policies, whereas the debatable matters during 
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Lacerda’s government were directly related to the governor.  Much of this 
may be attributed not only to the drastic differences in personality, but 
to future political aspirations.  While Negrão de Lima had an extensive 
federal and diplomatic service record, Lacerda had hoped to use his 
accomplishments and experience as the governor of Guanabara to 
catapult him to the presidency.  But, Lacerda’s personal ownership of the 
entire agenda and programs for the state of Guanabara made him an 
easy target for his critics.  Both governors were also in power when the 
national political climate changed dramatically.  The Lacerda years 
(1960-65) are divided by the military coup (post April 1964); whereas the 
second half of Negrão’s administration was marked by the most 
repressive phase of the military dictatorship (post 1968). 
 Lacerda could have been remembered for his tunnels, 
expressways, parks, water works, overpasses, and public schools, but 
his legacy is still dominated by the image of the controversial journalist 
and politician who was viewed as a loose cannon. This controversial 
nature of his legacy is compounded by his rivalry with Getúlio Vargas, 
his initial support for the military régime (which eventually imprisoned 
him), the eradication of the favelas, and his anti-communist agenda and 
fiery speeches presented worldwide.1  For many years, Lacerda has been 
seen as the enemy of the left and “popular” classes, while Negrão has 
                                                 
1 As Mauricio Perez mentions in his recent work on Lacerda’s legacy as an 
administrator, the initial idea of the eradication and relocation programs of the favelas 
began in the early 1940s during Getúlio Vargas’ Estado Novo, however it was ultimately 
Lacerda’s administration that took this approach to a larger scale.  
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been portrayed as the senhor simpático who made the public feel at ease 
and caused little friction amongst his peers. 
Many revisionist accounts now regard Lacerda, unlike his populist 
rivals, as an efficient and gifted administrator whose policies produced 
many positive changes in the landscape of Rio de Janeiro.2 Although 
Lacerda was always concerned with making progress in improving the 
zona norte and subúrbios, research shows that the significant 
improvements made in the infrastructure of that area of the city 
ultimately did little to burnish his legacy or to ensure the future success 
of his party in the 1965 gubernatorial election.3  The seeds of support 
that Getúlio Vargas, the PSD, and PTB had cultivated in the 1950s were 
still deeply entrenched and left little hope for electoral success for the 
UDN in sections of the zona norte and subúrbios.  
 Another assessment of Lacerda’s gubernatorial term cites his 
failure in getting his party’s candidate to retain the gubernatorial seat in 
the 1965 election. Marly Motta largely attributes this to the fact that 
Lacerda’s hand-picked successor, Rafael Almeida de Magalhães (Rafa), 
was barred from running by more conservative factions of the party for 
                                                 
2 For more on Lacerda’s legacy within the realm of urban planning see the previously 
cited article in chapter 3 in Veja Rio from 1995.  Furthermore, while Lacerda was an 
elected politician, there are many similarities between him and Robert Moses in New 
York City.  While both were extremely polarizing and ambitious public figures, they also 
left behind a certain benchmark to which future planning generations aspire to match.  
An interesting perspective on Moses’ legacy can be read in Floyd Lapp, “Robert Moses:  
Visionary or Villain?” Papers in Planning 04.01 Columbia University School of 
Architecture, Urban Planning Department. 
 




the reason that he was living out of wedlock with his girlfriend. 
Consequently, Lacerda’s Secretary of Education, Flexa Ribeiro, became 
the UDN’s candidate in 1965 against the PSD candidate of Francisco 
Negrão de Lima instead of Rafa.4 With the PSD and PTB joining forces, 
Negrão’s candidacy was more than enough to defeat the watered down 
candidacy of Flexa Ribeiro.  With the aftermath of the military takeover, 
Lacerda’s policies and personality, and Vargas’ legacy still a major factor 
in the working class areas of the city-state, Negrão coasted to a victory by 
capturing 49.5% of the vote, versus Flexa Ribeiro’s 37.6%.5  Whereas the 
working class vote was divided in the 1960 election between two 
candidates and parties, the PSD/PTB party took the overwhelming 
plurality of votes in the 1965 election, as well as drawing the more 
conservative middle class ones as well.   Military leaders were banking on 
a UDN victory which they felt would stabilize leftist insurgency, however 
they were not willing to risk any gains by the “left,” thus they decided to 
suspend political parties as Negrão de Lima was elected to office.  
                                                 
4 Flexa Ribeiro, in addition to serving as the Secretary of Education under Lacerda, was 
also the father in-law of Lacerda’s son, Sebastião.  In his Depoimento, Lacerda notes 
how he later revealed to Flexa that he knew he would never win the gubernatorial 
election in 1965 and that his own chances to become president would be slim as the 
military was banking on a UDN victory in Guanabara to at least entertain some form of 
eventual elections for the presidency.  Ultimately, Lacerda fell out of favor with the 
military and had his political rights suspended for ten years by the military in 1968.  
This was largely due to his protests against the military regime, and his founding of a 
movement called the Frente Ampla with his former political foes, Juscelino Kubitschek 
and João Goulart. 
 
5 Marly Silva da Motta, Saudades da Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação 
Getúlio Vargas, 2000).  
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Ironically, Negrão de Lima was a longstanding friend of General Castello 
Branco, the first military president from 1964-1967.6    
 While there is a wealth of literature on the political career of 
Lacerda and Chagas Freitas, very little literature exists on the political 
career of Francisco Negrão de Lima.  Born in Minas Gerais in 1901, 
Negrão de Lima established his political and diplomatic career in the 
1930s when he was a federal deputy for the state of Minas Gerais, and 
later was sent to head the Brazilian Embassies in Venezuela and 
Paraguay in the early 1940s. When Vargas returned to power 
democratically from 1951-1954, Negrão served as the Minister of Justice 
from 1951 to 1953.  Negrão, who was a staunch supporter and ally of 
fellow Mineiro, Juscelino Kubitschek, was appointed mayor of the Distrito 
Federal (city of Rio de Janeiro) from 1956-1958.  It was during his brief 
tenure in this position that the influential and powerful autarquia, 
SURSAN (A Superintendência de Urbanização and Saneamento) was 
established to coordinate and plan the city’s urban renewal agenda.  In 
1958, Negrão accepted Kubitscheck’s offer to serve in his cabinet as the 
Minister of International Affairs, which then landed him in Lisbon to 
serve as the Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal until 1963.7   
                                                 
6 With the passage of Institutional Act Number 2 (AI-2), political parties were cancelled 
and the two official party system was established.  ARENA – the official party of the 
military dictatorship; MDB – the official opposition party. 
 
7 Fundação Getúlio Vargas – CPDOC, Dicionário Histórico Biográfico da FGV – CD Rom 
Version, “Francisco Negrão de Lima” (Rio de Janeiro:  Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2002).  
Negrão was also involved in traveling across Brazil in early 1937 in order to confer with 
various governors and leaders over Vargas’ plans to stay in power instead of holding 
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 In many ways, Negrão de Lima’s ascendancy to the second 
governorship of Guanabara is rather peculiar.  Like many national-level 
politicians and technocrats of his generation, Negrão lived and spent his 
daily life in Rio de Janeiro, yet was never formally involved in local 
politics aside from his brief stint as mayor of the federal district.8  
Moreover, his position as the mayor of Rio de Janeiro from 1956 to 1958 
was essentially an act of patronage by his longstanding friend President 
Juscelino Kubitscheck.9 Negrão’s presentation of himself as a level-
headed and calm individual, vis-à-vis that of Lacerda and the military 
régime certainly instilled some confidence in the voters in the October 
1965 election.   
 The beginning of Carlos Lacerda’s term in office as the newly 
elected governor of the state of Guanabara was spent organizing 
Guanabara’s administrative structure.  The majority of this newly 
created structure, such as the creation of regional administrations and 
the use of mixed enterprises such as SURSAN, COPEG, and the DER-GB 
to coordinate urban planning and development were inherited and 
retained by Negrão’s administration in order to continue with 
                                                                                                                                                 
presidential elections.  Known as the “Negrão de Lima Mission,” this plan ultimately 
was a crucial factor in Vargas’ installation of the Estado Novo from 1937 to 1945.   
 
8 In Saudades da Guanabara, Motta discusses how Negrão de Lima, unlike Lacerda and 
Chagas, lacked the ambition to campaign and attend functions to obtain votes.  In his 
Depoimento, Lacerda categorizes Negrão as a lazy and apathetic figure who was directly 
linked to the Estado Novo.  While this is not surprising due to Lacerda’s disdain for the 
Getulistas, he does credit Negrão with continuing with the development of Guanabara.    
 
9 Negrão de Lima was the cousin of Sarah Kubitschek, the wife of Juscelino. 
 195
 
transforming the urban landscape of Rio de Janeiro.  Thus, despite the 
differences in party affiliation, the second government of Guanabara 
would continue to use and expand the administrative framework 
established by the Lacerdistas.  Nonetheless, the beginning of Negrão’s 
term was spent rectifying the budget and personnel problems that 
loomed from Lacerda vacating his mandate two months early.10  Working 
out these two problems were the top two priorities early into Negrão’s 
term, however they soon took a backseat to an unforeseeable 
catastrophe.    
5.1 Environmental Disaster 
 
“1966 began amid sweltering temperatures, as the beaches in 
Rio were packed with the promise of a joyful summer.  However, on 
January 10, 1966 a massive storm hit the city resulting in the loss 
of electrical power and telephone service, along with incessant 
flooding that caused multiple hillsides and buildings to collapse and 
fall; 117 people were killed and over 50,000 people dislodged…The 
storms lasted for three days as over 10,000 of the dislocated people 
were transferred to the Estádio Municipal (Maracanã) and given 
vaccinations and healthcare, while relief efforts to remove obstacles 
from the city’s streets took weeks.  The same disaster occurred at 
the beginning of 1967 when a colossal storm on January 22 caused 
massive flooding which eventually caused the city to lose water 
service as the new water supply system of Guandu became 
contaminated.  An even more powerful storm on February 22 caused 
buildings to collapse in Laranjeiras as rocks from the top of the 
surrounding hillsides eventually killed 116 people and caused 1,700 
people to relocate to the periphery of the state.” 11     
                                                 
10 In an interview near the end of his mandate, Negrão de Lima commented on how the 
offices and supplies within the government offices were in complete disarray.  See 
document    Arquivo Negrão de Lima – CPDOC-FGV, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
 
11 A very interesting book on the life and work of Raymundo de Paula Soares, the 
Director and President of SURSAN during Negrão de Lima’s administration, was 
published in small quantities. Engenheiro Paula Soares: Antevisão Urbana – Uma Visão 
Humana. (Rio de Janeiro: Programação Visual Desenho Industrial Ltda. 1997), 4-5.  




Shortly after Negrão assumed the governorship of Guanabara, the 
city of Rio de Janeiro was hit with powerful storms that resulted in 
serious flooding and the interruption of utility service for several weeks.  
Many residents, particularly favelados, either completely lost their homes 
or were temporarily displaced because of the natural disasters.  The 
floods of 1966-67 caused major problems in all areas of the city, 
predominantly in the neighborhoods of Santa Teresa and Laranjeiras in 
the zona sul, Grajaú in the zona norte, and Anchieta in the subúrbios.  
Additionally, the majority of displaced residents and deaths occurred in 
the favelas that had mushroomed throughout Guanabara’s hillsides 
since the early 1950s. 
Various relief drives took place in order to provide medical care 
and temporary housing for the various victims that were displaced from 
the storms.  While state and federal forces worked to clear the debris 
from the streets and clogged sewer lines, relief efforts across the city were 
coordinated at the large soccer stadium, Maracanã, and other venues 
such as public schools and churches in order to help displaced victims.  
In order to provide temporary and long-term housing for some of the 
displaced residents the state government of Guanabara began to lodge 
several thousand people in the newly finished housing complex called 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Lacerda and Negrão de Lima administrations which is indicative in the similarity of 
the approach towards urban renewal that was employed by both governors.   
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Cidade de Deus (City of God).12  Located in the underdeveloped region of 
Jacarepaguá, many of the initial inhabitants of the Cidade de Deus soon 
opted to return to the favelas of the zona norte and zona sul which were 
located near better opportunities for employment and public 
transportation services instead of staying in these new housing 
communities. Nevertheless, Negrão’s administration quickly began to 
expand the favela eradication campaign that started during Lacerda’s 
administration.  While Lacerda is often identified as the public figure and 
chief enemy of the favelados, it ironically was Negrão de Lima’s 
administration, in tandem with the federal government,  that eliminated 
more of Rio’s favelas, particularly in posh areas of the zona sul.13    
In order to further assist storm recovery efforts, Negrão de Lima 
issued a decree in May 1966 that established the Instituto Geotécnica.  
This newly founded institute became a division of SURSAN and was 
assigned to surveying the conditions of the city’s hills, slopes, and 
geological conditions in the aftermath of the storms of 1966 and 1967.  
The primary responsibility of the Instituto Geotécnica was to repair the 
hillsides throughout the city, and to also apply preventative maintenance 
                                                 
12 “New Housing Due to Open in Rio for Flood Victims,” New York Times, 13 February 
1966, p 13. Recently, the history of this community has become known worldwide 
through the novel and subsequent film based on the life experiences of one resident.  
See Paulo Lins, Cidade de Deus 2nd Edition (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002). 
 
13 For general overview of the eradication and resettlement approach during Negrão’s 
administration see Licia do Prado Valladares, Passa-Se Uma Casa: Análise do Programa 
de Remoção de Favelas do Rio de Janeiro, 2nd Edition (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 
1980);  Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1976). 
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measures that would avoid further catastrophes in the event of future 
storms.  Through detailed studies and reports, the various geologists and 
scientists of the Instituto Geotécnica concluded that the growth of favelas 
and tunnel excavation had gradually aided in the deterioration of the 
physical foundation of Rio’s hillsides which exacerbated the numerous 
mudslides that resulted from the record amounts of precipitation in 1966 
and 1967.14  Nonetheless, even after the environmental disasters of 1966 
and 1967, many of the city’s displaced residents would return and 
reconstruct homes in the city’s favelas for the lack of viable alternatives, 
while the state would continue with the “conquest” of the city’s 
topography by building more tunnels. The storms certainly caused major 
personal inconveniences for all social classes through the loss of 
residences and unreliable utility services. The storms and flooding also 
adversely impacted the commercial and retail sectors within Guanabara.  
Still concerned with the retention of industry within Guanabara, Negrão 
de Lima, SURSAN, and COPEG declared that they were fully committed 
to rebuilding Guanabara and that the “rain was the sole culprit” of Rio’s 
problems.15  
 
                                                 
14 “SURSAN aplicará 3 bilhões este ano principalmente em obras contra enchentes,” 
Jornal do Brasil 6 January, 1967, p 5.  Two examples of these detailed reports can be 
found in SURSAN, Os Aguaceiros e as Encostas da Guanabara, 1966; Presidência da 
República and Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas, Os Movimentos de Encosta no Estado 
da Guanabara e Regiões Circunvizinhas, 1967.    
 




5.2 The Febre Viária Continues 
 
Amidst the chaos caused by the storms that wrecked havoc on the 
city in early 1966 and 1967, SURSAN and the DER-GB continued their 
plans to expand Guanabara’s network of roads. Before beginning entirely 
new projects, finishing touches were put on the Túnel Rebouças and 
several of the viaducts and overpasses that began during Lacerda’s term, 
while work also was continued on the upgrading of the water and sewage 
systems - especially in the aftermath of the storms of 1966 and 1967.  
Likewise, the eradication and relocation of favelas increased as the city’s 
population began to approximate 4 million. With increased population 
density in certain regions of the city-state such as Copacabana, Tijuca, 
and many of the subúrbios along the rail lines, certain plans were 
devised in order to foster development in the western regions of 
Guanabara such as Jacarepaguá and Barra da Tijuca.  The development 
of these two areas was envisioned to alleviate the core areas of the city-
state from population pressure as well as to generate more industrial 
activity within the city-state.  Unlike other cities in Brazil such as São 
Paulo or Belo Horizonte that were able to continue growing outward, Rio 
was continuously hampered by its topography.   
 In order to urbanize and develop these two regions of Guanabara, 
a new massive network of roads, tunnels, and expressways were 
constructed, as access to both Barra da Tijuca and the majority of 
Jacarepaguá from the zona norte and zona sul was extremely limited via 
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the narrow Avenida Niemeyer even in the mid 1960s. Similar to the other 
ambitious expressway lines and tunnel that were constructed during 
Lacerda’s government, SURSAN and the DER used city-state funds along 
with funds from DNER in order to construct the Auto Estrada Lagoa-
Barra to provide access from the zona sul to Barra da Tijuca and 
Jacarepaguá.  Like the Túnel Rebouças, the Auto Estrada Lagoa-Barra 
was technically a portion of the federal highway BR101 (Rio-Santos) and 
part of Guanabara’s network of expressways known as the Anel 
Rodoviário (Ring of Roads). 
The Lagoa-Barra connection extended along a stretch of 10.5km, 
navigating via tunnels through mountains in three separate segments:  
Lagoa-Rocinha, Rocinha-São Conrado, and São Conrado-Barra da 
Tijuca.  Together with tunnels, viaducts, and suspension bridges, 
portions of the Lagoa-Barra expressway hovered over parts of the ocean 
thereby offering a panoramic view of the beaches of São Conrado and 
Barra da Tijuca.  The first portion of this large-scale project began in 
early 1967 with the excavation of the .66km long Túnel Joá and the 
.86km Túnel do Pepino which connected São Conrado with Barra da 
Tijuca.16  Unlike the other tunnels throughout the city, the Túneis Joá 
and Pepino contained two different levels for traffic going in each 
                                                 
16 “Começam em Janeiro as Obras do Túnel de Dois Andares no Joá,” O Globo 20 
December 1966; Escavados os Primeiros 45 metros do Túnel do Joá,” O Globo  5 
December 1967; “Estado inicia em fevereiro a Construção do Túnel Joá,” Jornal do 
Brasil 13 January 1967, p. 5. 
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direction.17 Soon after the excavation began on the Túnel Joá, 
construction also began on the Túnel Dois Irmãos, which linked Gávea to 
São Conrado by passing through the Morro do Capado in the vicinity of 
the gigantic favela of Rocinha.  Throughout the construction of the Túnel 
Dois Irmãos, several thousand favela homes were razed in Rocinha as 
excavation made certain areas of the hillsides unstable for housing.  
Many of these residents were offered homes either in the existing favela 
or in a new planned housing community in the nearby zona sul or more 
distant suburbs.18   
With its beautiful serene beaches and virtually uninhibited open 
space that was eight times larger than Copacabana, Ipanema, and 
Leblon combined, Barra da Tijuca and Jacarepaguá were seen as ideal 
locations for new housing and economic development initiatives in 
Guanabara.  In order to coordinate these new growth initiatives, Negrão 
de Lima’s administration hired the famed architect and planner, Lúcio 
Costa to devise a growth development strategy plan for Barra da Tijuca 
and Jacarepaguá in 1969.  The ultimate goal of this plan was to avoid 
the haphazard growth that had plagued areas such as Copacabana since 
the 1950s.  The decision to urbanize and develop areas such as Barra 
and Jacarepaguá coincided with the upswing in purchasing power for the 
                                                 
17 See the figure at the end of the chapter for a sketch of the tunnel’s design.  This 
design approach was also utilized in the reforming older tunnels in the city and in the 
Viaduto da Mangueira. 
 
18 “Obra Acaba Barracos na Rocinha,” Jornal do Brasil 13 January 1967, p 5. 
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middle and upper classes in Brazil, during the period known as the 
“Brazilian Economic Miracle.” From 1968 to 1973, the Brazilian economy 
grew significantly after years of hyperinflation that resulted from 
austerity measures implemented by the military régime from 1964 to 
1967. While Brazil’s industrial production, exports, GDP, and GNP 
increased, the grave differences in the distribution of wealth caused the 
new economic benefits to overwhelmingly benefit the upper and white- 
collar middle class.  Accordingly, realtors, construction companies, land 
speculators, and the state concentrated on Barra as a fertile area for 
growth and profitability.  Conversely, working class and poorer areas of 
the metropolitan region such as the ever-growing Baixada Fluminense 
were neglected and still lacked vital infrastructure such as water supply, 
electricity, and adequate sewage systems into the early 1970s.     
Costa’s plan for Barra and Jacarepaguá, which was not based on 
any detailed or technical research, divided the regions into specific areas 
for housing, leisure, commerce, and industry while also preserving the 
natural beauty of the beach.19  Costa argued that vast amounts of open 
space should be maintained between high-rise condominiums and 
buildings so that growth and land use could be monitored.  Additionally, 
Costa insisted that along with the development of a sufficient network of 
roads that connected Barra to the rest of the city, access to the area via 
                                                 
19 A nice concise history of the Barra da Tijuca area with a reprint of Lúcio Costa’s 
report is Ayrton Luiz Gonçalves, Barra da Tijuca, O Lugar (Rio de Janeiro: Thex Editora, 




rail and metrô (subway) was critical for the area’s development.  Similar 
to his plans for Brasília, Costa envisioned that the streets should 
primarily serve for the flow of traffic, rather than an arena for socio-
cultural interaction.20  Thus, while Barra da Tijuca was viewed as an 
extension of the zona sul via new tunnels and roads, it also projected a 
new form of lifestyle for Rio’s upper-middle classes; one where social and 
cultural interaction were contained within the confines of the 
condominiums rather than the streets.   
While Barra began to develop in the early 1970s through public 
and private development ventures, very little was ever followed from 
Costa’s plan for the region.  Development in the form of exclusive high-
rise condominiums began to proliferate by the mid 1970s; however it was 
not until the mid 1980s that the region began to significantly grow and 
develop into a region densely occupied by exclusive gated communities, 
upscale shopping malls, movie theatres, supermarkets, and restaurants. 
Many working class and poorer residents did in fact settle in Barra da 
Tijuca and Jacarepaguá in order to work as construction laborers or in 
the blossoming service economy. The majority of the new residents of the 
region however, tended to be of the upper and upper-middle class, who 
opted to relocate to Barra for more open space, the beach, and a refuge 
from the street chaos in neighborhoods such as Ipanema, Copacabana, 
                                                 
20 Rosemere Santos Maia, “A Produção do Espaço em Áreas de Auto-Segragação:  O 
Caso da Barra da Tijuca,” Anuário do Instituto de Geosciências –UFRJ 21 (1998): 39-75; 
Gerônimo Leitão, A Construção do Eldorado Urbano: O Plano Piloto da Barra da Tijuca e 
Baixada de Jacarepaguá – 1970/1988 (Niterói:  Editora UFF, 1999). 
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or Tijuca.  Since the end of the “economic miracle” in the early 1970s, 
crime, violence, inflation, and the proliferation of favelas throughout all 
neighborhoods of the city increased significantly as socio-spatial tensions 
throughout the city intensified. In order to escape from the commotion 
and perils of the streets of the zona norte or zona sul, many wealthy 
residents opted for a lifestyle of insularity and “voluntary-segregation” by 
purchasing an apartment in one of the exclusive condominiums of 
Barra.21  Subsequently, many of these new high-rise gated communities 
contained their own security personnel, supermarkets, and shuttle 
service, thereby fortifying these values of insularity and voluntary-
segregation.    
5.3 Piecemeal Reforms 
 
One reform that significantly transformed the urban landscape of 
Rio de Janeiro during Negrão de Lima’s administration was the reform 
and expansion of the beach areas in Copacabana along the postcard 
Avenida Atlântica. As mentioned in previous chapters, Copacabana was 
the most densely populated area of the city by the 1960s, which was 
attributed to a lack of zoning, incessant high-rise building, and the 
intense circulation of automobiles.  The reforms along the Avenida 
Atlântica were coordinated by SURSAN along with consultants from the 
                                                 
21 Maia, passim.  For some historical background on this form of auto-segregation in 
Brazil see Teresa Caldeira, “Fortified Enclaves:  The New Urban Segregation,” In Setha 






Laboratório Nacional de Engenharia Civil de Lisboa of whom they had 
previously worked with in the building of the Aterro and Parque do 
Flamengo.   
According to the technical planning literature, there were several 
environmental, economic, spatial, and social motives to remodel Rio’s 
most famous locale. One of the main explanations for the redevelopment 
of the Avenida Atlântica was to help conserve the stability of the various 
apartment buildings, hotels, and other establishments that were 
threatened by undertows and erosion.  Furthermore, there was a need to 
construct a new sewage line, as the water and sand was polluted from 
inadequate sanitation infrastructure.  By widening the avenue, it would 
be possible to install this new sewage line as well as establish a more 
precise boundary between the street and the beach.  The redevelopment 
campaign also stressed more spaces for leisure, athletic, and cultural 
activities for the city’s residents and tourists.  Lastly, the widening of the 
avenue was recommended in order to alleviate the intense flow of traffic 
and to provide adequate parking spaces for the rapidly increasing 
presence of automobiles.22
The 8 million dollar remodeling of Avenida Atlântica began on 
October 22, 1969 in front of the Leme Palace Hotel and took nearly 18 
                                                 
22 Engenheiro Paula Soares: Antevisão Urbana – Uma Visão Humana, 9; “GB Debate 
Praia Maior para Copa,” Correio da Manhã 8 June 1968; “A Nova Copacabana,” Revista 
de Engenharia do Estado da Guanabara (Jan-Jun 1969): 7. 
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months to finish.23   Many members of the Clube de Engenharia had 
mixed emotions about the project, arguing that widening the Avenida 
Atlântica and building another lane for traffic would only make the 
neighborhood and beach area more chaotic.  Famed Brazilian architect 
Sérgio Bernardes also suggested that the remodeling of the avenue would 
only aggravate the problems caused by population density, and that the 
redevelopment plan needed to accommodate humanity instead of 
vehicles.  Aesthetically, the reformed beach and widened avenue was 
given its signature style through the design of mosaic sidewalks by 
Brazilian landscape architect, Roberto Burle Marx.     
This project turned Rio’s most popular area into a temporary state 
of chaos with its heavy machinery, construction supplies, and never-
ending noise from construction. Even before the project was begun, 
many planners, residents, and business owners were wary of the short-
term consequences for the economic and traffic conditions for the 
neighborhood. Nonetheless, despite ongoing construction for an extended 
period of time, Copacabana’s beach still continued to be the hub for 
many Cariocas and tourists both from Brazil and abroad.  The following 
quote from the New York Times characterizes the atmosphere in 
Copacabana amidst the major redevelopment campaign along the 
Avenida Atlântica, as well as providing a contextualization of the socio-
                                                 
23 “Obras de Copacabana Têm Início às 10 Horas,” Correio da Manhã 22 October 1969. 
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spatial dynamics of Rio in the early 1970s, albeit from the viewpoint of 
the journalist: 
 “The 8 million dollar local-government project to extend 
Copacabana  Beach about 100 yards into the Atlantic and build a 
new road and sewer line along the beach has resumed its noisy 
process.  That and conflicting reports that the water at several 
beaches has been polluted by sewers overburdened by the city’s 
growth have changed some beach-going habits.  Nonetheless, the 
troubles have not altered the way the beaches reflect the city- and 
its social divisions-like a huge, sandy backyard…Despite the 
obstacle course of pipes, dikes and machines, Copacabana is 
crowded on weekends with families and tanned young men and 
girls who cannot afford to live in the crowded  apartment houses 
rising behind the beach.  They come out of the small apartments and 
dingy houses that alternate with machine shops and garages in the 
older residential districts north of the city center and take buses to 
the beaches. The rough sand at Ramos beach, deep inside 
Guanabara Bay, has been as crowded as Coney Island on a hot 
Fourth of July, though there is a scum of obvious pollution.  Poor 
families, many in flapping, unstylish bathing suits, take the buses to 
Ramos from the jumbled industrial slums still farther to the north.  
Middle class families, which bought more cars last year than ever 
before, have been using them to get to unpolluted ocean beaches 
farther south.  For the first time in memory there have been sweaty 
traffic jams each hot Sunday on the roads leading south to the 10 
miles of relatively unspoiled beach at Barra da Tijuca…Still on 
fashionable Ipanema Beach, people whose names are seen in the 
social columns gather in front of apartments that can rent for as 
much as one thousand dollars a month.  They sprawl on the same 
reed mats used by picnicking families at Barra da Tijuca and by the 
noisy poor at Ramos Beach.   
  
 Since Agache’s plan for Rio in 1930, Brazilians and foreign 
planners had written several plans for Rio’s subway (metrô). In 1968, the 
decision to approve a plan and begin construction finally came to 
fruition.  The 1968 plan superceded previous agreements made during 
Lacerda’s administration with a French firm to construct and partially 
finance the metrô, which had been opposed by the federal government 
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and those with stakes in other spheres of public transportation, 
particularly the bus companies.  The 1968 plan was a study that was 
prepared in 5 months by the Brazilian Companhia Construtora Nacional 
S.A. and the German firms of Hochtief Aktiengessellschaft and Deusche 
Eisenbahn Consulting GmbH.24  The mixed-enterprise Companhia do 
Metropolitano do Rio de Janeiro, (a subdivision of the Secretaria de 
Serviços Públicos) was established in 1968 in order to coordinate the 
construction and implementation of the main metrô line that would run 
from Ipanema in the zona sul to Praça Saenz Peña in Tijuca of the zona 
norte.25
   Interestingly, financial assistance was promised by both military 
presidents Costa e Silva and Médici to assist Guanabara in realizing the 
implementation of a mass transit system despite Negrão de Lima’s 
opposition to military rule.26  Moreover, Rio was at the center of the some 
of the most spirited organized forms of protests and insurgency against 
the policies of the military dictatorship in the late 1960s during Negrão 
de Lima’s term.  Consequently, the military régime began to expedite the 
full occupation of Brasília in order to escape the “subversive” climate of 
                                                 
24 Companhia Construtora Nacional S.A. and Hochtief Aktiengessellschaft für Hoch-und 
Tiefbauten vorm. Gebr. Helfmann and Deusche Eisenbahn Consulting GmbH., Metro 
Rio: Study of the Technical and the Economic Feasibility of the Metro of Rio de Janeiro. 
(Guanabara:  Estado da Guanabara, 1968). 
 
25 “Aprovada Linha-1 do Metrô Carioca,” Correio da Manhã 13 June 1968. 
 
26 This information can be found in the Arquivo Francisco Negrão de Lima at the 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV-CPDOC) in Rio de Janeiro document# NL 66.04.04.g – 
“Discurso do Governador Negrão de Lima pronunciado hoje pela manhã no Jardim da 
Glória, por ocasião da solenidade de inauguração das obras do metropolitano carioca.”  
No date given.   
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Rio de Janeiro.  Nonetheless, many federal and state-level technocrats 
argued that the metrô would be another mechanism to help increase 
economic and industrial activity within Guanabara and the greater 
metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro.27  Even though Rio had 
significantly improved its infrastructure and developed plans to generate 
more industrial activity within the state, many local and federal 
technocrats were still uncertain regarding the economic viability of 
Guanabara as industrial growth was still very marginal since the city-
state’s creation in 1960.      
 The advent of new expressways, tunnels, viaducts, and modern 
buses did nothing to alleviate all regions of the city from traffic 
congestion. The core and periphery of the city continued to grow 
exponentially as greater Rio’s population in 1968 was close to 6 million.  
According to the diagnostics of various demographic studies during this 
time period, it was predicted that the greater Rio’s population would grow 
26% by 1975, and subsequently double by 1990 (11.6 million 
residents).28  The new metrô system was seen as the most viable option 
to relieve the main corridors of the city from brutal traffic congestion to 
be expected from this population explosion.       
 Since the 1950s numerous debates emerged among Rio’s planning 
community over the practicality of the metrô.  Many engineers, 
                                                 
27 Costa e Silva Promete a Negrão Ajudar a Construir o Metrô,” Jornal do Brasil 18 April 
1967. 
 
28 A Experiência da Guanabara. (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora Laudes, 1970), 99.  
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politicians, and residents opposed the construction of a metrô by arguing 
that upgrading and modernizing the existing train lines (Central, 
Leopoldina) was more feasible and cost-efficient. Similar to certain 
episodes during Lacerda’s term in office, engineers and architects of the 
Clube de Engenharia opposed the creation of the Companhia 
Metropolitano do Rio de Janeiro on the grounds of not being invited to 
participate in the design and configuration of the metrô system.  
Likewise, they objected to the involvement of German firms in the design 
process, as well as the fiscal arrangements established with the federal 
government in order to pay for the project.  While many were in favor of 
the project, many then objected to the layout and location of the stations 
and lines. As Maria Lais Pereira da Silva notes, while previous 
disagreements centered on the upgrading of the railway lines, the post 
1968 discussions were over the layout and locations of the metrô’s 
stations and lines.  
  The involvement of the federal government in state-level urban 
development projects such as Rio’s metrô in the late 1960s displays the 
changes that occurred nationally with the new policies of the military 
dictatorship after 1967.  Prior to 1967, governors such as Lacerda had 
the ability to negotiate independently with foreign lenders to fund urban 
development projects. With the escalation of the military regime’s 
arbitrary power, the federal government assumed a more meddlesome 
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approach in the daily operations of state and municipal governments.29  
Perhaps another reason for federal involvement was the economic impact 
of the project. Almost ninety percent (90%) of material for the 
construction of Rio’s metrô such as the iron for tracks, motors, engines, 
and trains would be produced nationally. The electronic components of 
the project relied on foreign manufacturers.30  
 Many transportation scholars and residents argued that the 
construction of a new mass transit system would have very little impact 
on the traffic problems within the city.  In his work on the social 
significance of the metrô lines in Rio, Josef Barat assesses how the 
various delays in constructing the metrô impacted the millions of the 
lower class by the early 1980s: 
  “Had the Rio de Janeiro Metro been implemented from the 
beginning of the century, as was the case for several large cities in 
the world, it would have ensured consolidation of the urban site, 
causing the evolution of the modal participation of trips to be more 
consistent…The rise of the road-oriented policies in the country, 
along with the implementation and expansion of the car industry, 
have contributed to the imbalance in the modal distribution of 
trips…The non-construction of the Metro at the best time and the 
increase in competition between buses and tramways – finishing in 
an extension of the system – coupled with increasing motorization 
and population growth, have created saturation of streets and 
avenues with the subsequent congestion that has been such a 
dominant feature since the 1960s…The slow and discontinuous 
implementation of the Rio de Janeiro Metro System is a typical case 
of the disregard by transport authorities of the low-income 
population’s basic needs…Since 1968 successive state and federal 
                                                 
29 Maria Lais Pereira da Silva, Os Transportes Coletivos na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro (Rio 
de Janeiro:  Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, Turismo e Esportes, 1992), 100-103. 
 




have had diverse and contradictory attitudes in relation to the Metro 
system as a social priority.”31
   
 Initial construction of the primary line (Ipanema-Tijuca) of the 
Metrô began shortly before Negrão de Lima’s term ended in March 1971, 
and it was not until the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro fused in 
1975 that construction of the tracks and stations gained momentum.  
Much like the massive tunnels, expressways, and viaducts constructed 
in the early 1960s, the execution of the Metrô aided in the displacement 
of almost 300 families as well as the demolition of almost 1,500 
residences and buildings throughout the city.32  Furthermore, as the 
next chapter will vividly demonstrate, the majority of areas that were 
adversely impacted by these new forms of urban infrastructure were 
predominantly inhabited by the lower-middle classes. 
 Portions of the Botafogo-Tijuca (formerly Ipanema-Tijuca) line were 
eventually opened to passengers in 1979, with the complete line 
operating by 1981. Segments of a complimentary second line from 
Estácio to Irajá were also opened in 1981; however it was not until the 
late 1990s that this second line began to reach the subúrbios of Irajá 
and the Baixada Fluminense.  Importantly, it was not until the late 
1990s that the Metrô even reached Copacabana, due in part to 
                                                 
31 Josef Barat, “Rio de Janeiro Mass Transportation System: The Social Role played by the 
Metro Lines.  International Journal of Social Economics 17:9 (1990): 34, 39. 
 
32 According to Maria Lais Pereira da Silva, p. 106-107, these forms of demolition and 
displacement occurred throughout all regions of the city, however they were more 
common in the centro and subúrbios. 
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expressways that were designed in the 1960s such as the Linha 
Vermelha and Linha Amarela being given priority over the extension of a 
mass transit system that would serve all segments of the population.  
The lack of commitment to building the Metrô and the upgrading of 
railways for several decades clearly reinforces how planners of the 1960s 
and subsequent generations emphasized the role of the automobile 
largely at the expense of the millions of the lower socio-economic classes.    
 Although the majority of the construction for the Rio-Niterói Bridge 
from 1969 to 1974 (officially known as Presidente Costa e Silva Bridge) 
was mainly the responsibility of the DNER, it clearly had spatial, 
economic, and political consequence for the city-state of Guanabara.  
This 13 km bridge was built in order to directly link the city of Rio de 
Janeiro (Guanabara) to the city of Niterói (state of Rio de Janeiro) across 
the Guanabara Bay.33  Although many Cariocas and Fluminenses 
(people from the state of Rio) commuted to each respective city for work, 
school, and leisure, this was mostly done via ferryboat across Guanabara 
Bay.  The purpose of the new bridge was to provide rapid, direct access 
between the two cities and also to help trigger economic and industrial 
growth in the greater metropolitan region. Similarly, the bridge also 
synchronized with Guanabara’s new expanding network of roads and the 
new federal highway plans.   
                                                 
33 For an overview of how the urban reforms of Niterói mirrored Rio de Janeiro’s, see  
Marlice Nazareth Soares de Azevedo, “A construção da Cidade na primeira metade do 
século 20:  Niterói, Espelho do Rio.” In Urbanismo no Brasil 1895-1965 (São Paulo: 
Studio Nobel/FAUUSP/FUPAM, 1999): 71-82. 
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 Declared the longest suspension bridge in the world, the 
Presidente Costa e Silva Bridge was essentially a massive concrete slab 
elevated above the picturesque Baía da Guanabara.  Despite the bridge’s 
lack of aesthetic beauty, it still does not detract from the scenery of the 
bay and views of Rio de Janeiro and Niterói.  In many ways, the bridge is 
a prime example of technocratic planning that had been adopted in 
Guanabara and by the federal (military regime) during the late 1960s and 
1970s. A technical publication by ECEX, the construction firm 
responsible for the construction of the bridge in the early 1970s, 
underlines the technocratic mentality of planning which stressed the 
development of national, state, and municipal roads: 
  “The Presidente Costa e Silva Bridge materializes a secular  
aspiration of the people in Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, and other 
neighboring cities. Its construction was entrusted to ECEX – 
Empresa de Engenharia e Construção de Obras Especiais – an 
entity attached to the Transports Ministry through the DNER, the 
Brazilian Federal Highway Department.  The Bridge links Ponta do 
Caju in Rio de Janeiro to Avenida do Contorno in Niterói, across 
Guanabara Bay, and it is an integral part of BR-101, a coastal 
highway connecting the cities of Touros and São José do Norte.  
Prior to the bridge construction, the highway traffic between Rio and 
Niterói was accomplished either through a 110 km long peripheral 
road around the bay or utilizing a ferryboat system.  In addition to 
causing less interference with the local and long run sea traffic, the 
route selected for the Bridge presents other advantages over the 
other alternative studied, providing a lower overall cost and effecting 
the construction through peripheral areas of Rio and Niterói, thus 
releasing the respective urban centers from the burden of the heavy 
highway traffic…The travel time from downtown Rio to downtown 
Niterói is approximately two hours along the Rodovia do Contorno, or 
one hour and sixteen minutes using the ferryboat system.  Through 
the bridge, only seventeen minutes are required.34
                                                 
34 ECEX, Presidente Costa e Silva Bridge, No date given.  Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio 




 Despite the geographical proximity between Rio de Janeiro and 
Niterói, there was very little common ground culturally and politically 
between the two cities and their surrounding areas.  However, the 
ultimate goal of the bridge was to help bolster the economies of the two 
regions, as politicians and economists were still concerned with the 
viability and diversification of Guanabara’s industries. Although 
Guanabara was still the second largest industrial center of Brazil after 
São Paulo, more concerted efforts were made in the late 1960s to study 
and develop deeper economic relations with the bordering state of Rio de 
Janeiro.  The construction and subsequent inauguration of the bridge 
clearly foreshadowed what was to occur in April 1975; the fusion of the 
states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro.  I will discuss this matter in 
detail in the final chapter, however the explanations and basis for the 
fusion between the two states were indicative of the economic and geo-
political agendas of the military dictatorship as well as several state and 
municipal politicians and several influential commercial and business 
representatives. 
 In a span of approximately ten years (1961-1971) the city of Rio de 
Janeiro experienced its most intense phase of urban development as well 
as demographic growth.  Aside from the differences in party affiliation, 
personality, and political ambitions between Carlos Lacerda and 
Francisco Negrão de Lima, both governors were highly committed to 
rebuilding, developing, and improving the landscape and infrastructure 
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of the new city-state. The majority of this development was 
overwhelmingly accomplished with financial resources collected through 
city-state taxes; with a small portion coming from federal funds (DNER) 
and foreign loans and grants.   
 There are two key elements to understand the continuity of urban 
reforms between the Lacerda and Negrão administrations.  The first 
aspect is the role that was played by mixed-enterprise entities such as 
SURSAN and the DER-GB.  SURSAN was the major executor, planner, 
and supervisor of the road, water, sewage, park, and other forms of 
urban development during the 1960s. Accordingly, many of the 
technocratic personnel were employees of SURSAN during both 
administrations in the 1960s.  Since SURSAN paid market-value salaries 
to their employees, many young and ambitious engineers and architects 
opted to work for the autarquia instead of working in the private sector.  
While SURSAN was a part of the executive and state government, it 
essentially was exempt from any direct meddling from members of 
Guanabara’s Legislative Assembly.  As noted in chapter 2, autarquias 
such as SURSAN were often privileged due to their mixed-enterprise 
nature. Another critical element for understanding how Rio de Janeiro’s 
urban development blossomed under both Lacerda and Negrão is the 
consideration of the administrative structure of Guanabara’s 
government.  While Negrão de Lima had very little in common with 
Lacerda politically, he strategically utilized the administrative model 
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created by his predecessor to govern and coordinate the city-state’s daily 
operations and urban development.  The majority of these urban reforms 
were made to improve the quality of life for the city and its residents, 
while also trying to configure a new network of roads that would allow for 
the efficient and systematized flow of traffic. Symbolically, through urban 
reforms in the 1960s, many politicians, technocrats, and Cariocas 
wanted to show that Rio, still was, the de facto capital of Brazil. 
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Figure 5.11 More Views of the Avenida Atlântica and the Redesigned Sidewalks 
 
 






Chapter 6: A Neighborhood in the Way of Cars 
 
 Rio de Janeiro during the 1960s can be remembered as a time and 
place of intense urban growth where residents saw a huge expansion in 
the physical infrastructure of the city.  Urban planners, architects, and 
engineers managed to conquer Rio’s topography and remedy, albeit 
temporarily in several cases, Rio’s intense population pressure, 
circulation of traffic, and other infrastructural challenges such as water 
supply, public schools, and paved streets.   
Furthermore, many consider the Rio of the 1960s as an Época de 
Ouro (Golden Age) with the high rise boom in areas such as Ipanema, 
Leblon, and the newly remodeled Copacabana.  The late 1950s and early 
1960s were the heyday of the world-renowned Bossa Nova, Tom and 
Vinícius’ Garota de Ipanema, as well as the brief existence of ZiCartola 
and halcyon days of the Escolas de Samba of the Zona Norte such as 
Portela, Mangueira, and Império Serrano.  While many Cariocas embraced 
the new modernity of tunnels, expressways, bridges, overpasses, parks 
and new forms of transportation, many were not able to directly benefit 
from some or all of the new improvements in infrastructure.  The city’s 
population grew by almost 200% from 1950 to 1970, but so too did the 
population of people residing in the city’s favelas. The history, growth, 
eradication and resettlement campaigns, and elements of everyday life in 
the favelas have been well documented by numerous scholars, activists, 
and artists and certainly must be mentioned when discussing the city of 
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Rio de Janeiro in that era.  Despite the interest in the world of favelas, 
and to a lesser extent, the world of the beach, Bossa Nova, and the 
Escola de Samba, little work has been done about the millions living in 
the middle and working class neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro and how 
they embraced, reacted, and “negotiated” the new forms of urban 
development under Carlos Lacerda, Francisco Negrão de Lima, and 
Antônio Padua de Chagas Freitas from 1960 to 1975.   
On the surface, many members of the middle class and working 
class did in fact welcome the improvements in the city’s network of roads 
that permitted a fairly rapid journey between the zona norte and zona sul 
as well as relieving some of the traffic congestion of the centro which 
dominated the cultural and social life of the city until the mid 1940s.  
With the increasing presence of the personal automobile within the city, 
those who lived in the middle class areas of the zona norte such as 
Tijuca, Grajaú, and Vila Isabel could easily drive to the beach 
neighborhoods of Copacabana and Ipanema to enjoy the beach and also 
frequent the new movie theatres, restaurants, and clubs that quickly 
rivaled the cultural life of the downtown that used to predominate in the 
centro prior to the 1950s. 
However, there were many people of the working and middle 
classes who were rather skeptical about the new urban development.  As 
an example, the new tunnels and network of roads and expressways that 
were supposed to alleviate the city’s horrid traffic congestion were mainly 
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intended for automobiles and not the new buses that replaced the 
streetcars in the mid 1960s.  A report from a Rio newspaper in 1965 
noted how the increase in car and bus traffic adversely impacted several 
of the city’s neighborhoods such as Catumbi 
 “The Túnel Santa Bárbara brought about an extraordinary 
improvement to the north-south flow of traffic in the city, but the 
main access roads via Catumbi are unable to sustain rush hour 
traffic…When the traffic entering or exiting the tunnel is extremely 
congested, cars and local buses completely cover the Rua Catumbi 
and adjacent streets which is increasingly resulting in accidents.”1      
  
 As evidenced from the above quote, many traditional and working 
class neighborhoods were drastically incised in order to accommodate 
many of the new expressways, overpasses, tunnels, residential and 
business complexes that comprised the urban development initiatives of 
the 1960s and early 1970s.  Whereas many neighborhoods and their 
residents were not entirely opposed to urban development and its 
possible positive consequences for the city, they were wary of how certain 
areas of the city were completely neglected or subordinated to larger 
plans and suffered neglect in Rio’s rapid urban development in the 
1960s. Consequently, what emerged were contesting interpretations of 
abstract and social space within the city, to cite the terms of geographer 
Henri Lefebvre. Synthesizing the arguments of Lefebvre and other 
                                                 
1 “A “Garganta”” do Catumbi,” O Globo 20 July 1965.  While buses did not travel 
through the Túnel Rebouças until the late 1970s and early 1980s with frequency, there 
is evidence that buses did circulate through the Túnel Santa Bárbara in the early 1970s 
as documented in the O Catumbi, the official newspaper of the Associação de Moradores 
do Catumbi.   
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urbanists, Kevin Fox Gotham suggests that “abstract space is the space 
of state actors who are interested in the abstract qualities of space 
including size, width, area, and profit.  In contrast, “social space” is the 
space of everyday lived experience, an environment as a place to live and 
call home.”2  
What I have written thus far can be said of any major city that 
experienced large urban renewal campaigns during the twentieth century 
and there are probably many case studies that I could cite to draw a 
parallel to the history and experience of the neighborhood of Catumbi, 
located on the fringe of the centro and zona norte of Rio de Janeiro.3  
However, in this chapter I will tell a story of a neighborhood and its 
                                                 
2 Kevin Fox Gotham, Jon Shefner, and Krista Brumley, “Abstract Space, Social Space, 
and the Redevelopment of Public Housing,” In Critical Perspectives on Urban 
Development edited by Kevin Fox Gotham (Oxford:  JAI-Elsevier, 2001), 314.  This 
article offers a very good synthesis of the scholarship pertaining to the theoretical 
discussion of spatial relations.  For some samples of this literature see David Harvey, 
The Urban Experience (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Manuel 
Castells, The City and the Grassroots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); 
Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air (New York: Penguin Books, 1982); Henri 
Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers, 1991); Milton Santos, 
A Natureza do Espaço (São Paulo: HUCITEC, 1999); Michael Peter Smith, Transnational 
Urbanism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); and Edward Soja, Postmodern 
Geographies (London: Verso, 1989). 
 
3 Berman’s chapter on Modernism in New York and his tale of Robert Moses’ Cross-
Bronx Expressway is analogous in many ways to the experience of urban renewal in 
Catumbi during the 1960s and 1970s, although in a different political and national 
context. The literature on urban renewal in the United States is extensive.  For some 
examples see Joel Schwartz, The New York Approach: Robert Moses, Urban Liberals, and 
the Redevelopment of the Inner City (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993); Jon 
Teaford, The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985 
(Baltimore: JHU Press, 1990); Mary Corbin Sies and Christopher Silver, Editors, 
Planning the Twentieth-Century American City (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1996); Jon 
Teaford, “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath” Housing Policy Debate 11:2 (2000): 443-
465; Christopher Silver, “Neighborhood Planning in Historical Perspective” Journal of 
the American Planning Association 51:2 (Spring 1985): 161-74, M. Christine Boyer, 
Dreaming The Rational Dream: The Myth Of American City Planning (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1983); Steven V. Ward, Planning the Twentieth-Century City: The Advanced 
Capitalist World (West Sussex and New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2002).  
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residents that I believe contextualizes many of the broad factors and 
elements regarding urban development in Guanabara that I have 
discussed in the previous chapters. 
6.1 Revisiting Catumbi 
 
The story and history of Catumbi is not unknown to scholars who 
have written on Rio de Janeiro or even to the cariocas who remember the 
late 1960s.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Carlos Nelson Ferreira 
dos Santos and his team at the Instituto Brasileiro de Administração 
Municipal (IBAM) studied and produced a variety of articles, books, and 
even a documentary regarding the neighborhood.  Furthermore, Catumbi: 
Rebellião de Um Povo Traído published by journalist Guida Nunes in 
1978, dramatically depicts the struggles of everyday life in Catumbi from 
the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s.  These two works are indispensable and 
need to be cited in order to tell the story of Catumbi and frame and 
position its importance within the context of the history of urban 
development in the city of Rio de Janeiro in the 1960s.   
 Operating in an interdisciplinary fashion, the work of Carlos 
Nelson primarily focuses on the dynamics of the neighborhood 
association as an urban social movement.4  As a work geared towards an 
academic audience, Carlos Nelson’s study integrates and critiques 
anthropological and sociological theory of social movements and urban 
space, yet still leaves a void in placing the significance of Catumbi within 
                                                 
4 Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, Movimentos Urbanos no Rio de Janeiro (Rio de 
Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1981).   
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the broader scale of urban development in Rio de Janeiro, although he 
does connect Catumbi’s movement with two other case studies of 
neighborhood mobilization in Rio.5  While the neighborhood’s newspaper 
is a key source for Carlos Nelson, he also focuses on his personal 
experiences from the period in which he and a group of consultants were 
contracted by the Associação de Assistência e Orientação dos Moradores 
do Catumbi to analyze Guanabara’s redevelopment plans.  
Guida Nunes’ story is reconstructed mainly through the various 
newspapers that vibrantly chronicle the dedication and perseverance 
that the residents of Catumbi possessed in resisting the destruction of 
their neighborhood. Nunes’ account romanticizes the story of the 
neighborhood’s struggle from the day that certain residents learned of 
the plans to start the urban renewal campaigns for the Cidade Nova in 
1967, until the late 1970s.  Nunes vividly depicts the everyday life of the 
neighborhood’s residents and their concerns, struggles, and cynicism 
towards the numerous actors involved in the reconfiguration and 
dismantling of the neighborhood’s infrastructure.  While Nunes focuses 
mainly on the people who were involved in the foundation of the 
neighborhood association and subsequent newspaper, she chose to use 
fictitious names in order to protect the privacy of those individuals 
                                                 
5 The two other movements are the favelas of Brás de Pina and Morro Azul. 
 232
 
involved in the struggle. Canvassing the newspapers from the time period 
however does make it easy to reveal the identity of Nunes’ characters.6   
While the works of Guida Nunes and Carlos Nelson are certainly 
vibrant and offer the reader a strong sense of the social and cultural life 
of the residents and their struggle, connections between the broader 
significance of Catumbi in the social, cultural, and spatial 
reconfiguration of Rio de Janeiro during the 1960s and 1970s is often 
insufficient or presumed by the authors.  There have been a few case 
studies written concurrently with the work by Carlos Nelson and Guida 
Nunes that have focused on the actual planning policies surrounding 
Catumbi.7  These studies analyzed the plans that razed a good part of 
Catumbi, utilizing the theoretical frameworks of scholars such as Manuel 
Castells who were in vogue in the 1970s.  Whereas Carlos Nelson looked 
                                                 
6 Published in 1978, the majority of the story was most likely written while Nunes 
resided in Catumbi.  Aside from her other publication on Rio’s favelas, very little is 
known regarding the author, aside from the fact that she now resides in Portugal. 
Nunes’ writing on the various dilemmas, problems, and concerns regarding the 
neighborhood’s residents is certainly provocative and alive with imagery. Nunes’ 
account is limited to the struggles of the neighborhood and contains very little reference 
to the historical origins of the neighborhood’s situation in the context of urban renewal. 
Furthermore, although the main planning commissions such as SEPE (A 
Superintendência Executiva de Projetos Específicos) and CEPE (Comissão Executiva de 
Projetos Específicos) are mentioned throughout the novel, Nunes rarely mentions any 
names of those in power, even if they are fictitious.  This may be evidence of the climate 
of censorship during the military dictatorship of the 1964-1985 period, rather than lack 
of interest or omission by the author.  Moreover, both Nunes and Carlos Nelson do 
mention the fact that the main parish priest, Father Mário (named Oimar in Nunes’ 
account) was tortured and imprisoned by the military for almost two months due to 
their view of his social activism in Catumbi’s neighboring favelas of São Carlos, Coroa, 
and Morro do Catumbi as being “subversive” of the military’s ideological agenda, 
although questions of censorship may have figured somewhat into what Nunes’ 
account, there are elements of the horrors of everyday life aside from the dilemmas that 
the city-state’s urban renewal campaign presented. 
 
7 Fania Fridman, “Prática de Planejamento: o Caso do Catumbi na cidade do Rio de 
Janeiro” (Masters Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1980).  
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at the internal dynamics of the neighborhood movements from an 
anthropological and sociological perspective, the work of Fania Fridman 
examined the evolution and role of planning and real estate legislation 
mainly from 1900 to 1980, by utilizing Catumbi as a case study. 
   While conducting my field research in Rio de Janeiro, I established 
contact with several residents and members of the Associação de 
Assistência e Orientação dos Moradores do Catumbi of Catumbi.  After 
being warmly accepted and given help and access to the numerous 
volumes of newspapers, pamphlets, and other material in the 
neighborhood association’s small community library on the Rua Valença, 
I determined that the story of Catumbi of was still worth reconsidering 
within the historical context of the urban planning and renewal of the 
1960s and 1970s in Rio de Janeiro. I strongly believe that Catumbi’s 
place in the larger realm of the transformation of urban space in Rio de 
Janeiro has not yet fully been exhausted.  Whereas others have chose to 
isolate Catumbi, or in the case of Carlos Nelson, compare it with the 
mobilization efforts of the residents of certain favelas, I decided that the 
dilemmas of Catumbi could be told within the broader context of urban 
planning in Rio de Janeiro during the Guanabara period, especially 
during the administrations of Negrão de Lima and Chagas Freitas.   
My choice to focus on Catumbi stems from various concerns.  
First, its geographic location on the fringe of the centro always made it 
an attractive target for redevelopment schemes, especially once the Túnel 
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Santa Barbara gave the neighborhood more direct access to the zona sul.  
Additionally, the socio-cultural characteristics of Catumbi are rather 
complex and interesting.  In the 1960s, the residents of Catumbi were 
mainly comprised of first and second generation Portuguese and Italian 
immigrants, with an increasing number of diverse migrants from other 
regions of Brazil, particularly Minas Gerais.  Catumbi was also at the 
crossroads of Rio’s demographic explosion by being located near the 
centro as well as being surrounded by large favelas (Catumbi, Coroa, São 
Carlos) which were constantly growing with residents mainly of African 
descent.  The internal dynamics of the neighborhood’s residents’ view of 
Catumbi as a “small city within the metropolis” often went against the 
grain of the modernization and renewal schemes envisioned by planners 
and politicians who increasingly neglected to incorporate social planning 
into their agendas. 
 Another aspect that I feel makes Catumbi an interesting case study 
is within the actual movement itself.  The neighborhood association, 
which was founded informally as a commission in 1967 and later legally 
recognized in 1970, declared itself as the first such type organization in 
Brazil. Furthermore, the members of the neighborhood association 
declared that their movement, goals, and ideas were apolitical.  This fact 
is interesting (if unsurprising) due to the fact that the founding of the 
organization and the establishment of the newspaper, O Catumbi, 
occurred during the repressive hard-line régimes of Costa e Silva and 
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Médici. While O Catumbi’s content was certainly susceptible to the same 
censorship rigors of the military régime, its content regarding urban 
development and the degradation of the neighborhood due to the 
construction of an overpass, expressway, and housing complexes, 
represent viewpoints that were often unavailable in the mainstream 
press, as well as those in the planning community who treated urban 
development solely from a technocratic perspective.  
 The plans to construct a new residential, administrative, and 
commercial area known as the Cidade Nova is widely blamed for the 
demise of Catumbi, in conjunction with the plans to connect the Túnel 
Santa Bárbara with routes such as the Avenida Presidente Vargas, 
Avenida Brasil, the zona portuária, and the Rio-Niterói Bridge.  
Simultaneously, massive urban renewal projects such as the renovation 
of the Avenida Atlântica in Copacabana, the construction of the Túneis 
Dois Irmãos and Joá in order to facilitate the expansion of the city to 
Jacarepaguá and Barra da Tijuca were being implemented.   
6.2 The Character of a Neighborhood 
 
 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, most residents and visitors to 
the city of Rio de Janeiro would be hard pressed to distinguish the 
singularity of the neighborhood of Catumbi. Beginning with the 
construction of the Túnel Santa Bárbara and subsequent overpasses and 
viaducts, followed by the construction of the Cidade Nova by state and 
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federal planning agencies, the area of Catumbi lost all of its unique 
character, and simply became another “neighborhood in the way of cars.”   
 Located on the outskirts of the centro, and wedged between the 
neighborhoods of Santa Teresa, Estácio, Rio Comprido, Praça Onze, and 
the Avenida Presidente Vargas, the bairro of Catumbi was typically 
classified as a “traditional” neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro.  The area was 
originally populated mainly by aristocratic families, who resided in lavish 
houses and mansions until the mid to late nineteenth century, when the 
neighborhood gradually expanded and was transformed socially with the 
addition of smaller-scale enterprises producing furniture, fixtures, tiles, 
and print material.  With the growth of various small factories and plants 
that flourished in Catumbi, the residential character of the neighborhood 
changed significantly.    
From the late nineteenth to the mid twentieth century, the 
neighborhood’s residents mostly belonged to the middle and lower middle 
classes who either worked or owned businesses within the neighborhood.  
A large portion of Catumbi’s population resided in one and two-story 
homes which were designed in the style of homes found in Portugal and 
Italy with colorful tiles (azulejos), balconies, and fences.  Throughout the 
twentieth century, Catumbi remained one of the major residential and 
settlement destinations of Portuguese and Italian immigrants in Rio de 
Janeiro.  Along with a strong immigrant population, Catumbi also 
became the choice home turf of gypsies in Rio de Janeiro.  The diverse 
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socio-cultural composition of Catumbi was also enhanced by the high 
levels of migrants from other areas of Brazil who chose to reside in 
Catumbi or one of the neighboring favelas of Catumbi, Coroa, or São 
Carlos.  By the mid 1960s, almost 75 percent of Catumbi’s residents, 
who were predominantly lower-middle class, were renters rather than 
property owners. 8  Catumbi’s character was more reminiscent of a small 
town where places like the local market, butcher, pharmacy, bar, barber, 
and salon were integral to the community.  Numerous families and 
residents came directly from places such as Portugal, Italy, Minas Gerais, 
and southern and northeastern Brazil which over time contributed to the 
area being a “pleasant multi-racial neighborhood where honest working 
class people resided”9       
Throughout the twentieth century, Catumbi was the cradle for 
some of the most famous samba and cultural activities of the city, most 
notably the revered Blocos Carnavalescos: Bafo da Onça and Vai Quem 
Quer.  This traditionalism also was attributed to the various bakeries, 
street fairs, markets, and hardware stores that distinguished everyday 
life in Catumbi from the more cosmopolitan areas of the centro and zona 
                                                 
8 Célio Bermann, Fania Fridman, and Paulo Sérgio Paes de Barros, “O Problema 
Habitacional nas Áreas em Processo de Renovação Urbana- Um Estudo de Caso: O 
Bairro do Catumbi no Rio de Janeiro.”  Paper presented at the Simpósio sobre 
Barateamento da Construção Habitacional – BNH, Salvador, Bahia March 26-31, 1978.  
According to the authors on page 5, the main Italian immigrants originated from 
Calabria, while there were about 400 families of gypsies.  The Portuguese immigrant 
community steadily grew throughout the twentieth century, especially in the Post World 
War II period during Salazar’s reign.   
 
9 Paula Pinto, Handwritten notes regarding the history of Catumbi, 4 June 2002.  
Biblioteca da Associação de Assistência e Orientação dos Moradores de Catumbi, Rua 
Valença 7, Catumbi, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. 
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sul.  Catumbi’s character and history is contextualized through the 
testimony of several of the neighborhoods residents: 
“Catumbi possessed the ideal qualities to develop into a haven 
for tourists with its eclectic 19th century architecture, famed 
cemetery (São Francisco de Paula) where famous barons and dukes 
are buried, numerous carnaval groups, artisans, and setting for the 
novels of Machado de Assis…According to Giuseppe Giambattista, 
the editor in chief of O Catumbi, the largest concentration of Rio’s 
Italian immigrants reside in Catumbi, and Portuguese immigrants 
comprise 50% of the neighborhoods population…Silvio Catalado, the 
president of the Associação de Moradores, along with other small 
scale merchants, was forced to move his original eyeglass store 
because of the large-scale demolition…Two Portuguese brothers, 
José and Francisco Gomes, have lived and owned a bar  on the Rua 
Emília Guimarães for 27 years and commented – “Catumbi used to 
be very calm before they opened more passageways to the favelas, 
as well as the new freeways and tunnels. Our bar had very little 
clientele from outside of the neighborhood primarily because 
Catumbi was out of the way before the tunnel opened.  Not even taxi 
drivers meandered this way.”” 10
 
 Due to an inadequate infrastructure for sewage city-wide, Catumbi 
typically was a neighborhood that experienced serious flooding problems 
until the mid twentieth century.   These flooding and sewage problems 
exacerbated sanitation problems within Catumbi’s streets, which caused 
the neighborhood to reek from the overflowing of the Rio Papa-Couve, as 
well as accounting for the ubiquitous presence of rodents.  The 
canalization of the Rio Papa-Couve and an improved drainage system 
were finally implemented by SURSAN during Carlos Lacerda’s 
                                                 
10 Vivian Wyler, “Catumbi, O Passado Reconstruído Pelos Moradores,” Jornal do Brasil 
26 September 1979. 
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administration in 1963.11  Ironically, these efforts by SURSAN and the 
administration of Carlos Lacerda in 1963 coincided with the opening of 
the Túnel Santa Bárbara to traffic. While environmental concerns such 
as flooding, sewage, and the paving of streets were addressed, matters in 
relation to the increased circulation of cars and noise pollution became 
the primary threat to the character of the neighborhood. 
 The opening of the Túnel Santa Bárbara in 1963 certainly changed 
the social, economic, cultural, and environmental landscape for Catumbi 
and its residents.  As the number of automobiles circulating through 
Rio’s streets and expressways grew, it became increasingly evident that 
the layout of neighborhoods such as Catumbi and Rio Comprido was not 
prepared or conducive for heavy automobile traffic.  As cars became more 
prominent in the streets of Catumbi and Rio Comprido, the residents and 
proprietors were still determined to carry out their daily activities and 
rituals in a neighborhood composed mainly of one and two story homes, 
as well as small streets where children played soccer and other games.  
By the mid 1960s, the image of Catumbi and Rio Comprido transformed 
from neighborhoods that were “traditional” to “neighborhoods in the way 
of cars.” 
6.3 Technocratic Evaluations 
 
 The chaos caused by the opening of the Túnel Santa Barbara alone 
was sufficient for Catumbi to lose part of its character and sense of 
                                                 
11 “Amanhã o Governo Carlos Lacerda entrega à Guanabara o Nôvo Catumbi.” Diário de 
Notícias 28 de Julho 1963, 12. 
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identity by the mid 1960s.  Many of the residents of these neighborhoods 
were aware that the quality of life within the neighborhood would be 
adversely impacted by the tunnel, however nobody was prepared to 
witness what would transpire over the subsequent decades to greater 
Catumbi. 
 The roots of urban renewal in Catumbi are deeply entrenched in 
the plan that was presented by CEDUG and Doxiadis Associates at the 
end of Carlos Lacerda’s term in office in 1965.12  While Carlos Lacerda 
(UDN) and Francisco Negrão de Lima (PSD) were from different political 
parties, there were various planners, architects, and engineers who 
worked in Rio’s urban renewal and development departments during 
both administrations.  Despite the fact that many of the actual ideas 
regarding urban renewal in Catumbi were partly conceived during the 
research and writing of the Doxiadis Plan in 1964-65, a continuity 
among many technocrats and policy makers who worked in both the 
Lacerda and Negrão administrations helps explain many of the decisions 
that led to the subsequent transformations in Catumbi from the late 
1960s to the early 1980s. 
 The highly ambitious and detailed Doxiadis Plan highlighted two 
areas of Rio that could be targeted for urban renewal: Copacabana and 
Mangue.  According to the Doxiadis Plan:   
                                                 
12 See Chapter 4, “O Negócio Grego,” for in-depth information on the politics and outline 




“The community of Mangue lies directly in the path of 
anticipated expansion of Rio’s Central Business District (CBD)…It is 
a neighbourhood dating from the 18th century that has become 
blighted as a result of physical deterioration, functional 
obsolescence and haphazard development in response to economic, 
technical and social change.  Today the area is characterized by a 
mixture of land use, primarily low and middle income residences 
combined with commerce and industry of all sorts, most of which are 
in some stage of decay.  Other areas around the CBD of Rio are also 
showing similar signs of deterioration such as the older areas of 
Catumbi, Saúde, Lapa, Catete, and São Cristóvão…Since it lies 
within the path of Central Business District expansion it must be 
changed from certain points of view in order to facilitate this 
expansion.13
 
The authors and researchers of the Doxiadis Plan not only saw Catumbi 
and its environs  as hindering the growth process of the city-state, but 
identified it as an archaic area based upon the morphological conditions 
of the neighborhood.  The view that Catumbi was a blighted area which 
was ripe for redevelopment led to several recommendations within the 
Doxiadis Plan.  Even though the Doxiadis Plan was never legally 
approved, mainly due to its completion near the very end of Lacerda’s 
mandate, those very recommendations by a team of experts ironically 
seemed convincing enough to urban planners and Negrão de Lima.  Less 
than two years after the Doxiadis Plan was finished and heavily criticized 
for the socio-cultural implications it had for the Brazilian planning 
community, the technocrats of Guanabara began to implement some of 
the plan’s development schemes.   
                                                 
13 CEGUG and Doxiadis Associates, Guanabara: A Plan for Urban Development, 308. 
Catumbi is considered part of the greater Mangue area.   
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 The Doxiadis Plan ultimately proposed the reorganization of land 
use in the Mangue region.  The Doxiadis Plan suggested that Catumbi’s 
blight would be solved over time, through the construction of better 
forms of residential, commercial, and light industrial structures.  The 
plan’s authors proposed that constructing newer buildings that were 
more in concert with the city-wide reorganization of space would solve 
the land use issues and conditions of blight in Catumbi.  Moreover, the 
hallmark of the Doxiadis Plan was the various transportation networks 
that would improve the city-states spatial dynamics:   
“Four major transportation improvements are called for by the 
Master Plan.  All four affect the Mangue area…A (second) major 
roadway proposed by the plan is an arterial that passes through 
Mangue along the Rua Marques de Sapucaí, which is intended to 
join the exit of the Laranjeiras Tunnel with the port area.  A (fourth) 
arterial road proposed by the Master Plan passes along the northern 
boundaries of the Mangue area on the other side of the railway 
tracks and links the Avenida Guanabara with the Praça Mauá.14
 
The debates surrounding the Doxiadis Plan revolved around many 
issues, however there certainly were planners and politicians of several 
political persuasions that believed that several components of the plan 
had some merit.  During Francisco Negrão de Lima’s administration 
many of the schemes devised in the Doxiadis Plan were incorporated into 
the intense urban renewal and development agenda that began in early 
1960s with the election of Carlos Lacerda.  The plans outlined in the 
Doxiadis Plan for Mangue became a reality for the residents of Catumbi 
                                                 




in late 1966 with the creation of the first CEPE-1: A Comissão Executiva 
de Projetos Específicos. Based upon decree 1.476 in 1963 which 
stipulated that “Commisões Executivas de Projetos Específicos would be 
created by an act of the State Governor with the intention for the study 
and implementation of projects that merit special attention or which do 
not fall within the capacity of existing secretaries,” CEPE-1 was initially 
established in order to improve the quality of life in favelas and the 
recuperation of neighborhoods in decay.15
Soon after the creation of CEPE-1 was announced by Negrão de 
Lima’s administration, it was soon declared that the main priority of this 
special commission was to plan and urbanize an area of approximately 
110 hectares between the Praça Onze de Junho, Praça da Bandeira, and 
Largo do Estácio, and the entire neighborhood of Catumbi.  This 
urbanization project which became known as the Cidade Nova, which 
also included a new administrative complex for the state’s offices, was 
the chief responsibility of this new commission.  Eventually, CEPE-1 was 
transformed into SEPE-1 (A Superintendência de Projetos Específicos)16 
and the plans for the construction of the Cidade Nova became a reality in 
the early months of 1967.  As outlined by Negrão de Lima’s 
administration, SEPE-1 was to coordinate the re-urbanization of the area 
                                                 
15 A Experiência da Guanabara. (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora Laudes, 1970) 75-76.   This 
source is a collection of official state memos and messages from the Governor Francisco 
Negrão de Lima.   
 
16 For the purposes of consistency, hereafter, I will refer to CEPE as SEPE (A 
Superintendência de Projetos Específicos).  
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designated as the Cidade Nova, which also included the ambitious link 
between Botafogo in the zona sul with the zona portuária (Linha Lilás) by 
building a gigantic elevated overpass that would extend from the Túnel 
Santa Barbara in Catumbi for the purposes of being able to pass over 
Avenida Presidente Vargas.  Furthermore, the Botafogo-Cais do Porto 
link was just one of the many routes in Guanabara’s road planning that 
began to be realized during Carlos Lacerda’s administration from 1960 to 
1965. Negrão’s administration continued to plan Guanabara in the same 
fashion as Lacerda’s, thus the improvement and building of 
infrastructure such as roads, expressways, and freeways was central to 
their development schemes.  Routes such as the Botafogo-Cais do Porto 
were planned and implemented not only to foster the better circulation of 
traffic within Guanabara, but also to help generate economic 
development and provide easier access to neighboring states such as Rio 
de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and ultimately São Paulo.17   
SEPE was also in charge of the sale of state properties, of which 40 
percent of the revenue was to be used to help build the state’s new 
administrative center.18  Aside from planning and supervising the 
development process in the Cidade Nova, SEPE gradually integrated 
                                                 
17 Again, it is vital to keep in mind that questions regarding the economic viability of 
Guanabara due to its city-state status (the city of Rio de Janeiro) were constantly a 
central concern.  Plans to construct a bridge with the neighboring state of Rio de 
Janeiro would come to fruition in 1969.  Routes such as the Botafogo-Cais do Porto 
eventually would be part of the greater scheme that helped connect Guanabara with 
other Brazilian states.   
 
18 A Experiência da Guanabara, 76.   
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housing projects into their sphere of Rio’s development.  The most 
notable of these housing projects was labeled Unidade-Habitacional n° 2, 
which was planned in accord with the federal housing agency BNH- 
Banco Nacional de Habitação in areas surrounding Catumbi which the 
state “acquired”.  This and other subsequent housing projects in the 
vicinity of Catumbi (co-ops) were to be built in order to house lower-
middle income groups, particularly those who were members of trade 
unions and professional organization such as police officers, fire and 
rescue workers, electricians, military officers, and bank workers.  The 
first stage of the SEPE-BNH project was designed to house approximately 
2,600 people in various apartment buildings of both four and fourteen 
stories.19   
 In late 1966 and early 1967, the press began to divulge the plans 
of SEPE and BNH to redevelop and expropriate Catumbi.  These reports 
sparked a novel form of community mobilization unique in Rio’s history 
that is still very much active today.  While I have noted that Carlos 
Nelson and Guida Nunes have provided us with lively, informative, and 
scholarly interpretations of the urban social movement created by the 
Associação de Moradores, my focus in the rest of this chapter will be to 
consider what major issues and questions concerning Rio’s urban 
development engaged the attention of Catumbi’s residents.   
 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 76-77. 
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6.4 The Catumbiense Response 
 
 The Associação de Assistência e Orientação dos Moradores do 
Catumbi was officially founded on January 21, 1970 with the purpose of 
being a legal entity to represent the neighborhoods interests’ in response 
to the agenda of state and federal authorities. The subsequent 
publication of a monthly newspaper, O Catumbi, began in April 1971, “to 
symbolize the residents’ protests against the inhumane nature of 
expropriation and displacement and to fight for the right to be included 
in the new housing plans.”20  Although the founding of the Associação de 
Moradores (AMC) was not made official until 1970, in early 1967 
residents of Catumbi were already organizing their mobilization efforts 
against the multiple plans of urban development which threatened their 
neighborhood.  
 The earliest meetings of the unofficial AMC were held in 1967 at 
the neighborhood church, Nossa Senhora da Salette on the Rua 
Catumbi.21  These early meetings were attended by hundreds of people 
and were held to address the recently discovered news of SEPE’s massive 
urban renewal program for the neighborhood.  A key figure in the early 
stages of the movement was Father Mário Prigol, a progressive priest who 
                                                 
20 “Associação de Assistência e Orientação dos Moradores do Catumbi” O Catumbi Abril 
1971, 5. 
 
21 The church’s name is often spelled either as Salete or Salette and was founded by 
Catholic missionaries led by Father Clemente Moussier.  According to the church’s 
bulletin Nova Dimensão, No. 181 Ano 29, Abril de 1994, which they spell Salette, the 
church’s construction began in 1918 and the first part of construction was finished in 
1927.   
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later would be tortured by the military regime over a period of 45 days.  
While Father Mário never was an active member in the neighborhood 
movement, his involvement in social welfare campaigns in Rio’s favelas, 
combined with his progressive theological training that stressed social 
activism, was an important influence on the early stages of Catumbi’s 
mobilization efforts against SEPE’s redevelopment plans.  Nevertheless, 
the members of the neighborhood association frequently reiterated that 
their movement was both apolitical and without any links to a particular 
political party. 
 The previously mentioned SEPE plan was solidified by a law that 
identified Catumbi and its surrounding areas as zones to be expropriated 
by the state of Guanabara in partnership with the BNH in order to build 
housing complexes for various co-ops of workers or employees such as 
electricians, bank workers, barbers, and police officers.  This housing 
initiative, in conjunction with existing and future planned expressways 
and transportation projects such as the Botafogo-Cais do Porto freeway, 
would cause thousands of people in Catumbi to lose their homes and 
businesses, in addition to their sense of community.     
 While there were several issues that caused outrage among the 
residents of Catumbi, the issues surrounding displacement and 
exclusion from the new housing plans were paramount in their struggles 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  There was also anger over the 
evaluations regarding the condition and value of properties which were 
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performed by SEPE’s patrimonial department in conjunction with the 
Secretary of Finances, since these entities rarely offered fair market 
values for the land and buildings that were taken over by SEPE for the 
purposes of redevelopment. The topic of reasonable property 
compensation was continuously debated as SEPE evaluated and 
categorized the majority of the neighborhood as blighted.  Additionally, 
many property owners claimed that they never received the full payment 
of their compensation as was stipulated in the evaluations by SEPE.  The 
directors of SEPE, however, viewed the amounts offered to property 
owners as a good deal and declared that their calculations could be 
taken to court in case the proprietors deemed them unfair.22  The SEPE 
and BNH apartments were to be constructed in the form of super-block 
and high-rise condominiums, but these new apartments were for the 
aforementioned cooperatives instead of the current residents of Catumbi.  
Thus, the state not only offered devalued compensation for the 
expropriated land and buildings, but also the new Catumbi was destined 
for people who were outsiders to the community. 
 The lack of any form of planning regarding displaced residents as 
well as the struggle to remain and participate in the “new” Catumbi were 
the main matters in the neighborhood’s struggles with state and federal 
authorities such as SEPE and BNH.  The most active years of Catumbi’s 
struggles (1967-1975) took place during the most repressive years of 
                                                 




Brazil’s military dictatorship, thus it should come as no surprise that no 
consultation with citizens, especially those of the lower-middle class, was 
not incorporated in any form of planning.  Despite the apolitical 
declarations of the movement, the level of activism that the Associação de 
Moradores generated through their newspaper and organized protests 
and assemblies was remarkable in a period with top-down techno-
bureaucratic regimes and highly censored media outlets.   
“We are not against progress - quite the contrary - yet we 
would like to see that we can participate in a development program 
that is humane and permits that families who have lived here for 
decades, continue to reside here and have the opportunity to acquire 
the necessary property and financing promised by the BNH.”23
 
 This statement encapsulates the feelings that many of the 
residents of Catumbi held regarding urban development and its 
consequences for their neighborhood and the city as a whole.  The fact 
that the government and planning commissions did not put any thought 
into the displacement of individuals and families clearly displayed the 
absence of any social welfare considerations in the planning schemes.  
This lack of planning is peculiar, as the SEPE plan to bulldoze and 
redevelop Catumbi had its roots in the Doxiadis Plan. That plan did 
stipulate that provisions regarding the displacement of people and 
families should figure into any renewal programs.  The following quote, 
taken from the redevelopment proposals for Mangue visibly demonstrates 
                                                 
23 Sylvio Catalado “ Oito Anos de Luta” O Catumbi  1974. 
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how the matter of displacement should be considered in the 
implementation of any redevelopment scheme.  
“One aspect of redevelopment that is of particular importance 
and for which a plan should be drawn up is the relocation of the 
population that will be displaced by renewal action.  The 
development of relocation schemes will be necessary in order to 
relocate people, industry, and commerce that are to be displaced to 
achieve the functional reorganization that must take place within 
this urban area.  It therefore may be necessary to provide alternative 
housing and other facilities before people are asked to shift from 
their places of work.” 24
 
 Once the news spread through the neighborhood regarding the 
redevelopment of Catumbi which would eventually cause the demolition 
and displacement of thousands of homes, meetings were held at the 
Igreja Nossa Senhora da Salette in January 1967 to organize a movement 
to oppose SEPE’s plans for the Cidade Nova. The subsequent circulation 
of a flyer listing the perceived injustices, and indicating the actions 
proposed by the residents of Catumbi was distributed throughout the 
neighborhood:  Catumbi e Adjacências serão Arrasados! (Catumbi and 
Neighboring Areas will be Demolished!) 
 This flyer along with the future creation of the Associação de 
Moradores and the monthly periodical O Catumbi conveys the major 
issues, problems, viewpoints, opinions, and sentiments that many of the 
residents of Catumbi maintained in their struggle against urban renewal.   
“The commission of the residents of Catumbi – which 
represents the proprietors, renters, merchants, and industrialists of 
the neighborhood – after studying the various laws and decrees 
                                                 
24 CEDUG and Doxiadis Associates, 312.   
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concerning CEPE-1, a branch of the Government of Guanabara, 
hereby present the ways and means that the responsible authorities 
intend on executing their plan for the Cidade Nova…While CEPE-1 
intends to build housing for new residents, why can’t they use the 
money we paid in taxes for adequate services such as better 
garbage and sanitation, improved sidewalks, sewage and drainage, 
to improve the organic growth of Catumbi?…CEPE-1 intend to 
demolish the majority of Catumbi, except for the preservation of the 
cemetery, the church (Nossa Senhora da Salette), and the dwindling 
factories of large companies, while neglecting the smaller ones.  
These cleared areas will be used to construct high-rise apartments 
and super- blocks similar to those in Brasília (citing law 1,236 of 
January 4, 1967, article B), while other lots will be sold to 
cooperatives through the Banco Nacional de Habitação (BNH – 
article B) as well as to private real estate firm selected by 
CEPE-1 (!).  The sale of these lots will not only transform CEPE-1 
into the largest real estate agency in the city but also make it 
possible to finance the construction of overpasses, viaducts, schools, 
pools and open spaces where new residents will benefit…How long 
will it take – resident of Catumbi – for your moment to sacrifice for 
progress - nobody exactly knows…These are CEPE’s intentions, 
residents of Catumbi.  If you agree, applaud your program.  IF YOU 
DO NOT, SPEAK OUT.25
  
The various concerns the residents and commission voiced 
regarding SEPE’s initiatives resulted in multiple meetings with 
authorities of SEPE, BNH, and the press.  Clearly, both the state and 
federal authorities underestimated the resourcefulness and commitment 
to resistance that the residents of Catumbi mustered.  With the tense 
                                                 
25 “Catumbi e Adjacências Serão Arrasados.” Flyer encountered in the Biblioteca da 
Associação de Assistência e Orientação dos Moradores de Catumbi, Rua Valença 7, 
Catumbi, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. According to Marta T S Arretche, “the BNH (Banco 
Nacional de Habitação) was created in 1964 as a second line credit bank, that is to say 
it did not deal directly with the public. Its function was to deal in credit transactions 
and to manage the Employment Guarantee Fund (FGTS) through private and/or public 
banks and agents such as housing companies and water and sanitation companies. 
The BNH was the principal federal institution for urban development in Brazilian 
history, in its capacity as manager of the FGTS and as the body in charge of devising 
and implementing the Financial Housing System (SFH) and the Financial Water and 
Sanitation System (SFS). It was abolished by presidential decree in 1986.” Available 
http://www.mre.gov.br/cdbrasil/itamaraty/web/ingles/economia/saneam/planasa/bn
h/index.htm  Accessed March 27, 2006. 
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political climate in Brazil as a result of the policies of the military régime, 
the movement that emerged in Catumbi repeatedly professed its 
apolitical nature.  In the infancy of the neighborhood movement, several 
of these declarations were made to the mainstream press, in order to 
respond to claims made by Humberto Braga, Secretária do Govêrno, 
regarding the political nature of the resistance displayed by the 
neighborhood’s committee and movement.26   When pressured on this 
subject matter by the press (print, television, and radio) government 
officials such as Braga consistently maintained that just compensation 
was offered by SEPE and that the majority of residents were willing to 
cooperate.  Moreover, in a comment given to the Jornal do Brasil, Braga 
himself reiterated that the distinction between proprietor and resident 
was an important distinction when discussing the matter of 
expropriation and compensation.27  The director of CEPE-1, Enílton 
Vieira, declared that while these contested compensation values could be 
taken to court, ultimately “the area demarcated for expropriation will be 
developed into a new, comfortable, and modern neighborhood, where the 
residents will be property owners.”28 Through rhetoric, planning 
                                                 
26 For two examples see:  “Moradores do Catumbi fazem Carta ao JB afirmando que o 
movimento não é politico.”  Jornal do Brasil, February 2, 1967, p. 15  and “Catumbi 
adere em massa ao movimento contra demolição e renova apélo Govêrno.”  Jornal do 
Brasil, February 3, 1967, 7.   
 
27 “Catumbi adere em massa ao movimento contra demolição e renova apélo Govêrno.” 
Jornal do Brasil, February 3, 1967, 7.   
 
28 “CEPE Pagará Indenizações Justas e a Vista no Catumbi,” A Notícia 23 February 
1967.   
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schemes, and legislation, Guanabara’s technocrats and politicians 
attempted to “assign certain negative imagery, metaphors, and symbols 
to a space thereby stigmatizing inhabitants, their culture, and social 
relations.”29  The state’s negative depiction of Catumbi was generated 
through their devalued assessment of the bairro’s buildings as well as 
attributing the neighborhood’s decline partly to a high proportion of 
renters who were deemed incompatible with modernity. 
    1967 was certainly a turbulent year for many of the residents and 
those who owned property in Catumbi and the surrounding areas which 
comprised the Cidade Nova.  Many were faced with the dilemma on 
where they would reside after SEPE took over and demolished their 
homes and businesses.  Aside from taking away their homes, SEPE often 
gave people too little time to make arrangements to leave their homes 
and to find suitable places to live.  While many still wanted to remain 
and live in the “revitalized” Catumbi, very few of the residents would be 
able to afford or financially qualify for the new apartments that SEPE 
and BNH were planning to construct.   
6.5 The Ups and Downs of the Struggle 
 
 The first few years of the AMC’s struggle were spent negotiating 
with the state (SEPE) and national government (BNH) over the 
redevelopment schemes that concerned hundreds of families throughout 
the neighborhood.  Despite several meetings with the directors of SEPE 
                                                 
29 Kevin Fox Gotham, Jon Shefner, and Krista Brumley, 325. 
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and even Governors Francisco Negrão de Lima and Chagas Freitas, the 
state did not offer any solution regarding the construction of housing for 
displaced residents of Catumbi.  Due to the lack of cooperation from the 
state government, the AMC tried negotiating directly with the directors of 
the BNH over the possibility of obtaining areas for the construction of co-
ops for the displaced residents of Catumbi.   
 The new apartments and co-ops built by SEPE and BNH were 
earmarked for members of trade and professional unions that qualified 
for financing through the SFH-BNH national housing policies.  
Subsequently, the AMC inquired about the possibility of turning the AMC 
into a cooperative as there were no provisions that prevented the BNH 
from recognizing the AMC as a viable entity.  Subsequently, the BNH 
finally offered the AMC land for the construction of a co-op for some of 
the families displaced through renovation of Catumbi. Although only a 
small fraction of the displaced population would gain residences through 
this deal brokered with the BNH, it was a watershed for the BNH/SFH 
policy nationwide: cooperatives were no longer exclusively designated for 
unions or professional organizations - neighborhood associations were 
also eligible.  Consequently, the AMC began to establish an amicable 
relationship with the BNH (federal government), while the government of 
Guanabara was rather indifferent to the serious concerns of the bairro’s 
residents.  Accordingly, the AMC’s movement began to direct its 
animosity against the government of Guanabara and SEPE, while highly 
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praising the BNH and federal authorities for their approachability, albeit 
highly techno-bureaucratic.30    
The first coop, built primarily for displaced residents along the 
streets of Dr. Agra and Itapiru, “O Catumbi,” was officially inaugurated 
by Governor Chagas Freitas on September 30, 1971.  Built along the Rua 
do Chichorro, this co-op contained 9 blocks with a total of 72 
apartments.31 Even after inaugurating these new apartments, almost 
3,000 families that did not completely abandon the area still were in 
need of new homes.  Even before Chagas Freitas became the governor of 
Guanabara, he published editorials in O Dia and A Notícia, two popular 
dailies which he owned.  Printed in early 1967, one particular editorial 
was entitled:  “Demolir é Fácil” (“To Tear Down is Convenient).”32  Along 
with being a journalist and owner of two newspapers, Chagas Freitas was 
a populist politician who practiced a clientelistic style of politics. His 
ascendancy to the governorship of Guanabara was seen as a positive sign 
for the AMC, even though they continuously declared that their 
movement would never support the candidacy of any politician. Various 
editorials and front page articles in O Catumbi declared that “the 
                                                 
30 These sentiments can be viewed in the first six editions of O Catumbi, as numerous 
articles and editorials praise the policy and receptivity of the BNH.  Also see Santos, 
Movimentos Urbanos no Rio de Janeiro, 162-163. 
 
31 “Catumbi Inaugura 1° Conjunto Residencial,” O Catumbi September 1971; “Primeira 
Etapa Vencida,” O Catumbi October 1971.  The area is also known as the Ferro do 
Engomar.    
 
32 This editorial was reprinted on the front page of the first edition of O Catumbi in April 
1971.    
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governor understands the problems of Catumbi and promises 
solutions.”33 Near the end of Chagas’ term in 1974-75, the AMC had 
clearly realized that Chagas too was indifferent, insensitive, and 
unresponsive to Catumbi’s problems.  A front page editorial from the 
October/November edition of O Catumbi neatly summarizes the 
disintegration of Chagas’ relationship with the residents of Catumbi: 
“The residents of Catumbi were elated with your victory for 
the governorship of Guanabara in 1970 as a result of the 
compassion you displayed through your newspaper editorials…Your 
words inspired us to unite and fight the injustices that were brought 
upon us by the various authorities…During our first meeting with 
Your Excellency in March 1971, you passionately declared, “now I’m 
in a position where I can finally make something happen.” Since that 
initial meeting in 1971, we have been patiently waiting for solutions 
regarding housing, more schools, better public transportation, and 
infrastructural improvements that you all too often promised…As the 
lights start to dim on your administration, we sit here perplexed as 
our primary mission will always be to find solutions to improve the 
quality of life for the residents of Catumbi.” 34    
 
 Many of the residents who still maintained their homes or were not 
yet affected by the urban renewal schemes of the state, focused their 
attention on other pressing issues such as the lack of public schools, 
access to public bus transportation, declining commerce, and coping 
with the chaos that the tunnel, expressways, and vast construction 
brought to Catumbi. A common slogan was repeatedly posted throughout 
the neighborhood which conveyed the state’s policies towards Catumbi: 
                                                 
33 “Governador, Sensível aos Problemas de Catumbi, Promete uma solução,” O Catumbi 
January 1972. 
 




“Transportation, Schools, Housing, Policing, and Improvements…No! 
Devastation and Displacement…Yes!  Several editorials published in O 
Catumbi itself criticized the publication of the AMC for not dedicating 
enough coverage to the lighter side of daily life in the neighborhood.  
Accordingly, the paper began to dedicate more space to issues regarding 
health, culinary tips and recipes, fashion, beauty, sports, music, and 
literature.   
There was also a gradual change in the social character of the 
neighborhood, as many new residents from outside Catumbi started to 
move into the various housing co-ops built by the BNH. While the 
popular rhetoric of leaders and members of the AMC was that existing 
and new residents were always welcome to join the association, this 
clearly was a contested issue as several articles in O Catumbi were 
dedicated to developing strategies to foster a more harmonious 
relationship among longtime and new residents of the neighborhood.35 
Established Catumbienses wondered if the newer residents understood 
the dynamics and plight of their struggle, whereas newer residents 
suggested that the concerns of the AMC such as displacement and 
preserving the area’s character were not their concern.   
 This issue became even more complex as the favelas that 
surrounded Catumbi began to grow considerably.  Long-established 
residents of Catumbi prided themselves on the cordial race relations of 
                                                 
35 For an example see the article entitled “O Relaciamento com os Nossos Vizinhos e 
Novos Moradores,” O Catumbi October 1971, 14.   
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the neighborhood, however the increasing presence of Afro-Brazilian 
favelados in the daily street life of Catumbi, contributed to several 
articles in O Catumbi denouncing racism and promoting better 
relationships and understanding of the favelados.  Consequently, many 
of these favelas such as the Morro do Catumbi began to form their own 
community associations in order to organize their principal strategies for 
improving their standard of living.36 Many transients from the 
surrounding favelas and throughout the city, such as vagrants, 
transvestites, and prostitutes temporarily began to inhabit some of the 
vacated homes and dilapidated buildings that were targeted for 
demolition, which contributed to concerns over the quality of life in 
Catumbi.     
 The aspirations to transform the entire neighborhood of Catumbi 
into a co-op were never fully realized.  Despite promises from Chagas 
Freitas and other authorities to provide viable solutions for the residents, 
demolition and renewal schemes continued throughout the 1970s. The 
construction of the various viaducts and overpasses that complemented 
the access to the Túnel Santa Bárbara and the Cais do Porto-Botafogo 
thruway also coincided with the construction of yet another tunnel 
(Túnel Frei Caneca-Henrique Valladares).  The plan for this tunnel was 
put into action in order to complement the circulation of vehicles from 
the centro to the zona norte known as the Via Paralela da Tijuca.  
                                                 




Instead of traveling along the increasingly congested Avenida President 
Vargas, the new tunnel facilitated a new passageway that extended from 
the centro via Catumbi, Cruz Vermelha, Estácio, Rio Comprido, and 
ending at Rua Uruguai in Tijuca.37  Once again, portions of Catumbi 
were sacrificed in order to facilitate the primary mission of Rio’s 
planners:  remodeling the city in order to accommodate the automobile.   
 The AMC’s consistent mobilization efforts over the span of ten 
years (1967-1977) spawned very few victories, as Catumbi’s streets were 
at the confluence of many of the new networks of roads that had been 
under construction since the Lacerda administration.  Many displaced 
residents eventually decided to abandon Catumbi altogether, as their 
financial situations did not permit them to purchase an apartment in the 
new cooperatives built by the BNH.  Even though these co-ops were built 
primarily for the working class, only approximately 20 percent of 
Catumbi’s residents were ever able to enter into these new housing 
associations.38 Even many of the initial residents who were homeowners 
and financially eligible to enter into one of the co-ops resented the fact 
that they had to buy back what was theirs in the first place.  They 
suggested that the construction of super-blocks and apartments was 
detrimental to the neighborhood’s character, as the Catumbiense identity 
was one where the streets and sidewalks were integral to the social, 
                                                 
37 This tunnel would eventually be named Túnel Martim de Sá and was finished in 
1977.  See “O Mais Velho Túnel Novo,” O Catumbi August 1972, 1, 8.    
 
38 Célio Bermann, Fania Fridman, and Paulo Sérgio Paes de Barros, annexo. 
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economic, and cultural vitality of the neighborhood.  Many of these new 
co-ops also contained various social service personnel for the purposes of 
providing orientation and social welfare assistance.  Members of the AMC 
argued that the residents of Catumbi were self-sufficient and did not 
need “outsiders” to show them how to manage their lives as they proudly 
raised generations of responsible citizens.       
Even after ten years of drastic incisions and catastrophic 
demolitions throughout the region, Catumbi’s residents would suffer yet 
again at the expense of a newly planned arena for Carnaval known as the 
Passarela do Samba or Sambodromo. Eventually inaugurated for 
Carnaval in the early 1980s, this open-air stadium designed by Oscar 
Niemeyer became the new venue for Rio’s famed Carnaval processions.  
By the late 1970s, Rio’s Carnaval had become increasingly more lavish, 
commercialized, and highly geared for international tourists.  Due to the 
increase in the size of the Carnaval processions, the new city 
government39 of Rio de Janeiro opted to remove the pre-Lenten festival 
from the city’s streets and to construct a stadium as near as possible to 
the original cradle of samba:  Estácio, Catumbi, and the Praça Onze.  
Ironically, due to the constant demolition throughout the 1970s, some of 
Catumbi’s revered Carnaval associations such as the Bafo da Onça had 
their buildings “compromised” in order to make way for the plans of the 
Cidade Nova.  Subsequently, these traditional cultural associations were 
                                                 
39 After 1975, the state of Guanabara fused with the state of Rio de Janeiro.  The city of 
Rio de Janeiro would become the capital of the new state of Rio de Janeiro. 
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forced to abandon the neighborhood altogether, thereby eliminating part 
of the neighborhood’s cultural history and identity.40 In order to 
construct the new Sambodromo, a venue that was to be used only three 
days out of the year, almost 350 families and 50 commercial buildings 
were removed.  Finally on March 14, 1980, nearly 13 years after the 
initial demolition and expropriation of Catumbi began, Mayor Israel 
Klabin signed a law that prohibited any future plans from expropriating 
buildings and homes at the expense of the residents of Catumbi.41
6.6 Catumbi’s Broader Connections 
 
 On the surface the AMC’s movement might appear to be rather 
insular, as they were immediately concerned with how the febre viária 
and urban renewal schemes of the state and federal authorities 
threatened their survival and homes.  Considering the history of urban 
renewal in Catumbi however, illuminates many of the broader social, 
cultural, and political issues relevant to Brazilian and Latin American 
history during the 1960s and 1970s.  By perusing various editions of 
their official publication, O Catumbi, it is possible to uncover many 
matters that enhance our understanding of urban planning and 
Brazilian society during the height of the military dictatorship. 
                                                 
40 Santos comments that several of the leaders of these associations such as the Bafo 
da Onça were indifferent to the struggles of the AMC primarily due to their solid 
relationship with various politicians. 
 
41 “A Luta Continua,” O Catumbi July/August 1991. 
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 The events that occurred in Catumbi exemplify the top-down, 
techno-bureaucratic nature of urban planning during the 1960s and 
1970s.  This “undemocratic” and “top-down” approach relied heavily on 
technical schemes that were unilaterally implemented, often on a 
piecemeal basis, without any consultation of the communities that it 
would impact.  While the repressive nature of the military dictatorship 
contributed to this abuse of power by numerous technocrats, planners, 
and politicians, it also demonstrates how these planners believed that 
their training, methods, and education were the ultimate tools for 
modernizing society. Urban residents across Brazil, not just 
Catumbienses, reacted to the deficiencies in these planning practices, 
which did not prioritize social or humanitarian considerations in their 
schemes.42  The plans that SEPE implemented for the construction of the 
Cidade Nova were selectively adopted from the Doxiadis Plan, as 
evidenced by entirely neglecting the need to consider alternative housing 
solutions for displaced residents.   
 The pinnacle of the AMC’s negotiations with state and federal 
authorities coincided with the most repressive years of the military 
dictatorship under Costa e Silva and Médici, which certainly clarifies why 
they continuously claimed that their movement was apolitical and not 
affiliated with any specific politicians or party (ARENA or MDB in this 
case).  Nevertheless, it is remarkable the degree of eloquence, creativity, 
                                                 
42 “Precisamos Humanizar os Técnicos,” O Catumbi December 1971, 5. 
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and severe criticism that was produced by the AMC through the 
publication of O Catumbi during an extremely repressive period when the 
media was highly censored.  While the mainstream print and electronic 
media did investigate Catumbi’s problems and the broader implications 
that urban development had for the city and its residents, their 
description and insight lacked the ingenuity and expressiveness that the 
members of the AMC generated through their newspaper and 
documentary film.43  These experiences subsequently fortified their own 
ideas regarding urban development, and therefore challenged the 
dominant notion that urban planning was exclusively for engineers and 
architects.  Through the publication of O Catumbi, numerous women, 
men, and children significantly contributed to the understanding of the 
broader implications of urban development in Rio de Janeiro, as well as 
the social, political, and cultural climate in Brazil during the military 
dictatorship.    
 Aside from declaring their movement apolitical, the character of the 
AMC was heavily inspired by the morals and values of its strong 
immigrant population who were predominantly Roman Catholic. As 
military dictatorships gradually proliferated throughout Latin America in 
the 1960s and 1970s, many Catholic clergy began to oppose these highly 
                                                 
43 With the publication of Guida Nunes’ novel and two books by Carlos Nelson, many of 
the members of the AMC gained notoriety and were invited to speak to university 
classes and participate in Round Table discussions.  An example of a proceeding can be 
seen in Alvaro Costa e Silva, “Catumbi Arrasado Pede Socorro,” Revista de 
Administração Municipal  25 (Julho-Setembro 1978) : 80-89.  
 264
 
repressive authoritarian regimes.  Heavily influenced by the principles 
and mission of the Vatican II conference in the early 1960s which 
advocated eradicating socioeconomic inequalities and fighting 
discrimination (Liberation Theology), Catholic priests such as Father 
Mário preached a stronger sense of awareness and community among 
the Catumbienses.  While he always preferred to be a silent participant 
in the movement, Father Mário’s theological philosophy and progressive 
politics clearly left an imprint on the AMC as the hundreds of articles 
published in O Catumbi advocated the importance of faith and drew upon 
parallels to the bible.44  Other than Father Mário, there have not been 
any reports of any members of the AMC being arrested or tortured due to 
their protestations over the urban renewal schemes of the Cidade Nova.  
Moreover, Father Mário’s torture by the military is largely attributed to 
his involvement with favelados and other Catholic workers movements. 
 Despite the precedent set by the AMC for being recognized as a 
cooperative, very few people who wanted to stay in Catumbi had the 
financial means to do so.  The new apartments built by the BNH were 
extremely modest, however most Catumbienses previously rented their 
homes and did not meet the minimum income requirements to be able to 
purchase one of the new residences.  While the majority of Catumbienses 
were considered to be part of the lower middle class, they still lacked the 
                                                 
44 A good example can be seen in the December 1971 edition of O Catumbi, as the 
majority of the articles deal with Christmas wishes for a prosperous future in Catumbi.  
Santos mentions that the state tried to co-opt Father Mário and other members of the 
parish before publicizing their redevelopment plans for the Cidade Nova.   
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purchasing power of waiters, cab drivers, bank workers, military 
personnel, electricians, and barbers (also considered lower middle class) 
who were unionized or organized into established cooperatives.  While 
most of the families displaced attempted to remain in the neighborhood 
by staying with relatives, many were either forced to relocate to the 
periphery of the city where housing was cheaper than in some of the 
surrounding favelas.   
Many present-day Cariocas or visitors to the city of Rio de Janeiro 
would be hard pressed to distinguish Catumbi among the numerous 
expressways, tunnels, favelas, viaducts, ramps, and Sambodromo.  Many 
of the high-rise condos built by the BNH and SEPE during the 1960s and 
1970s are presently in a state of decay, located between the non-stop 
flow of vehicles and gunshots heard from the neighboring favelas.  
Strolling along what remains of the neighborhood after the drastic 
incisions of the 1960s and 1970s, it certainly is not easy to recognize the 
unique morphological and social characteristics of what was a “small 
town within the metropolis.”   While the AMC’s tactics, strategies, and 
agenda did not always produce concrete and favorable results, it 
foreshadowed the shift, albeit too late for Catumbi, to a model of 
communicative planning that would develop in the late 1980s and 1990s 
by incorporating voices from the government, planning community, 
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private industry, as well as residents.45  Almost 40 years later, the AMC 
is still extremely active and still proud of the precedents that they set for 
other neighborhood and community organizations throughout Rio de 
Janeiro and Brazil.  Likewise, the history and experiences of the AMC 
and the residents of Catumbi offer a greater understanding of the 
broader complexities of daily and urban life during Brazil’s long military 
dictatorship. 
                                                 
45 Two recent examples of this in Rio de Janeiro are the Rio-Cidade and the Favela 
Bairro Program.  More information regarding the Favela Integration programs can be 
seen in: Ayse Pamuk and Paulo Fernando A. Cavallieri, “Alleviating Urban Poverty in a 
Global City:  New Trends in Upgrading Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas.”  Habitat International 
22:4 (1998): 449-462 and Mauro Manfrin, “Programmi per una Città Indivisa:  Favelas e 
Recupero Urbano” Spazio e Società 90 (April-June 2000): 14-23.  For information on the 
communicative planning model see Judith E. Innes, “Information in Communicative 
Planning” Journal of the American Planning Association 64:1 (Winter1998): 52-63 
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Figure 6.2 The Túnel Santa Bárbara Cutting Through the Heart of Catumbi 











Chapter 7: Reconsidering Guanabara - Concluding Remarks 
 
  During the administrations of Carlos Lacerda and Negrão de Lima 
the city-state of Guanabara continued to grow demographically while 
attempting to reform and expand the infrastructure of the city of Rio de 
Janeiro.  It was during Carlos Lacerda’s and Negrão de Lima’s 
administration that certain reforms such as the Túnel Santa Bárbara, 
Túnel Rebouças, the Aterro do Flamengo, the reform of the beach along 
the Avenida Atlântica in Copacabana, and the expansion of the city to 
Jacarepaguá and Barra da Tijuca changed the city’s spatial and 
locomotive conditions.  Aside from the millions of dollars invested in 
expressways, tunnels, and parks, the government of Guanabara also 
invested copious funds into the building of schools, the supply of water, 
and sewage. Indeed, both administrations made great strides in 
establishing an urban reform and development agenda that certainly 
transformed the city-state’s spatial dynamics. Nevertheless, there were 
segments of the population that opposed many of the urban planning 
programs initiated by the two administrations of Carlos Lacerda and 
Negrão de Lima.   
 In the previous chapters I have documented the methods that 
Lacerda and Negrão utilized in order to reform and redevelop Rio de 
Janeiro’s urban space.  It was during Lacerda’s term that the government 
of Guanabara received millions in dollars of transnational aid from 
agencies such as the Inter-American Developmental Bank and the 
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Alliance for Progress.  Along with savvy politics and negotiation, Lacerda 
was able to use these funds, in addition to city-state and federal funds, 
to design, begin, and complete urban reform projects.  The supervision 
and role of the city-state entity, SURSAN (A Superintendência de 
Urbanização e Saneamento), in both Lacerda’s and Negrão’s governments 
was critical to the establishment, direction, and supervision of the most 
important urban development projects from 1960 to 1970.  SURSAN was 
originally established in 1957 when Negrão de Lima was the mayor of the 
Distrito Federal, and it was unquestionably the major city-state entity in 
overseeing and reshaping Rio’s urban space during the 1960s.   
Carlos Lacerda spent the early years of his administration in 
organizing the administrative structure of the new city-state, by focusing 
on decentralization of administrative districts (regiões administrativas) 
and the creation of secretariats.  The organizational scheme created by 
Lacerda was mostly maintained and expanded by Negrão de Lima, 
despite the political differences between the two governors. The 
continuity in the engineers, planners, architects, and technocrats who 
worked for SURSAN is one of the major reasons for the strides in 
redevelopment of the new city-state in the 1960s.  While the city-state of 
Guanabara did have many small departments such as public works, 
transportation, garbage and sewage, urbanism, tunnels, and roads, most 
of these reported to SURSAN, rather than an official department of 
planning.   
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As much as Guanabara was an anomaly in the Brazilian federation 
for being a state with one municipality (Rio de Janeiro), so too was the 
administrative structure that it employed.  The use of city-state owned 
companies and autarquias such as SURSAN, COHAB, SEPE, DER-GB, 
and COPEG to carry out major developmental projects and daily 
planning operations were more common to cities than states during the 
1960s.  Thus, while Guanabara was a state in the Brazilian Federation, 
the fact that it was a new state with one municipality made its existence 
very unique. Lacerda and Negrão were able to govern, urbanize, and 
reform the city-state using tactics and strategies that still treated 
Guanabara like a city instead of a full fledged state.  This afforded them 
much more power and flexibility to implement their agendas.  With the 
indirect election and new administration of the third and final governor 
of Guanabara, Antônio Padua de Chagas Freitas, these administrative 
would disappear while several geo-economic and political concerns would 
supersede the urban planning agendas that were established during 
Guanabara’s first two administrations. 
7.1 The Arrival of Chagas 
 
 Both Carlos Lacerda and Francisco Negrão de Lima were popularly 
elected as the governors of Guanabara in 1960 and 1965 from different 
political parties.  Due to the arbitrary institutional acts passed by the 
authoritarian military regime that cancelled political parties and set up a 
two-party system with an official military party (ARENA) and a legal 
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opposition (MDB – Movimento Democrático Brasileiro), state governors 
from that point on were elected indirectly rather than strictly through 
popular vote.  Guanabara, already considered unique in the Brazilian 
republic due to its city-state status, also became an exception among the 
other states within Brazil by electing the only governor from the legal 
MDB opposition party in 1970, Antônio Padua de Chagas Freitas.  Thus, 
while all other Brazilian states such as São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and the 
neighboring state of Rio de Janeiro were all governed by members of the 
official party of the military régime (ARENA), Guanabara was the only 
state that overwhelmingly voted, albeit indirectly, for a leader from the 
legal opposition party.1   
 Chagas, similar to Carlos Lacerda, was the owner of two popular 
daily newspapers, O Dia and A Notícia, and also held various political 
positions within the old Distrito Federal, as well as at the national level.  
The work of Marly Motta, Carlos Sarmento, and Marieta Moraes Ferreira 
has carefully analyzed the political career of Chagas Freitas, in addition 
to the creation and implementation of his political machine known as 
Chaguismo, which was heavily based upon patronage and clientelism.  
Aside from the obvious fact that Chagas Freitas was not elected directly 
like his predecessors, the last administration of the state of Guanabara 
                                                 
1 For background on the political career of Chagas Freitas see Carlos Eduardo 
Sarmento, organizer, Chagas Freitas (Rio de Janeiro:  Editora Fundação Getulio Vargas, 
1999) and Francisco Manoel de Mello Franco, O Governo Chagas Freitas:  Uma 
Perspectiva Nacional Através de Uma Experiência Local (Rio de Janeiro:  Livraria José 
Olympio Editora, 1977). 
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was remarkably different in regards to urban development than the first 
two governments led by Carlos Lacerda and Francisco Negrão de Lima. 
 While there were certainly projects and initiatives to continue and 
complete from Negrão’s administration, the focus and priorities of the 
last administration of Guanabara changed significantly from 1971 to 
1975.  Several explanations for the divergence of Chagas’ administration 
from the approaches taken by Lacerda and Negrão regarding urban 
development and planning exist, and it is vital to consider both the local 
and national forces that aided in the departure from the previous 
administration’s strategies. 
 Despite the massive efforts that Lacerda’s and Negrão’s 
administrations employed to solve the increasing flight of industry from 
Guanabara, the question regarding the city-state’s economic viability 
reemerged during the early month’s of Chagas’ tenure in office.  This 
question regarding the sustainability of Guanabara, which periodically 
resurfaced since the late 1950s, was also supplemented with the 
questioning of the governing and administrative structures that were 
utilized by Lacerda and Negrão.  Those who continuously opposed or 
questioned Guanabara’s existence on both the local and national level 
argued that the administrative structure and tactics used by Lacerda 
and Negrão were still reminiscent of a city rather than a state.  Thus, if 
Guanabara indeed was a full-fledged state, it would be organized 
administratively similar to any other state in the republic.  As I have 
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described in earlier chapters, the operation of the influential SURSAN 
which was responsible for the majority of the reshaping of the new city-
state, was more common for cities than states.  While Rio de Janeiro’s 
urban development was significant in its first ten post capital years 
(1960-1970), it still did not have an actual secretary of planning.  Thus, 
many protested that Guanabara should abolish the companies 
(autarquias) that it employed for urban and economic development, and 
create an administrative configuration that resembled other Brazilian 
states. 
 Since the 1950s, questions surrounding the identity of Rio de 
Janeiro continuously resurfaced.  From the beginning, many proponents 
of Rio’s unique identity as the former capital still affirmed that despite 
the new capital of Brasília, Rio still would continue to be the cultural 
capital of Brazil; thus, its status could never decline to that of “any other 
city.”  Despite this opinion, the official de-capitalization of Rio gradually 
did continue to occur throughout the 1960s as federal agencies, 
embassies, and other public entities slowly migrated to Brasília - even 
though some did so with great reluctance. 
 Throughout Guanabara’s existence from 1960 to 1975, many of 
the city-states’ elected leaders and vocal citizens were continuously at 
odds with the national government.  This relationship became even more 
complex with the imposition of the military dictatorship in 1964.  
Although Lacerda initially was an avid supporter of the April 1964 coup, 
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he soon became disillusioned with the military’s plans to cancel elections 
and transformed himself into one of the biggest critics of the 
dictatorship.2  Subsequently, Negrão de Lima’s comfortable victory in the 
election for the gubernatorial seat of Guanabara in 1965, was one of the 
defining factors in the military régime’s cancellation of political parties.  
Negrão, although a friend of then military president Castello Branco, 
served as governor from 1965 to 1971, which were the most repressive 
years of military rule during its twenty-one year existence (1964-1985).  
The massive protests, rallies, and demonstrations that occurred within 
Rio de Janeiro during Negrão’s term, especially in 1968 and 1969, served 
as a sign that the city-state was a breeding ground for radical and 
subversive socio-cultural politics in the minds of the military.  This was 
further compounded by the election of Chagas Freitas who was the only 
representative from the opposition party, the MDB, in 1970.3    
 By the late 1960s, the military régime began to heavily invest in 
the functionality of Brasília, deemphasizing its national presence in Rio 
de Janeiro.  The commitment to Brasília in conjunction with the troubled 
relationship that the military held with Guanabara certainly is a factor in 
explaining some of the events that would shape the agenda of Chagas 
Freitas’ tenure in office.  Ultimately, Chagas would have his term cut 
                                                 
2 Lacerda was jailed in 1968 and had his rights suspended for ten years.  He died in 
May 1977. 
 
3 Some people maintained that even though he was a member of the MDB,  Chagas 
conspired with the military regime. For more on this issue, see the Sarmento collection 
cited in footnote 1. 
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short as a result of the law signed by General Ernesto Geisel in 1974 that 
declared that the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro would fuse into 
the new state of Rio de Janeiro in April 1975. 
   Since taking over the country in 1964, the military regime 
became concerned with Guanabara’s industrial and economic viability.  
Its status as a city-state was threatened when a law in 1973 created 
eight official metropolitan regions in Brazil: São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, 
Recife, Porto Alegre, Fortaleza, Curitiba, Salvador, and Belém. Noticeably 
absent from this geo-political and economic plan, the technocrats of the 
military regime argued that in order for Rio de Janeiro to be considered a 
metropolitan region, unification with Niterói was essential. While the 
construction of the Presidente Costa e Silva Bridge and various economic 
surveys conducted since the late 1960s suggested the possibilities of the 
fusion, the military regime officially advocated this matter on geo-
economics:  in order for Rio de Janeiro to prosper economically, it needed 
to be integrated more with the state of Rio de Janeiro and city of Niterói. 
There were also certain political factors behind the fusion of the 
two states.  ARENA, the political party of the military dictatorship, held a 
strong majority in the state of Rio de Janeiro, whereas the opposition 
party, the MDB, held an overwhelming majority in the state of 
Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro city).  Through fusing the two states, it was 
believed that the ARENA majority throughout the state of Rio would 
water down the MDB in the city-state of Guanabara (city of Rio de 
 277
 
Janeiro).  In the end, the President/Dictator of Brazil, Ernesto Geisel, 
signed an act, “unilaterally” in 1974 that fused the states of Guanabara 
and Rio de Janeiro.  Finally in April 1975, the city of Rio de Janeiro 
became the new capital city (replacing Niterói) of this new state of Rio de 
Janeiro and the hub of the new metropolitan region.4   
7.2 The End of an Era  
 
 The autarquia of SURSAN exemplified the technocratic nature of 
planning in Guanabara from 1960 to 1971.  While politicians often 
receive credit for the construction and development of the built 
environment, it ultimately was the work of the men and women employed 
by SURSAN that were responsible for transforming the urban landscape 
and spatial characteristics of the city of Rio de Janeiro.  Despite the 
achievements and efficient nature that was garnered by the entire 
Superintendência by the end of Negrão’s term in 1971, Chagas’ 
administration opted to disband SURSAN in 1973 and try to establish an 
official department of planning.  This was part of Chagas’ broader plan to 
transform Guanabara into a bona fide state. This meant the use of 
autarquias, mixed-enterprise companies, and foundations were sacrificed 
for more conventional secretariats and departments that were prevalent 
                                                 
4 Recently published sources regarding fusion and the newly created state of Rio de 
Janeiro since 1975 are  Américo Freire, Carlos Eduardo Sarmento, and Marly Silva da 
Motta, organizadores, Um Estado em Questão:  Os 25 anos do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de 
Janeiro:  Editora FGV/ALERJ, 2001); Marieta de Moraes Ferreira and Mario Grynszpan, 
“A Volta do Filho Pródigo ao lar Paterno?  A Fusão do Rio de Janeiro,” In Marieta de 
Moraes Ferreira, coordenadora, Rio de Janeiro: Uma Cidade na História, (Rio de Janeiro:  
Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2000) 117-137; Marieta de Moraes Ferreira, “Por trás 
da fusão,” Nossa História 2:19 (Maio 2005): 60-63. 
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in other Brazilian states.  While state-creation was a major goal of the 
third governor of Guanabara, many former SURSAN technocrats 
suggested that the core elements of Chaguismo – clientelism and 
patronage -  did not mesh well with SURSAN’s way of doing business.  
Furthermore, there was a good deal of resentment over the high salaries 
paid to those engineers and architects paid of compared to those in the 
regular city-state departments.5  While the construction of the Presidente 
Costa e Silva Bridge foreshadowed the end of the state of Guanabara, a 
tragic incident in November 1971 also symbolized the downfall of Rio de 
Janeiro’s planning movement. 
  For some time, the DER-GB together with the firm of SOBRENCO  
had been working on an elevated expressway designed to link the Praça 
da Bandeira directly to the entrance/exit of the Túnel Rebouças above 
the Avenida Paulo de Frontin in Rio Comprido. Early in the afternoon of 
Saturday November 20, 1971 at the confluence of Avenida Paulo de 
Frontin and Rua Haddock Lobo in Rio Comprido tragedy struck as 
numerous pillars and sizeable portions of the elevated concrete slab 
collapsed and crushed nearly 25 cars, one bus, and a truck.  20,000 tons 
of concrete collapsed and eventually killed and injured numerous people 
resulting in a complete state of chaos for the surrounding neighborhood 
                                                 
5 Arnaldo César, “SURSAN:  O Fim de Uma Era,” O Jornal (RJ), 30 September 1973, and 
“SURSAN se aposenta com 16 anos de Trabalho,” Jornal do Brasil (RJ), 30 September 
1973, Primeiro Caderno 
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and streets.6  Police, rescue, and paramedics rushed to the scene 
immediately as the total number of deaths were in the teens. Total 
injuries were never officially confirmed, however many people were 
rushed to various hospitals and had limbs amputated at the scene of the 
catastrophe.   
 Upon visiting the disaster, Governor Chagas Freitas promised a 
thorough investigation of the tragedy by immediately creating an 
investigation committee. During the aftermath of the tragedy, many of 
the engineers working on the project either declined to comment on the 
situation or sat in a state of disbelief over the severity of the events on 
that Saturday afternoon.  Although many accidents resulting in deaths 
had occurred during the construction of the various roads, tunnels, and 
expressways of the 1960s and 1970s, hardly any of these affected 
innocent bystanders or civilians not involved in the construction process.  
In the days following the disaster, several reasons were tossed around 
regarding the possible causes for the collapse.   
In the following months and years after the accident, numerous 
engineers and technocrats gave courtroom testimony and offered insight 
on the possible causes for the collapse of the Elevado de Paulo de 
Frontin. A consensus explanation was never entirely offered by either the 
                                                 
6 “Destruição no Elevado atingiu 120 metros,” Jornal do Brasil 21 and 22 November 
1971; Comissão de Sindicância já tem chefe nomeado,” Jornal do Brasil 21 and 22 
November 1971; Heleno Claudio Fragoso and Nilo Batista, O Caso de Elevado Sobre a 
Av. Paulo de Frontin - Em Defesa dos Engenheiros (Rio de Janeiro:  1971).  This book 




technical or criminal investigative committee regarding the elevado’s 
collapse.  Moreover, many of the engineers involved maintained that they 
were neither negligent nor erroneous in their calculations.  According to 
one engineer who offered his testimony: “accidents are inevitable in large 
urban construction projects – and while we probably will never know the 
exact cause for the collapse, we have to learn to accept that there will be 
a margin of risk when building structures such as the Elevado Paulo de 
Frontin.”7  Ironically, these same engineers and technicians had always 
championed the scientific rationalization models of planning which 
asserted that all could be monitored and controlled.  This technocratic 
approach to planning stressed that the environment could be controlled 
and monitored through the application of scientific and engineering 
principles.  Ironically, they were humbled and realized through a tragic 
incident that planning was not an exact science, and that many other 
factors aside from science were fundamental to building and developing 
the city.  
The collapse of the Elevado de Paulo Frontin was not the first or 
last major construction accident in the city’s history, yet it vividly 
symbolizes the end of a planning era for the city of Rio de Janeiro.  While 
I am cautious of nostalgically analyzing the Guanabara years as an 
“Época de Ouro,” I do think that it is vital to recognize the massive 
amounts of infrastructure that was constructed in a short period of 
                                                 
7 Heleno Claudio Fragoso and Nilo Batista, 84-85. 
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fifteen years.  Furthermore, most of this development coincided in a 
climate of extreme demographic growth, a tense political climate, 
hyperinflation, curbed civil liberties, and little support from the federal 
government.  Many of the urban development policies of this time period 
largely ignored any input from community and civic leaders; which 
exemplifies the “top-down” values of the technocratic planning culture of 
the 1960s. Furthermore, while a great deal of this infrastructure was 
envisioned to unite the city, in many ways it reinforced socio-spatial, 
cultural, and economic tensions among the city’s residents which in 
reality created even more disunity. After the fusion occurred in 1975, 
many of these tensions began to accelerate and manifest themselves in 
crime, violence, and the proliferation of favelas.   
The majority of the urban development projects for the city in the 
late 1970s and 1980s dulled in comparison to the ventures undertaken 
during the Guanabara years.  Many of the plans that were devised by 
Doxiadis and CEDUG, SURSAN, the DER-GB, CODESCO, and COHAB in 
the 1960s were heavily influential in the projects implemented by the city 
government during the 1990s.  Despite the shortcomings and “tunnel 
vision” of many of the urban planning projects of the 1960s, the 
initiatives formulated during the administrations of Carlos Lacerda and 
Negrão de Lima continue to serve as reference point for the current 
generation of planners and Cariocas who aspire to reform the city of Rio 






















Figure 7.4 Another View of the Disaster 
 
 















Figure 7.8   The Completed Elevado Paulo de Frontin with the Rio-Niterói Bridge 
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